FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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
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HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium and Vice-President of the Council; Secretary-General of NATO, 1957–61; three times Prime Minister of Belgium and four times previously Foreign Minister; President of the U.N. General Assembly, 1946 * * * *KAI-UWE VON HASSEL,* Minister of Defense of the German Federal Republic; former Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein; Deputy Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party * * * *BRIGADIER-GENERAL SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, II,* U.S. Marine Corps, ret., Research Fellow with the China Project of the Council on Foreign Relations; served in China and in the war in the Pacific; later Provost Marshal of North China; author of "Sun Tzu: The Art of War" and "The Battle of Guadalcanal" * * * *COLIN LEGUM,* African correspondent of *The Observer,* London; co-author of "South Africa: Crisis for the West," author of "Congo Disaster," "Must We Lose Africa?" and "Pan-Africanism" * * * *LESTER B. PEARSON,* Prime Minister of Canada; Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1948–57; President of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1952–53; author of "Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age" * * * *HANSON W. BALDWIN,* Military Editor of *The New York Times;* author of "The Price of Power," "Great Mistakes of the War," "World War I" and other works * * * *JOHN S. BADEAU,* Director of the Near and Middle East Institute, Columbia University; recently Ambassador to the U.A.R.; President of the American University in Cairo, 1945–53; author of "The Emergence of Modern Egypt" and "The Lands Between" * * * *HILGARD O'REILLY STERNBERG,* Professor of Geography, University of California, Berkeley; former head of the Geography Department, University of Brazil * * * *SELIG S. HARRISON,* correspondent of *The Washington Post* for South Asia since 1962; for seven years managing editor of *The New Republic;* in India for the Associated Press, 1951–54; author of "India, The Most Dangerous Decades" * * * *JOHN MICHAEL MONTIAS,* Professor of Economics, Yale University; author of "Central Planning in Poland" * * * *MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN,* Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and Assistant Professor of Economics at Wellesley College; Research Professor of the Brookings Institution, 1963–64; author of "Comparative Economic Systems: A Reader."

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 43 JANUARY 1965 No. 2

THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS

A NEW EFFORT TO BUILD EUROPE

By Paul-Henri Spaak

THE politics of Western Europe center around two great achievements—the Atlantic Alliance and the Common Market. At this point in time, one would be blind not to see that both are in danger. How could this have come about?

The Atlantic Alliance was concluded in Washington in 1948, born of the fear aroused among the Western democracies by Soviet imperialism, and particularly by its recent and spectacular demonstration in the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia. The signers aimed to defend the free world against possible Soviet aggression. They intended, in any event, to raise what they hoped would be an insurmountable barrier against any Soviet advance in Europe and North America.

The idea of a united Europe came back to life at a congress at The Hague in 1948, after a state of unconsciousness into which it had been plunged by fascism, Hitlerism, Communism and the Second World War. Its advocates (who included some of those who had signed the Washington treaty) aimed to lift Europe out of weakness to its former level of strength and influence, so that it might become a full-fledged partner of its great American ally.

There was no contradiction or conflict between the concept of the Atlantic Alliance and of the European alliance. Rising from its ruins, Europe rallied to both ideas, and—let it never be forgotten—found peace and prosperity.

How is it possible that a system which brought peace and prosperity can now be in danger? The answer is perfectly clear. The enemy we thought we had defeated raises his head once more, not yet strong enough to win but vigorous enough to cause serious trouble. The enemy is nationalism.

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Obviously, I do not mean to cast aspersions on a reasonable love for one's fatherland and its traditions, a legitimate reverence for the memory of great historical events, and, for that matter, a preference for certain features peculiar to one's own community. What I wish to condemn is an idea which is untenable in the twentieth century—the idea that individual peoples, no matter how strong, can solve by their own efforts alone the political, military and economic problems they encounter.

For 15 years collaboration and coöperation prevailed within the Atlantic Alliance and throughout the various attempts to organize Europe. Many realized that above individual and often selfish national interests there was a higher community interest, and that to it some sacrifices must be made. The time had not come for a world government, but it was indispensable to group together those who shared the same political views and had attained comparable standards of living.

During those years we hoped that we had made some progress on the road which some day, however distant, would lead to the unity of nations. Our twofold Atlantic and European experiment developed in breadth and depth. Both military integration and political consultation within the Atlantic Alliance and economic collaboration within Europe—the Little Europe of the Six, at any rate—were progressing satisfactorily, and much more rapidly than the most optimistic of us had dared hope.

Then came General de Gaulle. It implies no disrespect to the President of the French Republic to describe him as a stumbling-block. On the contrary, it is an acknowledgment that what is happening in the world cannot be explained without first analyzing the positions he takes and trying to understand his intentions —which means giving due recognition to the vast part he plays.

I should begin by noting that General de Gaulle did not sign either the Washington treaty or the Treaty of Rome. He was not in office when the Atlantic Alliance and the Common Market were formed, but he inherited both from the Fourth Republic. Now he does not much care for anything that does not bear his own stamp. Further, he does not care greatly for an alliance in which the United States, being the strongest partner and having been the most generous contributor to the common defense, necessarily plays a leading role. Nor does he have a fondness for the Common Market, an initial step toward an organized Europe, for in it he sees a first manifestation of supranational power.

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As early as 1958 he demanded that a basic change be made in the Atlantic Alliance by setting up a political triumvirate consisting of the United States, Great Britain and France. The United States and Great Britain rejected this proposal, wisely, because it would have been unacceptable to all the other members of the alliance. The consequences of that refusal are still being felt today.

General de Gaulle did not wish to oppose the Common Market as such because the financial and currency reforms successfully carried out by Mr. Pinay put France in a position where she did not have to take advantage of various exceptions in her favor, and more, allowed her to play a most important part in the new economic organization.

Within both organizations, nevertheless, he has opposed every development that might conceivably lead to integration. He considers the idea of integration to be wrong; he refuses to support it, and fights it in the name of nationalism. He rejects political and military integration within the Atlantic Alliance, for there, since France is not the strongest, France would not benefit by it. Perhaps, he would be less intransigent if integration were to be offered only to continental Europe, for then it might result in a French hegemony. And within the Common Market he will not have economic integration either, for it would mean—and here he is right to some extent—that the technicians would have more power than the politicians.

What we are witnessing today, then, is a struggle between these two opposing fundamental principles—collaboration leading to integration on the one hand, and nationalism on the other. From that struggle come our present troubles and difficulties.

They abound, both within NATO and within the Common Market. Make no mistake, they are all interrelated. Today, a purely military alliance is no longer conceivable. Peoples which might have to fight side by side in the future must think about helping each other in their daily life. The picture of a community effectively united for possible military operations but at the same time torn by political or economic conflicts is an illusion. The price of grain, which has been a major problem in the Common Market, is bound up with the success of the Kennedy Round, while the further development of NATO will depend on agreement or lack of it among the six countries of Little Europe. Lastly, the success or failure of the Multilateral Force will have direct repercussions on the organization of Europe.

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II

With a threat of crisis impending in the Europe of the Six, many people thought another attempt should be made at achieving European political unity. I was one of them, for a number of reasons. To begin with, the European Economic Community has been having increasingly heavy going. The community spirit is losing ground and the spirit of nationalism is gaining. Each government defends its positions passionately, indeed obstinately. No distinction is drawn any longer between what is essential and what is secondary. Hours, days and months are wasted in discussing unreal problems. With no one prepared to make concessions, it becomes more and more difficult to arrive at a compromise.

Secondly, there is anxiety over the mood prevailing in Germany. Nationalist tendencies are once again coming to the fore. The thing is contagious. If nationalism is good for France, why not for Germany? The argument is naïve, and there is no answer. But if French nationalism seems to me unfortunate, nationalism in Germany, the only European country which still has boundary problems, strikes me as dangerous. All reasonable Germans, in whose number I include Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder, believe that the only alternative to the rebirth of German nationalism is the development of the European idea. I think they are right, and that we must help them. For some time Mr. Erhard has been talking about a fresh attempt to achieve political unity in Europe. We should follow him.

Lastly, it is obvious that the idea of a united Europe, which is inherently dynamic, loses much of its force when it is seen to be marking time. Since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, nothing has been done except to develop the Common Market. Political Europe has made no advance whatever.

The authors of that Treaty said that they conceived of the economic community as only a stage—an important one certainly, but still only a stage—on the way to a politically united or even politically integrated Europe. They were convinced that by tightening the economic bonds the signatory states would be led step by step to unite in other ways. No doubt they were right, but only in the long run; and it is dangerous to leave things to historical processes.

Meantime, doubts have arisen. The idea of the Common Market having received wide backing, and industrialists having

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based their plans on certain assumptions about where it was leading, people now are beginning to wonder whether they were not mistaken. They hesitate; they refuse to commit themselves fully. It is time to give them renewed confidence by demonstrating some progress.

For all these reasons, a fresh attempt to achieve political unity in the Europe of the Six is now essential. But how is it to be made? On what basis would it have a chance of success? For an answer we must go back and consider the reasons for the failure of the Fouchet Plan in April 1962. That Plan was prepared largely on French initiative with a view to giving a new impetus to the idea of a politically united Europe. Although the intention was excellent, the methods for realizing it were unacceptable.

There are two major schools of thought in Europe on the subject of political union: the partisans of "l'Europe des Patries" —a Europe of separate nations—and the partisans of a supranational Europe.

For the former, the national being is of primary importance and must not be tampered with. All powers of decision must continue to rest with the national governments, and it is unthinkable that these should delegate any of their sovereignty to a supranational body, especially in the important matters of foreign policy and defense. In this view, consequently, it is enough to arrange that chiefs of state or ministers should meet at regular intervals, inform each other of their projects, discuss them and go home—each retaining full freedom of judgment and action. Anything that goes beyond this conception is an idle dream.

The partisans of a supranational Europe, on the contrary, claim that an international organization can function effectively only if it has a higher authority to guide it, if decisions are taken by the majority, and if the minority, as in all democratic organizations, is obligated to accept such decisions. They stress that a system of meetings which does not go beyond exchanges of information and discussion would be incomplete and ineffective, and that it is futile to speak of a united Europe in which each country continues to act exactly as it pleases, even on occasion against its partners' wishes.

The Fouchet Plan was based entirely on the Europe-of-Nations idea. It was the subject of long and arduous negotiations among the governments of Little Europe, but in April 1962 it ended in resounding failure. Three points in particular were discussed: the

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relationship between a united Europe and the Atlantic Alliance; the new organization's relationship to the Common Market; and the prospects for the future.

Most of the governments concerned demanded that there be clearly defined links between a united Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, and that faithful adherence to NATO should be strongly affirmed. They did not want the new organization to infringe on the rights of the European Commission; in particular, they insisted that all its prerogatives in economic affairs established by the Treaty of Rome remain intact. On those two points, compromise formulas were finally worked out, though with difficulty.

As regards future prospects, on the other hand, no compromise could be reached. Some countries which were able to accept arrangements that did not go beyond "l'Europe des Patries" as a first step felt unable to accept such a limited field of action permanently. They therefore asked for future guarantees; and when these were not forthcoming, the negotiations broke down.

In launching anew the idea of a politically united Europe, we cannot possibly ignore the lesson of those negotiations. If an attempt is to be made, as I believe it must, there will have to be a basis for compromise. What compromise? A fundamental reconciliation of the idea of "l'Europe des Patries" and the idea of a supranational Europe is today out of the question. It therefore appears impossible to conclude a final treaty now. However, it may well be possible to make an experiment of three, four or five years' duration and to be guided by its outcome. That is the new approach I have to offer.

In matters of substance, I feel that there is little chance of departing from the basic concept of the Fouchet Plan. It would not seem possible to go beyond regular meetings with ministers for purposes of information and discussion. Some advance could nevertheless be attempted—namely, to apply to the new political organization the results of our six years of experience in the Common Market.

No one familiar with that organization's work will deny the important and indeed often decisive part played in it by the European Commission. The fact that economic progress has been much more rapid than expected and that the groundwork has been laid for a common agricultural policy is due in large measure to the Commission, or at least to the constant dialogue between governments defending their national viewpoints and the Com-

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mission defending the interests of the community. Why not extend this successful experiment to the purely political sphere?

In the first stage, it should be possible to set up an organ composed of three members, with the main task of preparing the ground for the meetings of ministers, of carrying out any decisions taken and of drawing up, in the light of experience, a definitive treaty providing for a united Europe. This Committee of Three would have no power of decision; that would be retained entirely by the ministers. One of the principal features of the Europe-of-Nations concept would thus be safeguarded. On the other hand, the agreement to set up the Committee of Three would constitute recognition that there exists a community viewpoint which may be opposed to the national viewpoint, and that the solution of some of the problems arising out of that opposition may be found by means of the ensuing dialogue. This could be the basis for a compromise, whereby the parties would content themselves with a very modest immediate achievement, but whereby the community viewpoint would be recognized and the future left open.

Not long ago it seemed that a resumption of negotiations on the basis of such ideas could reasonably be expected. However, several recent speeches by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville and Premier Pompidou have put the whole problem in a new light. In their view, there are three prerequisites for any fresh attempt at a political unification of Europe. First of all, there must be a solution to the problem of the price of grain in the Common Market. That question settled, Europe can then make progress only if a European foreign policy is formulated, and if agreement is reached on a common system of defense, more particularly nuclear defense.

A question of diplomatic tactics now arises. What is the best reaction to these categorical French statements? Some, pretending not to understand, ignore them; they attempt to overcome the difficulty they present by looking away and by saying as little as possible about it, in the hope that it will solve itself. Others (I am of their number) feel that refusing to see facts does no one any good, and that they should be resolutely faced. In other words, there should be an early, open and complete confrontation.

Let us examine the French prerequisites, and see what can be done about them.

On the question of the price of grain, the French position has

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seemed to me basically justified, for two reasons. It is surely inconceivable that, with the Common Market developing in the industrial sector at a faster pace than foreseen, no way can be found to formulate and develop a common agricultural policy. Secondly, even though the agricultural provisions in the Treaty of Rome tend to be vague, the spirit of the Treaty certainly calls for parallel efforts in industry and in agriculture.

It should also be borne in mind that in January 1962 the six governments belonging to the Common Market decided that the grain price should be definitely set as of December 31, 1969, and that in the meantime the gaps between the prices in the various countries should be gradually reduced. Yet nothing was done about it in 1962, or in 1963, or so far in 1964. The French are entitled to demand that the commitment be met, and it now appears that it will be. Germany has indicated a willingness to lower its grain price and, though it may not wholly meet the French demand, compromise now seems within reach.

I am therefore confident that the "agricultural crisis" is on the way to being resolved. If I am proved wrong, the situation will be very serious, for all other European and Atlantic talks will become much more difficult, if not impossible. But on the basis of my optimistic hypothesis, let us turn to the remaining difficulties.

III

There is nearly always a hard core of logic in French positions. When the French maintain that there can be no united Europe unless it has a common foreign policy, and that a common foreign policy cannot exist so long as there are different or opposed European systems of defense, one must admit they are right. The question, then, is whether today the Europe of the Six can have a common foreign policy and reach agreement on the problems of nuclear defense.

Should there be a European foreign policy, and what should it be? The answer is simple. Yes, of course, a united Europe must have a common foreign policy. Secondly, that policy cannot be anti-American nor must it be such as to separate the Europe of the Six from the Anglo-Saxon world. If agreement cannot be reached on this proposition, further discussion is useless.

Personally, I believe that agreement *can* be reached. Those who have worked in recent years for a united Europe have never

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for a moment thought that the Europe which they wanted to restore to its place in the world, by endowing it with the strength to hold that place, should be a satellite of the United States. They wanted this new Europe to be a worthy partner of the United States, able to deal and negotiate on a footing of complete equality. Having said that, I think it is equally self-evident that the unity of the Western World must be maintained. None of the new problems with which the world is faced—neither the evolution of the Communist countries, nor the conflict between the Soviet Union and China, nor the growing political significance of the Asian and African countries, nor the fact that the United States no longer has a monopoly of nuclear weapons —justifies any weakening of Western solidarity.

At the moment, sincere agreement on the principle is enough. Since there is no question for the time being of a supranational authority, and since in the last analysis the governments retain their freedom of decision, there is no need for agreement on each and every issue that might possibly arise. Desirable as it is to reach agreement whenever possible, a degree of flexibility is none the less acceptable.

The problem of working out a common position on a system of nuclear defense is much more complicated, because the instinctive reactions of the different European countries vary a great deal, depending on their strength, their place in the world and their traditions. It would be foolish to expect France and Belgium to have the same reaction to an issue of this sort. France quite legitimately can refuse to place itself in certain situations to which Belgium would make no objection. Belgium can agree to the United States having a monopoly of nuclear power in the West; it can agree to having the nuclear defense of Europe entrusted to the United States; it does not ask to participate either in planning nuclear strategy or in putting the plans into operation. However, courses which are possible for a small nation are not necessarily so for a great nation.

The French seem not to rule out the possibility of an old-fashioned sort of war in Europe in which the aggressor can attain a considerable success without the United States making any nuclear response. This hypothesis seems to me untenable. I cannot foresee the Soviet Union launching an attack with conventional arms against Europe and leaving the United States free to choose the timing and form of its response. As things

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stand, it seems to me out of the question for the United States to let its armies in Europe be crushed without making use of the tremendous nuclear force which it has concentrated there.

However, what I consider right or wrong is irrelevant for the moment. I am trying to understand the French point of view, and I am convinced that General de Gaulle will never consent to France being dependent on the United States for nuclear defense. That is a fact which cannot be ignored.

In these circumstances, is it not possible to conceive of a system of Atlantic defense which would permit countries to withdraw their own nuclear forces in case of national necessity? Might not the same system which applies to conventional forces within NATO be extended to nuclear forces?

On the other hand, if it proved feasible to create an Atlantic system of atomic defense, plans for using it ought to be coördinated eventually with plans for using the nuclear forces which remained entirely American. In this way coöperation for the defense of Europe would become indispensable and certain great powers could be associated in working out the required nuclear strategy and in executing it.

Though I am opposed absolutely to a political directorate for the Atlantic Alliance, I would not hesitate to accept the idea of a nuclear directorate. The conception of an authority split among 15 governments which would try in a crisis to agree on the use of a nuclear striking force seems to me impractical. But it seems to me reasonable to take that course in associating the United States with the great European countries for the defense of Europe. Those who reject this procedure will not be able to prevent the spread of atomic weapons and the creation of national striking forces—certainly the worst of all possible solutions.

The Europe of the Six and NATO recognize the difficulties confronting them. The French position is clear. There is nothing to do but to grapple with the problems it raises, to study them in detail and at once. It is simply not true that problems solve themselves. But if we set to work at them with frankness and sincerity, and with a pinch of imagination, we can save the solidarity of the West and give Europe a chance to move forward toward unity.

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THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS

ORGANIZING WESTERN DEFENSE

By Kai-Uwe von Hassel

WHEN the Western European Union was founded, and when the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO, there existed a uniform political concept which was supported by all partners in the alliance. On it was based the strategic concept, which in turn was the basis for setting force requirements that were to be built up and maintained by all the members. In the course of the last few years, however, we have seen a growing divergence of opinion on the basic questions of our common defense and strategy. By the time President Kennedy took office, the concept which had been in effect up to that time—namely the principle of massive deterrence and, should it fail, of massive retaliation—was no longer considered by the United States to be credible. Strategy was adapted to the development of modern weapons technology and flexible response was made the official and binding American military doctrine.

After a decade, during which all American military effort had been centered around the nuclear potential, the consequence of the new doctrine was that conventional units and their weapons systems again came to be emphasized. At the same time, the airlift capability was sizably increased. With regard to nuclear weapons, the idea of the "second strike capability" became important, which meant the development and introduction in increasing degree of weapons that could still be employed effectively after the enemy had launched the first strike. The objective of these measures was to gain a wider political margin for the employment of these weapons.

Of course, the American attempt to make the new strategic doctrine the basic doctrine of NATO as a whole was not successful because a major member of the partnership objected. The result has been that the old concept is still officially accepted, even though most of the members of NATO no longer consider it binding. It was modified by the so-called "Athens Guidelines" and by the new Emergency Defense Plan of SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command, Europe). However, no formally approved new concept as yet exists. Hence it is a top priority task to work out a new strategic concept which will meet with the approval of all the member nations.

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II

Before turning specifically to the European situation, I must note, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that the Federal Republic of Germany is the only member nation which has assigned all its combat troops of all three services to NATO.

The reason is that for us a purely national war is completely out of the question. We have no national German operational command with a separate strategic concept. Our security is inseparably linked with the security of our allies. Thus we believe it is in the interest of all the NATO partners to do everything in their power to develop a common concept as rapidly as possible. Even though the national interests of each partner determine its security policy, the common interests of all partners will be decisive in this process. This is also the view of my French opposite number, Pierre Messmer, who very clearly underscored it in my talks with him in Paris not long ago. He was of the opinion, moreover, that a common concept could be found.

At the time I write, the third week in November, I do not suppose that European members of NATO would question the fact that, in view of the world situation, Western Europe can be effectively protected only by NATO, that is, only in the closest partnership with the United States. The importance of the military potential of Western Europe in any East-West conflict is undeniable. Since any war would be a catastrophe not only for Europe but for all the nations of the alliance, it is of the highest importance to see that the risk for the potential aggressor remains incalculable and that deterrence remains credible. The maintenance of that credibility in the atomic age calls logically for a system of graduated deterrence, since resort to a system of total nuclear defense, which would be tantamount to self-destruction, is not credible. Hence all levels of possible aggression must be matched with the appropriate means of defense. This means, so far as concerns the defense of Europe, in contrast to other parts of the world, that the atomic threshold must be very low, because Western Europe—considered as part of the whole NATO territory—is only a strategic bridgehead without depth which can neither accept loss of terrain nor diminution of its potential.

That is why the strategy of forward defense along the Iron Curtain, which SACEUR made official for NATO on September 1, 1963, is the essential prerequisite, not only for the Federal Re-

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public of Germany but for its European partners as well. This is a matter of life and death for my country. To regard the Federal Republic, or even a larger part of Western Europe, solely as a battlefield, which NATO forces would have to liberate afterward, would forecast the total destruction of Western Europe. This appears to me hardly a valid objective of defense policy.

The human and material sacrifices which are called for to maintain freedom—sacrifices made by the German people as well as by others—can be justified only if they result in keeping deterrence effective, and on the assumption that, should the deterrent fail, we can conduct our defense in such a way that a favorable outcome can be achieved within a very short period. The objective is to force the enemy to give up his idea of aggression by demonstrating that his only alternative will be willfully and deliberately to initiate escalation, which would be equivalent to his own self-destruction.

The concept of flexible response in Europe—both political and military—must not be interpreted to mean that the so-called atomic threshold can be raised unduly high, without reference to political considerations. Apart from the fact that this would lead the potential aggressor to think that he could calculate his risk, it would create a situation in which he could seize pawns for future negotiations.

In order to prevent this, atomic demolition mines, nuclear air defense weapons and, if need be, nuclear battlefield weapons must be made ready for employment in an early phase of a recognizable attack on Europe. Only in this way, as I see it, can a last determined warning be given the enemy without involving escalation as a consequence. Further supporting this view is the fact that a prolonged conventional war would lead rapidly to attrition of forces, jeopardize the operational readiness of the nuclear capability and thus rapidly shift the balance of power in favor of the enemy.

These ideas were the subject of discussions in Washington in the middle of November between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, and the Chief of the Federal Armed Forces Staff, General Trettner, as well as between Secretary McNamara and myself. It was particularly satisfactory to find that the views expressed by the two sides were the same in all essentials. This harmony is a valuable contribution toward reaching a NATO-wide agreement on the strategic concept.

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I should make clear, however, that we continue to draw one political and military consequence from the aforementioned principles—the necessity of integrating the NATO forces. And on this question there is some divergence of opinion within the alliance.

However, the evident necessity of further developing the Atlantic Alliance, of adapting it to changing political and military requirements, and of solving the complex problems that will be encountered in the course of that evolution, should not make us forget that the basic structure and core of the alliance are sound. No partner in the alliance is unaware of the necessity—in his own interests—of countering any aggression with all the means required to thwart it.

III

I believe that the projected Multilateral Force will play an essential part in the future planning of the alliance.

It will be remembered that SACEUR responded to the threat caused by the establishment of a belt of land-based medium-range ballistic missiles in the Soviet Union by deciding to build a similar missile belt on the NATO side. However, it has not proved possible, over a period of seven years, to implement this plan; nor does there seem to me any great likelihood that it can be realized in the foreseeable future. Apart from the fact that the weapon itself has not yet been developed, its deployment on European territory would cause major difficulties. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the project.

On the other hand, the Soviet M.R.B.M.s constitute an undeniable threat. Undeniable, also, is the interest of the non-nuclear West European partners of the alliance in obtaining a bigger say in nuclear strategy and targeting. They have good reason to fear that if nuclear weapons are employed they will be exposed to situations which they cannot foresee or fully comprehend, and with unknown consequences.

When we consider what forms of effective defense NATO could set against the Soviet M.R.B.M. belt, it seems clear that a sea-based M.R.B.M. system—*i.e.* the M.L.F.—could be created more easily than a land-based one. Equipped with Polaris missiles, the M.L.F. would form a new, primarily European component of the deterrent, and under a European command, *i.e.* under SACEUR, would be able to cover most of the targets that con-

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stitute a direct threat to Europe. My view is that this nuclear force should be tied—through the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command in Omaha—into the over-all nuclear potential of the United States. The targets in question are largely covered by SAC, which is not subordinate to SACEUR; but deterrence would doubtless be considerably increased by the M.L.F., as an essentially European-oriented force, and the defense preparedness of Europe would be made unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union.

The military effect of this integration will be valuable, by adding power to the deterrent. It will also indicate that the leading power of the alliance is making an effort to take into consideration European interests, while maintaining the doctrine of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—a doctrine, by the way, which should also be in the interest of the Soviet Union. In addition, it will be extremely valuable politically in increasing the close political ties with America which are vitally important to the security of Europe. I have followed closely the course of the M.L.F. working group negotiations in Paris. I still hope, as I write, that in spite of all political, military, personnel, financial and legal difficulties the project will end in bringing in as many European partners as possible, thus merging the United States and Europe into an inseparable community.

In my talks in the Pentagon, the M.L.F. was, of course, an item on the agenda, but just one item amongst others. I must make it unmistakably clear that the basic attitude of the Federal Government with respect to the M.L.F. has remained unchanged, *viz.* that the project is both militarily useful and politically extremely valuable. Obviously, however, its value will increase with the number of the nations participating. The United Kingdom has a new government, and I think it only logical that it should have what time it requires to make its decision. If the British should propose suggestions for modifying or amending the original plans, the rest of us in the alliance will have to discuss them and ultimately agree on a result which will be of the highest general benefit. It is the joint responsibility of all the NATO nations which joined the M.L.F. working group to work out the details. The decisions will be made there.

Let me make it quite clear that the M.L.F., as its name implies, must be a multilateral force, and not a bilateral one. It also has to be an Atlantic force, not a European one, since a European nuclear force could have a disintegrating effect on the Atlantic

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Alliance and would be bound to whittle down the United States engagement in Europe, to Europe's severe disadvantage. The necessary basis for a European nuclear force would be a politically united Europe; and even when such unity has been achieved, Europe must not allow herself to be isolated by the fact of possessing her own nuclear force, but must rather strengthen her standing by playing an active part in the strategy and in the nuclear weapons systems of the Atlantic Community.

IV

There is no member of NATO which is not deeply interested in achieving genuine disarmament. But the limits for disarmament or for measures to restrict armaments must be drawn so that the possibilities of Soviet aggression are reduced and not increased.

Now, no nation can have a greater interest in disarmament and in a détente than the Federal Republic of Germany. This is not just an empty phrase. Our government proved it through voluntary waivers in the nuclear field, by armament restrictions accepted under the W.E.U. Treaty, and by signing the partial test-ban agreement. But any measures for disarmament or détente must be carried out only on the basis that our security is maintained.

There is complete agreement in the alliance that the Soviet politico-ideological objective—Communist world domination—has remained unchanged, even though the methods and tactics to arrive at that objective have been altered and refined. We also agree that there is no reason to believe that the Soviets would not revert to the ways of force, or threats to use force, if they saw advantage in it. We are all aware that it is solely the Atlantic Alliance which bars that way to them.

Recent events in the Soviet Union have once again made clear how suddenly and unexpectedly changes are possible there. It thus is in the highest interest of all NATO members to see that "disarmament measures must not offer any advantage to either side"—as agreed upon by the United States and the U.S.S.R. in September 1961. This must remain as our unwavering doctrine. So far as can be seen at this time, the agreements reached and the statements made concerning the partial test ban, the direct line between Washington and Moscow, the renunciation of stationing nuclear weapons in outer space and the reduced produc-

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tion of fissionable material for military purposes have taken this principle into account.

The decisive obstacle to further negotiations is the Soviet refusal to accept any form of inspection and control on Soviet territory. We would not be justified in agreeing on disarmament measures with the Soviets on the basis of mere trust, or to make arrangements solely for the sake of arrangements. Let us remember the assurance of the Soviet Government that it would not conduct any nuclear tests as long as the United States did not, and that despite this the Kremlin covertly prepared a gigantic series of tests and included weapons of the very highest yield. This experience confirms the view that we can never renounce the requirement for a genuine and effective control system.

In spite of attempts by the Soviet Union to enlarge its area of influence in other continents, Europe remains of special importance in Soviet politico-military objectives. Everyone, and not only those who are living close to the Iron Curtain, should realize that the Kremlin considers coexistence and détente as means of destroying the protective belt which the West set up around the Communist bloc. However alluring the Soviet proposals and plans for regional armament reductions in Europe may be, and whatever the fascination of slogans like "military thinning-out," they are incompatible with the security of the alliance.

The military forces of the nations in Central Europe have never reached the strength that NATO considers necessary. Thus those which do exist for both deterrence and forward defense must be considered at best a minimum; they must remain available. Any military thinning-out would have quite different strategic consequences on the two sides of the Iron Curtain, and would change the balance of power to the detriment of the West. The various plans that have been proposed have been studied by expert military authorities down to the minutest details and the unequivocal conclusion is that to accept them would be tantamount to ending the defense capability of Western Europe. Any policy which takes the values of peace and freedom seriously will have to respect these facts.

I personally foresee a genuine chance for a détente in Central Europe only at such time as the Soviet Union changes its political objectives vis-à-vis Europe. It would be a fatal error to assume

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that the Kremlin has already given up its objectives simply because it, too, does not desire world war, and because the danger of a universal conflagration is dwindling. Correct though this reasoning may be, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that the Kremlin had given up its objective of world domination. Events such as the Cuban crisis and the developments on Cyprus, in the Congo and elsewhere have shown how rapidly politics can move to the brink of war; but apart from that, no one can refute the fact that it is solely the defense efforts of the West that bar the way of brute force in the furtherance of a militant ideology. The real nature of the so-called Soviet peace strategy is shown by the fact that the Russians continue, as in the past, to try to weaken the internal coherence of the alliance, to paralyze its defensive military power and to neutralize its capacity for deterrence. Effort at neutralization through the Rapacki and other plans—all in the name of easing tensions—is only another phase in Moscow's policy of sapping the Western defense system in Europe. An important aspect of these efforts is the Communist calumny against the Federal Republic on the score that it is *revanchist*—an absurd accusation considering the fact that our military forces are integrated in NATO. But by this means they hope to manœuvre Germany out of the Atlantic Alliance.

To my mind, the only convincing proof of a change in Soviet objectives vis-à-vis Europe would be for the U.S.S.R. finally to recognize in fact the right of self-determination, which it verbally supports, and to agree to let the German people be reunited in freedom. Only then would any meaningful arms limitation in Europe appear to be feasible; for only then would it afford objective and subjective security to all the nations concerned, the Soviet Union included.

We still can continue, however, to search for possible arrangements to reduce the danger of war. Because of its political and geographical situation, my country is perhaps more interested in this than any other. Negotiations with the Communist nations, in particular in Geneva, should be continued patiently and with determination, for which purpose I suggest that timely and detailed consultation among the Western allies is necessary. But let me repeat that efforts to arrive at a political détente are meaningful and offer prospects of success only if the causes of tensions have been eliminated beforehand. A simple reduction in armaments in itself cannot eliminate these tensions.

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COMMUNIST CHINA'S CAPACITY TO MAKE WAR

By Samuel B. Griffith, II

ONE hundred and sixty-six years ago, a political writer on the staff of a respected journal—the *Philadelphia Monthly Magazine*—devoted a column to reports of a civil war then said to be raging in China. This anonymous and unpretentious commentator, unlike some who follow the trade today, admitted that his analysis was almost entirely speculative, for he wrote: "Our knowledge of that nation is very little, and that little, too obscure to be trusted."

Since 1798 this situation has not improved much, if at all, and there is small prospect that it will. Thus, any lay estimate of current Communist Chinese military capabilities, or future potential, is likely at best to be but partially correct; at worst, flagrantly inaccurate. "It is extremely important," Mao Tse-tung wrote in "On Protracted War," to keep the enemy "in the dark about where and when our forces will attack." This, he goes on, creates a basis "for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. . . . In order to achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds."

Even those whose primary professional concern it is to assess Communist Chinese military capabilities have made egregious mistakes. History has qualified the late General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command in Korea, as an expert witness to the truth of this statement. At the Wake Island conference, on October 15, 1950, President Truman asked MacArthur what he thought of the Chinese capability to intervene in the Korean War. MacArthur was not perturbed. He viewed this as a remote contingency. He replied:

> Very little. Had they intervened in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand with hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100,000 to 200,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to P'yongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.[1]

[1] Roy E. Appleman, "U. S. Army in the Korean War," v. 1, "South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu." Washington, O.C.M.H., Department of the Army, 1961, p. 760.

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Forty-eight hours before that meeting on the peaceful mid-Pacific atoll, advance elements of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army of almost a quarter of a million men had begun to cross the Yalu, and to disappear, without a trace, in the rugged mountains of North Korea.

The secret concentration of overwhelming force in the zone of operations preceded attacks that brought the United Nations Command in Korea suddenly face to face with disaster. The episode should exert a salutary effect on all of us who in discussing the present and future capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.) are inclined to make dogmatic statements and to draw subjective—and therefore unwarranted—conclusions.

II

One need not labor the obvious fact that a nation's military potential in our age is a complex amalgam of many diverse elements. Among the most important are its size, terrain and environmental situation; its national philosophy; the number, character, standards of literacy and morale of its population; its natural resources; the capacity of its indigenous science, technology and industry to develop these resources advantageously; the quality of its leadership at directive levels; the viability of its alliances, including material and other assistance it receives from allies; its internal communications; its strategic doctrine; and the size, nature and quality of its armed forces, including the supporting establishments.

There is also the important question of how effectively a nation can, or will, apply its military power at various levels of violence in various areas, and under various conditions, in pursuit of policy objectives. For example, Peking demonstrated during the border fighting with India that it could very effectively deploy and support limited but still significant conventional land power beyond the Chinese borders under particular conditions. This it had previously demonstrated, on a much larger scale, in Korea.

China has the capability to intervene directly or indirectly in different ways in areas susceptible to so-called "National Liberation Wars." To date, it has not participated directly in such wars, even in peripheral areas, and whether it will do so will depend on a variety of circumstances, not all of which would be under its control. For instance, it is giving more than political support to the Pathet Lao, but this is principally indirect, via Hanoi.

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Although China will develop an atomic-nuclear capability, it has none at the moment, and it is a very long way indeed from an indigenous capability in strategic (ballistic missile) delivery systems other than those of crude types. Still, we must remember that the Chinese may consider such refined systems as those possessed by the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States to be both uneconomical and unnecessary.

The Chinese potential for the production of atomic bombs is believed by Ralph E. Lapp, a well known nuclear physicist, to be "less than one A-bomb per month." But even with this relatively limited capacity, China will in several years have available a respectable stock of weapons. With its obsolescent aircraft, it could deliver Hiroshima-type atomic bombs on almost any target on the continent of Asia, on Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines. Hanson Baldwin has pointed out (*New York Times,* October 26, 1964) that while this capability presents no challenge now to the continental United States it does "pose an imminent threat" to our allies in Asia, and its existence "postulates major political and psychological problems."

Several other fundamental factors are germane to any assessment of Peking's present and future military potential. One of these is that the régime is now, and for a number of years will be, faced with many hard choices. The leadership some time ago discovered that modern arms and equipment are extremely expensive and, in an economy of scarcity, demand a disproportionate share of resources required to create and operate a flexible and versatile base for heavy industry and to speed the technical revolution in agriculture, upon which the creation of this base essentially depends.

However, one of the features of a controlled economy is the ease with which it can swing resources and support into any selected field. Central control of over-all production strategy in China is popularized under the slogan "The entire nation is a chessboard," or a "game of chess"—"*Ch'uan kuo i p'an ch'i.*" Thus, during the past two years, the Chinese have thrown resources into enlarging the chemical fertilizer industry, as well as into synthetics, petroleum extraction and refining. It would appear that in, say, ten years' time, this principle could be applied to the development of short-range and even medium-range missiles, should the leadership feel the need to be paramount. But, should they make this decision, they could achieve their aims

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only by slighting productive sectors of an economy which in many respects will still be primitive, and at the expense of modernizing conventional forces. There is just not enough cake to go around.

In sum, although some factors in the amalgam of China's military potential can be broadly assessed with reasonable accuracy, we can make no objective assessment of others. The régime has not been remarkable for the consistency of its domestic economic policies, and this alone makes projections of future development of the defense industrial base difficult if not impossible. Otherwise, our knowledge is either sparse or nonexistent, for information and statistics directly relating to military matters are not published. Thus we can at best hope to make approximations; at worst, surmises which may be wildly inaccurate.

But it is no speculation that China is a formidable land power relative to those nations, including the Soviet Union, with which it has common borders. With presently mobilized manpower, it could, if it wished, literally saturate Nepal, the Northeast Frontier Area, Bhutan, Sikkim, Burma, Laos or Thailand, threaten South Korea, and hold a club raised in the direction of the offshore islands, Taiwan, India and Japan.

III

China's millions, frequently cited as an element of its potential power, are in fact a serious source of weakness, and if the population increases in the next 20 years at the rate demographers believe it has in the past 10 or 15—that is, at least 12,000,000 annually—this weakness could easily become critical. True, there are empty spaces in the hinterlands of Tibet and Central Asia which are now being peopled by Han Chinese sent from overcrowded cities and farm villages. But vast areas of these territories are inhospitable, and mere displacement of people to subsistence areas is no more than a temporary solution.

National morale depends to a great degree on the ability of the commodity and consumer goods section of the controlled economy to meet *minimum* demands levied against them by an exploding population. No one denies that the Chinese are ingenious and industrious, but, unless the ratio of population to resources is stringently manipulated, they are going to have to run very fast indeed to stay in the same place in terms of food, clothing, housing, public health, education, transportation and communications. Many amenities we take for granted will be scarce, if

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available at all. But morale is neither produced nor destroyed by gadgetry.

Unrestricted access to abundant supplies of iron ore, coal, petroleum and a variety of metals and minerals is an *a priori* requirement for any nation which aspires, as China does, to get into the great-power club. Lacking them, there is no possibility of creating the industrial base which in the contemporary world underlies the structure of military power. It appears now that China is well endowed with these primary resources. However, all are not found in areas which permit rapid and efficient exploitation. Sinkiang is reported rich in oil and nonferrous metals. But Sinkiang is a long, long way from anywhere. Better prospects are the fields in the Kansu "panhandle."

At present, China can by no means meet its minimum basic annual requirements in such fundamental items as machine tools, alloy steels, electronics, agricultural machinery, synthetic rubber, extracting equipment, petroleum products, chemicals, turbines, generators, motors, electrical transmission and control equipment, precision instruments, road-building machines, tractors, heavy-duty trucks, automatic switching and signaling equipment, synthetics in general, computers, diesel engines and electric locomotives. It can assemble, but it cannot make, either jet engines or airframes on a production basis. Jet engines, airframes and the electrical and hydraulic equipment—to say nothing of the navigational, fire-control instrumentation and weaponry which modern combat aircraft require—cannot be produced by "back-yard" enterprises, even if the catalyst is "the glorious thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung."

Thus, although the Chinese have registered significant advances on a broad front embracing electrical, hydraulic, mechanical and chemical engineering, electronics and metallurgy, their progress, when projected against fundamental requirements, is not particularly remarkable. The picture of scientific, technological and industrial development during the last 15 years is an extremely uneven one. In many areas, the Communist Party established unrealistic goals; in others, political dogmatism has interfered. Possibly the single most important lack has been trained scientists and technical personnel. Naturally the departure of the Russians accentuated this particular aspect of the Great Slide Backward, from which the Chinese economy is only now beginning to recover.

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The party is well aware of the deficiency in personnel, and is doing everything within its power to remedy it. I think it reasonable to estimate that as of 1975 China will have a respectable corps of trained scientists and qualified engineers. Scientists of international repute are today numbered in scores only. In 10 to 15 years they may be numbered in the hundreds, and engineers and other well qualified technicians in the thousands. Major educational emphasis is being placed in these specific areas.

IV

Mao Tse-tung wrote: "Once man has eliminated capitalism he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again know war."

But this Utopia can be achieved only by force of arms: the Chinese leadership believes, as an article of faith, that struggle —and they specify *violent* and *mortal* struggle—is inevitable as long as "class society" exists. There is a corollary: it is the sacred duty of all good Communists—and particularly Chinese Communists—to hasten the demise of the competing society by whatever means possible, including war.

A "just" war is by definition any which contributes to this end. China, then, may wage "just" wars in support of claims it unilaterally defines as "legitimate." It did so to enforce its claims along the borders of India. It has "rightful" claims, listed by Mao Tse-tung, in other peripheral areas. At one time or another he has named these as Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, Outer Mongolia, Hong Kong, Macao and the former tributary states of Southeast Asia (less Thailand).

If other and less delicate means fail, the ultimate instrument available to enforce these claims is the People's Liberation Army, a force of 2,700,000 including the ground forces, Air Force, Navy and Border Guards. Headquarters, P.L.A., no longer exercises command over the People's Armed Police (estimated at about 500,000). This force is now controlled by the Ministry of Internal Security. The over-all figure, 2.7 million, is derived from the secret "Liberation Army Work Bulletins" acquired by the U. S. Government, and may be deemed reliable.

Policy control and supreme directive authority in all important matters is vested in the Military Affairs Committee of the Central

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Executive Committee of the Party, frequently designated by the term "Central Authorities." It appears that Marshal Lin Piao, Minister of National Defense, is concurrently Chairman of the M.A.C., which reports directly to the Chairman of the Party, Mao Tse-tung.

The nation is divided into 13 military regions, of which three —Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet—are "Direct Control" regions. The senior officer in each region commands the armed forces assigned thereto, as well as the militia. Regions which include two or more provinces are further divided into "Districts," the boundaries of which coincide with provincial boundaries. There are 23 such "Districts."

I do not think anyone questions either the professional competence of the superior commanders or their dedication to the party. How well versed they are in application of combined arms has not really been tested. However, they are imaginative and meticulous planners. In Korea, their response to battle situations suggested that they were less intellectually flexible than we. This, if still true, is of course a serious weakness.

The bulk of P.L.A. manpower (2,000,000) is believed to be assigned to approximately 40 field armies, each basically consisting of three infantry divisions. A Chinese field army cannot be equated with a U.S. corps, which packs greater fire power and is equipped with extremely flexible and efficient communications. (Parenthetically, estimates of the number of 11,000–12,000-man infantry divisions range from 105 to 154.)

In respect to modern, standardized infantry weapons—*i.e.* automatic rifles, submachine guns and "burp" guns, light and heavy machine guns, light and medium (60 mm., 82 mm. and 122 mm.) mortars; 90 mm. rocket launchers; recoilless rifles (57 mm. and 75 mm.), and light and medium artillery (all of which are being produced by the Chinese)—the Army is adequately equipped. Major shortages exist, however, in heavy and self-propelled artillery, trucks and other military vehicles, heavy engineer equipment and tanks, other than the obsolete T-34. Some of these shortages were indicated in Work Bulletins. Others are inferred from Chinese "shopping lists" made available to foreign firms and governments anxious to trade.

The rocket and short-range missile picture is confused to say the least, but one must presume that since 1961, when Work Bulletins reveal at least one failure to attack a Nationalist recon-

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naissance plane flying over Peking, the Chinese have been working energetically on air-to-air, short-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air rockets and missiles. The Russians are reported to have given the Chinese some rockets—precisely what sort was not made clear by the source, which was Mr. Khrushchev. Another critical sector, and one to which attention is also being paid, is that of strategic and tactical electronic communications, and radar. Here the Chinese are probably at the stage that Western armies, navies and air forces were in 1941–1942.

A major impediment to efficient operations is the scarcity and low quality of technical personnel. One finds constant reference to this in the Work Bulletins. The complaints focus on poor maintenance of aircraft, trucks and ships, due both to inexperience and carelessness of personnel, and to a critical shortage of spare parts. Accident rates in all these services as of 1960–1961 were high.

The Army's tactical mobility is excellent, but its strategic mobility is of a low order. Airlift capabilities, even if all civil transport planes were employed, are meager, and limited to lift of personnel with individual arms and light infantry weapons. Some estimates set the maximum airlift capability at two battalions. North to south rail communications are reasonably good but lateral lines are few. Railway bottlenecks are vulnerable to interdiction from the air or by sabotage. There is no such thing as a modern highway system, and even if one existed the P.L.A. would be unable to make full use of it because of a most critical shortage of automotive equipment.

In 1961, Wang Shou-tao, Minister of Communications, in a frank discussion of transport problems, observed that one-half the length of Chinese highways could not be used in rainy weather. At the time—and there has been very little change since—practically all short-haul rural transport was accomplished by animal-drawn carts, human carriers, wheelbarrows, donkeys, camels, and on lakes, rivers and canals by animal and man-pulled barges, sail and motorized junks.

A word of caution is perhaps in order here. In each military region, there no doubt are one or more fully motorized élite divisions capable of fairly rapid movement, even during hours of darkness. The Chinese have on occasion deployed troops to the southeast coastal areas with considerable speed. In Korea, under extremely adverse conditions of both weather and terrain, the

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troops displayed an unexcelled capability for movement. Last year, emphasis in training was devoted to night marching, and the high standards set—40 miles with full equipment—indicate that major reliance for speedy tactical movement is still, as it was in Korea, placed on the soldier's legs.

Today the Air Force numbers about 2,600 aircraft of which some 2,000 are jets, approximately 1,600 of them MIG 15s and 17s. The remainder are light and medium bombers (of which about 400 are subsonic jet types), trainers, helicopters and a few transports. Sixty to eighty MIG 19s are reported, but no MIG 21s. A small naval air arm is included.

As of 1963, jet pilots were averaging 8–10 hours a month as compared to the 20 hours that the air forces of the United States, Japan and Nationalist China consider the minimum necessary to maintain all-weather pilot proficiency. In 1961 an uncertain percentage of combat aircraft were grounded at all times because of lack of fuel and shortage of spare parts. Work Bulletins reveal that operational accident rates were high, and that pilots were forced to do much of their "training" on the ground. The figures on pilot hours can be misleading, because the Air Force can and probably does "peak" selected squadrons periodically. By reducing flying time for older, more experienced pilots, headquarters can schedule more time for younger pilots.

Rotation of units into and out of the southeastern coastal land, with "alert" squadrons getting more than average time for intercept and ground-attack training, instrument flying, gunnery and so on, could help maintain proficiency of combat pilots at a higher level than the figures suggest. (Incidentally, when the Communists tangled with the Nationalists over the Taiwan Straits in 1958, the kill ratio was 16 to 1 in favor of the latter, and the majority of Nationalists' kills were made before they were equipped with "Sidewinders.")

In order to keep their obsolete combat aircraft flying, the Chinese must resort to cannibalization—at least until they can produce high quality spare parts or procure them from outside sources. Their interest in buying machine tools and machine tool-making plants reflects these critical shortages. Reëquipment of the Air Force with modern aircraft of all types appears to be a pressing problem.

Jet fuel remains in critical short supply. Although the Chinese have recently announced "basic self-sufficiency" in oil require-

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ments, we may view the claim skeptically. What they may have achieved is a "basic self-sufficiency" in crude petroleum at the source. This is an important first step. But there are many obstacles to be overcome before fuel in adequate quantities can be delivered to consumers. And here again they are faced with competing claims to limited resources. The design and construction of refineries and rectification plants and the creation of facilities for transportation, storage and handling of volatile jet fuels present a variety of complicated technical and engineering problems, to say nothing of a major investment of skills, materials and capital.

In sum, the combat capability of the Air Force—even in defense of the homeland—is low, and there is little chance that it will improve much in the immediate future unless massive aid from Russia were to be forthcoming. At present, the Air Force could not conduct sustained offensive operations in peripheral areas if there were any sort of opposition by high performance aircraft. In fact, there is little reason to suspect that at present it could put up an effective defense against anything but small-scale, local air attacks.

The Chinese Navy consists basically of submarines and coastal patrol craft. The exact number of long-range (9,000 miles) submarines is not known, but is believed to be about 20. Some of these (W-class) could be fitted for short-range (250–400 miles) missiles. There is a possibility that some have been modified to carry one or two such missiles. With atomic or nuclear warheads for these, the submarine force could at some future date pose a substantial terror threat to cities on the West Coast of the United States. The Navy can lay coastal mines, and its high-speed motor torpedo boats give it a capability for attacking ships which enter coastal waters. The Navy's amphibious capability, specifically against Taiwan, is primitive. The picture conjured up of thousands of junks crossing the Strait is totally unrealistic, given an effective Nationalist Air Force. And today the Nationalist Air Force is effective, as the Communists are well aware.

The P.L.A. is unique in several other respects that deserve mention. First, it assists in agricultural and industrial production, in road and railroad building, in hydraulic projects ranging all the way from construction of dams, levees and canals to local irrigation projects. The P.L.A. is a ready, disciplined, working force that can be thrown into any emergency project. It grows

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a high percentage of the cereals it consumes, raises its own hogs, chickens and ducks, and where conditions permit, augments its rations by hunting and fishing. It also manufactures its own uniforms, shoes, blankets and bedding, builds its barracks and other facilities, and maintains all its installations.

We might wonder when the P.L.A. finds time to train. This is apparently one of the questions which worried Marshal P'eng Teh-huai and his Chief of Staff, General Huang K'o-ch'eng. Unfortunately for them, they apparently wondered out loud.

Two important adjuncts to the P.L.A. are the militia and the People's Armed Police. The militia has been drastically reduced in size, purged, reorganized and "remolded" during the past three years. Recent reports are to the effect that it is again being expanded. The "Every Man a Soldier" movement was launched in 1958 when the Great Leap began, and the party found it necessary in the interest of increased production to regiment the rural population. The reason given for this radical policy was that the American "imperialists," allied with the Chiang Kai-shek "bandits," threatened the Fatherland.

Obviously, the militia provided the party with a built-in mechanism for disciplining, controlling and indoctrinating the masses. Considerable experience had been gained during the 1930s and '40s, when the party organized militia to extend and deepen its control in every village and county under its jurisdiction, and a clandestine militia in areas where its administrative fiat was extra-legal. The "Every Man a Soldier" movement thus seemed to party leaders a perfect instrument in the campaign to collectivize and martialize the entire nation.

But in 1960 the party discovered to its horror that its militia system was simply not functioning. In not a few areas the organization existed only on paper. A number of peasants queried by investigators did not know whether or not they were members. Work Bulletins cite several instances of militiamen who stole weapons and became bandits. Obviously, radical measures had to be taken, and as a consequence of the sorry state of affairs the party completely reorganized the militia.

At least until very recently, all youths not conscripted by the P.L.A. automatically entered the basic militia (*chi kan min ping*). All demobilized servicemen are automatically fed into it. All male students in technical schools and colleges are members of local basic militia companies or battalions. In the cities, all bank em-

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ployees, railway workers, members of the governmental bureaucracy, etc., under the age of 26, are members of functionally organized basic militia units. Apparently, particular attention has been paid to training and indoctrinating militiamen in the southern coastal belt.

The P.L.A. exercises command over the militia, is responsible for its training and for custody of weapons. Supervision of the militia, while no doubt a burden, pays the P.L.A. direct dividends in terms of the quality of conscripts, who now enter the armed forces for the required three years equipped with at least a basic knowledge of infantry weapons, as well as an ability to adjust rapidly to service life.

Until August 1958, public security forces were under P.L.A. command. Since that time they have been responsible to party control. Very little information is available relative to their organization and equipment. One would be safe to assume that their personnel are specially selected, well equipped with individual and team weapons, and entirely reliable. Estimates of strength vary from a low of 185,000 to a high of 700,000.

V

If the population at large is subjected to surveillance, close control and constant indoctrination, we might assume that even more stringent measures are taken to ensure that the Chinese People's Liberation Army thinks correct thoughts and marches unswervingly under the Great Red Banner of Comrade Mao Tse-tung. If so, we would be entirely correct. The mystique of the army is unique. It was well summarized in the September 7, 1962, issue of *China News Analysis,* a weekly Hong Kong newsletter:

> A communist army, certainly the army of China, is run in a very different way from the "capitalist" armies, at least as they were before psychoanalysis, unfortunately, was applied to the life of soldiers. In the good old days the sergeant shouted at the top of his voice, and all obeyed; the sergeant was not much interested in knowing your *Weltanschaung,* or whether you had one. In the Liberation Army things are different; at the company level, and it is there that human beings are encountered, the real commander is not the commander of the company; he is the political guide, a comrade whose curiosity has no limits. He wants to know, it is his duty to know, not only what you do but—and primarily—what you think, whether you think the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. It is his business to see to it that you do.
>
> He is not alone in his job. He is helped by men called "kanpu," cadres, who are, or should be, specialised in the job; but all others must give a helping

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hand. Indeed everybody, officer and soldier, must help everybody else to think the thoughts of Chairman Mao and report it if someone has kept a little private ownership in a corner of his mind. That would be a dangerous thing. A general of high authority declared that such things must be detected at their first appearance, before the evil is done; it is a kind of mine-detecting work, in the minds of men.

In October and November 1961, after a detailed country-wide investigation of P.L.A. units at all levels, the General Political Department issued a series of directives designed to correct the ideological situation in the armed forces and to ensure predominance of the party.

This emphasis is consistent with the party's views of the correct nature of the political-military relation. Many years ago Mao laid down the basic guidelines for these views. "The Party commands the gun; the gun will never command the Party," and "In war, man, not material, is decisive." We find these themes echoed constantly by members of the hierarchy.

Here, for instance, is General Hsiao Hua, Deputy Director of the General Political Department, P.L.A., in an address to the Army's "Political Work Conference" on February 14, 1963:

Although the role of weapons and technical equipment has become more important in modern warfare, man—not materials—is the determining factor in war. In the end, victory or defeat in combat depends on the courage of man, his awareness, and his willingness to sacrifice.

The decisions of the Military Affairs Committee pointed out that while the material atom bomb is very important, the atom bomb of the spirit is even more important.

A revolutionary army is not afraid of the enemy, no matter how powerful he is. It is not afraid of any weapon, no matter how strong it is. What a revolutionary army is really afraid of is political backwardness, isolation from the people, and loss of determination to fight.

Mao Tse-tung has taught us that politics is the commander and the soul. If our political and ideological work is carried out well, then other activities will fall into their proper places. Therefore, to develop a force with strong combat powers, it is first necessary for the cadres to profoundly learn the thinking of Comrade Mao on people's war—and to be guided by the thinking of Comrade Mao in all activities. The most basic tasks in political-ideological work are to raise the great Red Banner of Mao's thought, to use this thought to arm the combat commanders, to have everyone study his writings, work according to his directions, and become a good soldier of Mao Tse-tung. . . .

The question is: Are the tasks summarized in the directives, and outlined by Comrade General Hsiao Hua, being successfully accomplished? I venture to say they are. During the last three years, repeated ideological "remolding" campaigns

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have no doubt located and weeded out the "remnant bourgeois" and "lurking counter-revolutionary elements" of the officer and non-commissioned officer groups, together with "Russified" officers, followers of former Defense Minister Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, and other dissidents and malcontents.

The control postulated by the Military Affairs Committee is comprehensive. It is wide and deep; vertical and horizontal. Activists in platoons, squads, sections, gun crews, air crews—*i.e.* at the very lowest levels in the armed forces—are alert to discover signs of "wrong thoughts." Should these be discovered, or indeed imagined, to exist, remolding is in order.

A good example of how the party operates on a selected group is provided by the *Hsia Lien Tang Ping* ("Go down to the companies and soldiers") campaign as applied to the officer corps between 1959 and 1962. During this operation, which involved every officer from Lin Piao down to the most junior lieutenant, officers served in the ranks for stated periods and performed every menial task, including cleaning spittoons and lavatories, washing dishes, policing barracks and grounds, and so on. The purpose of this was stated by the party to be to ensure the "unity" of officers and enlisted men. Possibly. But the punitive aspect of the campaign cannot be overlooked. Undoubtedly some officers objected to this sort of remolding. If they did so vocally, they are no longer officers. As one does not now hear anything of the *Hsia Lien* movement, it may be assumed that this rite of purification was consummated.

Several other mechanisms are used in the remolding process. Possibly the best known of them is the "criticism" meeting. Here officers and soldiers are encouraged to reveal publicly their innermost thoughts and confess their ideological shortcomings to the group. "Before I read and studied the works of Chairman Mao, I was arrogant and bureaucratic and treated the soldiers in my platoon too harshly. But now that I have studied our revered Chairman's inspirational and illuminating essays, I am greatly enlightened." Etc., etc.

Another favored type of mental and emotional therapy is the "recollection of past bitterness, contemplation of present sweetness" meeting. At these gatherings, which are essentially "hate-meetings," the soldiers are encouraged to work themselves into a state bordering on hysteria as older men recount the outrages perpetrated before 1949 by landlords, merchants, other bourgeois

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elements and imperialists. On this subject the Work Bulletins state that the cadres should not "enforce" mass weeping! The clear inference is that paroxysms of enraged grief should be encouraged, but not demanded. After the wailing sessions, the soldiers reflect (aloud of course) on "present sweetness."

A third device currently in favor in the P.L.A. is the "emulation" campaign. Such campaigns were common enough in agriculture and industry, but were not applied to the armed forces until 1962. Here a particular individual or unit (some no doubt fictitious—their reported virtues and accomplishments are really unbelievable) is selected as a model of frugality, industry, "loving the people," "loving the party," or studying the works of Chairman Mao. When an emulation campaign is launched, all stops are pulled. One of the purposes of these various campaigns is to keep the revolutionary fervor of the soldiers at a high level. We see in press reports many references to the necessity for the P.L.A. to maintain the revolutionary élan which distinguished the Eighth Route Army.

Still another mechanism which can be manipulated by the party to ensure a high level of ideological commitment is the conscription process. Since 1959 the party has been much more selective than it was previously. To induct 750,000 young men a year (the current rate), the P.L.A. need only choose one from every seven or eight of the approximately 6,000,000 young men who reach the age of 18 each year. The party is thus able to ensure, during the annual draft, that only ideologically reliable youngsters with untainted family backgrounds are taken. Additionally, quite rigid mental, physical and emotional standards can be applied to them, as to officer aspirants.

For these reasons, it is not realistic to assume a crisis of morale in the P.L.A. or to entertain the hope that the armed forces, or really significant elements of them, will prove disloyal to the party. On Taiwan now it is an article of faith that the P.L.A. is on the verge of disintegration. This I believe to be wishful thinking. There may be schisms in the command hierarchy in the future. There may be occasional defectors. But the notion that the armed forces harbor important anti-party elements is illusory. The P.L.A., or the People's Armed Police, might be the decisive factor should there be a split in the hierarchy after the death of Mao. But that the P.L.A. could act independently to deprive the party of control of the state apparatus appears an extremely

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remote possibility indeed. If the P.L.A. were not now considered entirely "safe" we should not have it held up, which it is at present, as a model worthy of emulation on a national scale. The Chinese people today are constantly adjured: "Learn from the P.L.A.!" Learn what? Frugality, industry, implicit obedience, love of the party, reverence for Chairman Mao.

Work Bulletins reveal that the quality of leadership at lower levels has been a source of concern. Very few officers below the rank of lieutenant-colonel—that is, below battalion commander—have actually participated in combat. Hence the present emphasis on schooling and training. Politics has not taken a back seat, but has been considerably deëmphasized. The P.L.A. operates an elaborate graded school system, and there is no reason to believe that the officer corps is not rapidly gaining professional competence. The substantive question is to what degree, if any, pervasive party control affects the morale and operational flexibility of the armed forces. Certainly, in combat, situations will frequently arise in which military and political commanders find themselves deadlocked.

Theory holds that in a combat "emergency" the military commanders' view prevails. In all conditions other than "emergency," differing points of view should be presented to the next higher echelon for resolution. We know, in fact, that in Korea political officers and their military counterparts at low echelons frequently did reach just such an impasse, with the result that critical decisions were often not taken when they should have been. For instance, General Mark Clark refers to this: ". . . The system resulted in a weakness in military leadership at lower levels, and forced the Chinese to sacrifice flexibility in their operations. Individual initiative during action was rare in the Chinese Army."

This lack of flexibility at platoon, company and battalion levels was noticed by U.S. Marine officers and documented in official reports. It is true that the Chinese apparently took steps to correct the situation, but no evidence is available to me as to what, precisely, the measures were. Nor is there the slightest evidence of lack of initiative on the part of lower commanders during the Sino-Indian fighting. Indeed, the contrary seems to be the case.

Certainly, there seems to be no doubt in the minds of the top leaders that the system is effective both in peace and war, and that

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it is a decisive factor in promoting and maintaining very high standards of loyalty, morale and discipline.

VI

China's capability for sustained conventional action on a major scale outside its own borders is poor. Its present military impotence stems largely from the stoppage of Soviet aid, as a result of which for the last five years it has been deprived of the military hardware, technical assistance and professional advice which was essential if a balanced defense establishment were to be created. Still, when appraising possible Communist military actions we must not, as Mao says, take "a purely military viewpoint," but must relate them to the contexts of domestic and external situations. Should the party feel that national morale needs a massive injection, the leadership might tie renewed intensive bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu to a xenophobic anti-U.S. campaign, or it might so provoke the Indians that another "self-defense counter-attack" would be in order.

Today, the P.L.A. does not have even a primitive capability for operations involving combined land, sea and air arms. In the ground forces, emphasis in training during the past few years has apparently been directed to the individual, to squads and to companies, with special attention given to night marches, infiltration, night fighting and techniques of close combat. One may conjecture that regimental and divisional manœuvres involving close coördination of the infantry-tank-air-artillery team are confined to élite units, if indeed they are held at all, which I doubt. A campaign to conserve fuel oil, coal, electric power and materials of all descriptions—including ragged garments and soles of shoes—has been applied to the armed forces across the board, and it is most unlikely that the party would encourage the P.L.A. to conduct expensive live-firing exercises on the scale required to achieve battle proficiency when so many other requirements cannot be met. However, small-unit training has distinct relevance to situations which may develop in Southeast Asia.

China's geographical position is such that it can attack her avowed enemy, the United States, only indirectly in South Korea. That it would provoke conventional hostilities in this quarter is no more than a remote contingency, but cannot be dismissed completely. China might react here to pressures in other areas, or it might stir up trouble along the 38th parallel as a distraction

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operation. In the context of the split with Russia, unilateral action in Korea would apparently constitute an unacceptable risk. On the other hand, such an action might be a deliberate catalytic attempt designed to involve the Russians, and so precipitate a general war from which the Chinese feel they stand to gain.

Conventional forces could be used in Southeast Asia, but again the risk would be great. In that area the United States and its allies enjoy incomparably more strategic and tactical flexibility, and thus many more options than would be available to the Chinese, who would additionally be faced with staggering logistic problems. Too, China's opponents, with carrier aircraft, highly mobile amphibious striking power, and a significant airlift capability, could strike targets of their choice along the southeast Chinese coast, or in other rear areas. The fear of a major Nationalist landing on the southeast coast, or on Hainan, would be a further, and perhaps decisive, deterrent to conventional adventurism to the south.

Military action to recover Mongolia—which Mao has claimed to be Chinese territory—seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Sedition, subversion and support of other treasonable activities would no doubt be her policy in any attempt to influence and gradually assimilate this area. The Russians are, however, quite as skilled in these forms of activity as the Chinese. The same applies to Sinkiang, where there is no well-defined natural boundary, and where until fairly recently there was a constant ebb and flow across relatively open borders.

The Chinese could take over Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Assam should they wish to do so. Troop strength in the Tibetan area amounts to five or six acclimated, well-equipped mountain divisions, plus some separate task groups of regimental size. Over-all strength is possibly 160,000.

India can by no means match Chinese capabilities for action in the Himalayan states. It may be able to hold present precarious positions in Ladakh, but I doubt if it can regain territory already lost. Here the controlling factor for both sides is supply, and while the Indians are rapidly improving their capabilities for defense, the Chinese have been similarly engaged. The situation there appears to be a stalemate, which will probably persist for some years. There is no reason why the Chinese would be particularly interested in physically occupying Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. And, in any case, it would not be fear of India which

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would discourage the Chinese from committing the P.L.A. there in furtherance of imperial ambitions.

China's capabilities for defense against conventional attack are of a different order entirely. In these circumstances, Mao's theories of nation-wide and protracted war would be applied. The vastness of China, and, with the exception of Manchuria and the northern provinces, the nature of its terrain, rules out any attempt to conquer it by conventional means.

Chinese capabilities in the paramilitary field—the entire spectrum of insurgency, of which guerrilla warfare is but a part—are high, particularly in Southeast Asia. With a relatively slight investment of resources, and at very little risk, it stands to receive a disproportionate return. China can easily exfiltrate selected young men and women for intensive political indoctrination and training as propagandists, organizers, terrorists, saboteurs and guerrillas. These agents can then be brought back as nuclei for cells. Several such training centers are said to be in Yunnan. These reports are probably correct; the procedure is a logical one, for Southeast Asia provides a target area suitable in all respects for the application of Mao's theories of protracted insurgent war.

One may suspect that when Chinese troops pulled out of the Northeast Frontier Area, they took with them a number of candidates for this schooling, and it should come as no surprise to the Indian Government if, in say 1967, it finds itself suddenly faced with this very threat in that region.

Burmese terrain is favorable to quiet insurgent organization and build-up; the northern and eastern parts of the country are remote and sparsely populated and can be supplied from China. Local take-overs in the north by puppets supported by "People's Volunteers" would give the Chinese a number of bases for small-scale infiltration and attacks on Assam from the south. The area east of the Salween River is also particularly suitable. A similar type of operation can be run from Laos against susceptible eastern Thailand along the Mekong.

How many North Vietnamese units are now in Laos under Pathet Lao cover would be difficult to estimate. One figure is as high as 15 battalions of 600 men each. Possibly we are inclined to overestimate, but, in the general context, it is only prudent to assume that there are troops present and that the Pathet Lao is receiving material aid (to say nothing of vociferous moral encouragement) from Peking. We are sure, for example, that the

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Chinese are building tracks for jeeps in northern Laos. There is thus a decided potential capability to "put the bite" on Thailand from two directions.

The United States, or anyone else, would find difficulty in countering directly operations of the nature and on the level described. The Chinese might calculate that we would be inhibited from a conventional response elsewhere by the spectre of escalation. However, should they commit conventional units to operations along the Mekong (a most unlikely but possible course of action) they would, of course, be inviting intervention elsewhere.

VII

Release by the United States Government of the captured Work Bulletins gave us new insights into the Party-P.L.A. relationship. They substantiated the supposition that morale problems as of 1960–1961 were quite serious. They validated the opinions of some analysts that the combat efficiency of the Air Force was steadily deteriorating, that the Navy (such as it is) was practically immobilized because of lack of fuel and spare parts, and that the ground forces were suffering from shortages of automotive transport, heavy weapons and spare parts.

Nevertheless, in many areas of interest we lack (and no doubt shall continue to lack) specific information on which reasonably accurate estimates of Communist China's military potential must be based. Consequently, our appraisals tend to swing wildly from one extreme to the other. This has been characteristic of Western (particularly American) estimates of Soviet capabilities, which periodically are unreasonably upgraded only to be downgraded later.

In the American press, the Chinese leadership is frequently represented as a group of almost superhuman Machiavellis. But these men, and the members of the authoritarian bureaucracy over which they preside, can make mistakes. They have made serious errors in the past, and they will make them in the future. Nevertheless, of one thing we may be certain: they are determined to extend their influence, at the least risk and cost to themselves, to susceptible areas. If a limited military adventure offers a handsome payoff at very low risk, they will probably embark on it. It is part of our business to narrow the field of choices open to them and thus to deny them strategic options from which they may reap large returns on small investments.

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WHAT KIND OF RADICALISM FOR AFRICA?

By Colin Legum

"AN excellent revolutionary situation exists in Africa" was the way Chou En-lai summed up his visit to the continent earlier this year. Was this mere wishful thinking on his part? Or was it a deliberate attempt to foster revolutionary thinking? The answer to the second question should be obvious. Not so the first. Chou En-lai thinks of revolution in Mao Tse-tung's terms of "the seizure of power by armed force; the settlement of the issue by war is the central task of the highest form of revolution." If Chou En-lai was indeed talking in this sense, his appraisal of Africa's present condition is incorrect. There are a number of African states (other than just the remaining colonial territories) where the violent overthrow of government is possible; but it is highly unlikely that "seizure of power" will herald a Mao Tse-tung-type revolution. There is little reason to suppose that this is what would happen if the present rebels in the Congo were successful.

And yet, if one thinks of revolution in a different sense from Chou En-lai's, there are strong grounds for the view that conditions in Africa favor a revolutionary rather than an evolutionary process. Changes are likely to be abrupt, drastic and even violent.

If one can talk about the "mood" of a continent, Africa's mood strongly favors radical changes, both internally and internationally. There are, it is true, strong internal resistances, especially where traditionalist tribal society remains strong; but the pacemakers who wield power enjoy a general sanction to "leap into the twentieth century." The authority of the modernizing élite is strongly reinforced by the energetic ambitions of Africans to liberate themselves not only from colonial rule but also from the bondage of backwardness and dependency. Both for themselves and their societies, they are impatient to become better educated and trained; to grow richer; and, above all, to achieve the dignity of equals with other races (especially with whites).

African independence is therefore an instrument to destroy the badge of shame which has attached for so long to black people. To overlook the strength of this feeling is to misjudge

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the true temper of Africa, to misunderstand a vital element in African foreign policies, and to underestimate the power-thrust of Pan-Africanism on certain issues, despite its internal tensions.

The realities of post-colonial Africa favor intemperate rather than temperate attitudes. These attitudes, however, are usually modified and restrained by other realities—the need, for example, to rely on overseas aid and capital. But while policies may be adapted to take account of these other realities, the basic attitudes remain. In certain circumstances the inhibitions felt under these restraints serve only to harden intemperate attitudes.

What are the basic realities of Africa? Briefly, I would describe them in the following order. The approaching end of colonialism finds the continent balkanized into a large number (potentially 52) of small, poor and weak states. While the continent as a whole is potentially rich, it is still desperately poor. Its resources are unevenly distributed; its main sources of economic wealth are controlled by expatriate firms or are dependent on external capital; its main export crops are subject to the vicissitudes of a world market over which African governments have little control; it has insufficient experts and trained personnel at all levels to man its technical services and to execute its development plans. Pan-Africanism has grown rapidly as an emotional and practical response to these conditions and to the inequalities felt by black people. But the Pan-Africanist movement contains within itself serious tensions produced by the differing interests and attitudes of its protagonists. (These range from Ghana's President Nkrumah with his ideas for political unification to Malagasy's President Tsiranana, whose belief in African unity is extremely slender.) Africa's societies are in a state of flux: tribal society is disintegrating or being transformed; urbanization is advancing rapidly; unemployment, urban individualism and social rootlessness are being experienced on a large scale for the first time; new economic and social classes are emerging; the youth are becoming increasingly separated from tribal or family disciplines.

In Africa, the nation-state has preceded the formation of the nation: this presents awkward problems for national governments seeking to persuade, or coerce, tribal and regional units to acknowledge a central authority and a single overriding loyalty. Africa is obsessed with the danger of a second scramble to carve it up in more subtle ways. In the West, "neo-colonialism"

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is usually regarded as merely a Communist slogan; African leaders, including uncompromising anti-Communists like Nigeria's Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, believe it to be a real threat. The continent is in a state of war against the remnants of colonialism—the white-controlled citadels in the Portuguese territories, in Rhodesia and especially in the Republic of South Africa. But Africa is militarily weak and vulnerable to internal and external attacks. Non-alignment is the dominant aspiration of the continent's leaders; but they know that so far they have not been able to prevent Africa from becoming a battleground for influence between the West and the East, and between Moscow and Peking. Finally, there is the reality of government by a single party: of the 36 independent African states, only five still manage to cling to some form of parliamentary democracy. The one-party state is felt to meet the special needs of the present situation. Whether it can fulfill the wants as well as meet the needs remains a moot question.

These, then, are the principal realities which need to be taken into account in analyzing the interplay of African political forces.

II

Because politics is essentially a struggle for power, it is inevitable that where a single party takes to itself the monopoly of power, the political struggle should become increasingly radical or revolutionary. Those defending power come to rely more and more on tough methods; those in opposition are driven to adopt increasingly unconstitutional methods and to seek external support.

The process of transferring power within the single-party state originates within the palace. It generally has two stages. The first starts with the existence of acknowledged pressure groups within the ruling party which produces a continuous internal rivalry for power. The second stage sees the growth of an active opposition—acting subversively within the state or in exile, or both. The exile group is usually harbored by a neighboring country—the Congo rebels in Brazzaville and Burundi, the Sawabah Party of Niger in Ghana, the Rwanda exile movement, "The Cockroach," in Burundi; there are also the examples of the exiled Communist parties of Algeria and the U.A.R. which operate either from Eastern Europe or China.

In this way internal party splits achieve an external dimension:

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it might go no further than involving other African states, or it might involve foreign powers. Irrespective of whether or not the opposition remains embedded in the ruling party or goes into exile, its methods become surreptitious. The effect of driving the opposition underground is that the rulers must look under their beds as well as out of their windows—a situation that greatly favors the growth of paranoidal tendencies. The rulers, fearing persecution, persecute those they fear. Often these fears are only too well grounded. Ghana's President Nkrumah is justified in believing that one plot against his life was planned by his most trusted lieutenant, and a second by one of the most senior members of his security forces; in the Ivory Coast, President Houphouet-Boigny had to deal with no fewer than three plots in a single year, all of them involving ministerial colleagues. The creation of an atmosphere of suspicion works toward the establishment of a closed society: trade unions are controlled; the organs of information are supervised; the universities come under close state surveillance; the civil service is continuously purged; the promotion system works in favor of acolytes; the security forces are multiplied. (The U.A.R. has no fewer than five secret services which work independently, and jealously watch over each other.)

Because active opposition comes mainly from the élite or from those with special interests to defend, the degree of oppression involved is usually limited to comparatively small groups such as the intellectuals, or pressure groups like trade unions, or ethnocentric groups with particularist grievances which make for strong disaffection, *e.g.* the negroid tribes in the southern Sudan, the Watutsi of Rwanda, the northerners in Dahomey, the Tauregs in Mali, the Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia, the Baganda in Uganda. Sometimes these ethnocentric centers of disaffection make common cause with other disaffected groups or with like-minded groups in neighboring countries. This is true, for example, of the Somalis in Kenya and in Ethiopia who look to Somalia; of the Watutsi of Rwanda who look to the Watutsi-dominated government of Burundi; of the southern Sudanese who look (so far without success) to Uganda, Kenya and the Central African Republic. These links between opposition elements and neighboring countries of course produce acute friction between the states involved.

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III

The immediate problems faced by most newly independent African governments have been similar: first, to develop an apparatus of government capable of ensuring the survival of the new state within the frontiers established under colonial rule; second, to promote national consciousness among disparate ethnocentric elements; third, to achieve economic and social development at a pace which would cope with, if not fulfill, the high hopes that independence had aroused; fourth, to develop rapidly effective police and military forces capable of dealing with the problems of internal security and, in some cases, to protect national frontiers; and finally, to replace the old colonial relationship with a foreign policy that is relevant to the needs of the new Africa.

Within the continent, the new foreign policy had to give expression to the emotional and political desire for African "unity." Further afield, it demanded new relationships with the former colonial powers as well as with other foreign powers. In practical terms this meant that African governments had to learn how to get on with each other, how to operate within a cold war situation, and how to avoid becoming entangled in the separate struggles within the Western and Communist camps. President Modibo Keita's pragmatism makes it possible for Mali to lead the African chorus of praise for Peking while being an associate member of the "neo-colonialist" European Economic Community. To regard such an attitude as immoral is to miss two important points. The first is that African radical governments, while emotionally drawn toward Peking and Moscow, are able to make realistic decisions when it comes to adopting policies relevant to their own social development. The second point is that because present-day African governments are so heavily involved with the West, they feel a strong need to counterbalance their economic dependency by having cordial relations with the Communist countries.

At independence, all the African governments, with the single exception of Guinea, looked primarily to the West for economic and technical assistance to enable them to meet the five major challenges which have been described. Although some of them—notably the U. A. R., Ghana, Algeria and Mali—came to rely to a greater or a lesser extent on Russian and Chinese aid as well,

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all have nevertheless continued to look to the West to supply the major part of their economic, military and technical needs, and for their trade. All still receive more Western than Communist aid. Guinea is now the fourth largest African recipient of American aid ($39 million annually), after the U. A. R., Tunisia and Ethiopia.

The common experience of African governments has been that Western aid (for all its faults) has been more useful to them than Communist aid, except in the military field. But few of them feel that Western aid has been sufficient, or always of the right kind. All the major African states are now strongly convinced that aid is less important to their economic development than trade—a feeling which crystallized into positive demands for action during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development earlier this year. They believe that fluctuations in commodity prices over the last ten years have more than wiped out the total monetary benefit to Africa of foreign aid from all sources. Henceforth, emphasis will be on the need for new international trade relationships. But although aid is now regarded as being of secondary importance, it is by no means thought to be of negligible value. Because Africa's trade lies overwhelmingly with Europe and the United States, it is on Western leadership that the African states fasten their hopes—and, in the meantime, direct the shafts of their criticism.

Africa's economic dependence on, and heavy involvement with, the West make it inevitable that economic and governmental failures at home should be attributed, at least in part, to the West. The West becomes the scapegoat for failures at home. It is blamed for not doing enough; for not responding in the right way; for not being sufficiently understanding of African needs; and not caring enough—beyond the protection of its own economic and strategic interests. These attitudes are shared by leaders one would readily identify as being well disposed to the West. This disillusionment, though by no means total or fixed, is a comparatively new phenomenon in Africa. In the past, African attitudes toward the West have always been strongly ambivalent but with the positive side usually more in evidence. Now the negative aspect is much more pronounced, and seems to be getting stronger.

How should one explain this disillusionment, and what does it portend? It is important to understand the frustrations caused

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by the limited capacity of newly independent governments to act effectively, especially in economic affairs. The limitations are of many kinds. For example, there is the widely accepted need to work within the established pattern of economic relationships since they are difficult to disturb in any major way without serious repercussions both abroad and at home. Here it should be noted that of all the African states only Guinea and the U. A. R. have experimented with revolutionary methods in their economic relations. Because most governments have been unwilling to adopt revolutionary methods, they have faced difficulties in mobilizing the masses for disciplined work in societies which are not easily amenable to discipline.

Frustrated and impotent, government leaders become anxious and defensive. They begin to feel that their survival is at stake; and because they are the leaders who brought their countries to independence, they tend to equate their own survival with the survival of their country's independence. In this anxious mood they turn on their friends who they feel are letting them down. The more a government feels beholden to the West, or economically tied to one of the Western countries, the more strongly it reacts. This has already been seen in the relations between French-speaking countries and France, and one should expect other radical protests in this area.

Although the present African governments are led by pragmatists rather than doctrinalists, they sometimes select weapons from the Marxist armory to experiment with at home, *e.g.* ideas about centralized planning—reinforced, perhaps, with a Marxist planner or two; state farms or coöperative tractor stations. (So far few of these experiments have been markedly successful; nor indeed have they been pushed very far. In East Africa the most successful large-scale peasant coöperative scheme has been developed by the Israelis.) African leaders have remained attached to the idea of a mixed economy. Guinea, which tried to do without it, has turned back; in Ghana, after a strenuous internal party struggle, the first Seven Year Plan ended by *expanding* the private enterprise sector. In general it could be said that although some African countries have opened windows to Communist ideas, they have not opened the door to them. From the point of view of governments seeking ways of rapidly expanding their economies, relatively few practical gains have yet come from agreements with the Communist world, except in the special case

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of the U. A. R. Nevertheless, Nasser still gets more aid from the United States and West Germany than does any other African country; and even though Algeria and Mali have close ties with Russia and China respectively, their economies rest strongly on French aid, trade and preferences.

One of the crucial factors in African politics today is that few of the African states have so far succeeded in getting their economies moving at a pace fast enough to counteract the tensions set up by lack of economic opportunities. A country like Nigeria has to find new jobs for 700,000 school leavers and graduates in the six years spanned by the Development Plan which it adopted in 1962. To meet this target it will need about $1.8 billion, of which one-third must come from external sources. Approaching the end of the second year of its Development Plan, it has succeeded so far in getting less than half of its total foreign requirements. Yet if its plan should fail the inevitable result must be mass discontent in a highly articulate society—indeed, in the only really "open society" in the continent. All African governments, though in different degrees, face problems similar to those of Nigeria; and these are most acute in countries which have already achieved a reasonable level of development, where the rate of education, the tantalizing presence of a thin layer of prosperous tradesmen, farmers, bureaucrats and (especially) politicians, and the *possibility* of a richer society, are themselves active agents of discontent.

This discontent is to be found in a number of identifiable and potentially powerful pressure groups: urban workers, unemployed youth, the middle ranks of the civil service, young army officers and, notably, the intellectuals. These are the recruits for militant radicalism. The youth often suffer real hardship from the lack of educational and employment opportunities; the urban workers are caught up in an inflationary economy which allows costs to rise but keeps wages pegged; the "middle groups" resent the wide gap between themselves and their superiors; the intellectuals protest against the apparent ineffectiveness and inequities of the new order which have brought rewards to a new "bourgeois" class. All bitterly resent the nepotism and corruption prevalent in most African countries. Some feel strongly about the loss of civil rights.

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IV

Radicals in Africa can be divided into three broad categories: those who seek to bring about fundamental changes—the revolutionaries; those who believe in reform within the existing framework—the radical reformers; and those who are mainly concerned about the loss of civil rights and the growth of nepotism and corruption. Though still no larger than a cloud the size of a hand, this third group of radicals is nevertheless a significant element; what they lack in numbers they often make up for in quality and prestige. They sometimes coöperate with the other radicals but usually only in so far as it serves as an outlet for their own protest against the loss of personal freedom under the existing order.

With few exceptions, radicals usually work within the established political parties, constituting themselves into militant left-wings as distinctive caucuses. Their tactics, however, vary. Some operate as pressure groups; some seek to capture key positions within the party machinery or the government; some seek to establish themselves close to the actual sources of power whence they may hope to influence policy behind the scenes. In some countries the radical elements themselves constitute the leadership (Sékou Touré in Guinea, Modibo Keita in Mali, Nkrumah in Ghana, Ben Bella in Algeria); but because they are at the head of national front governments, their ability to implement radical policies is limited. In such situations the radical movements are used by the governmental leadership to prepare the ground for more "progressive" policies.

Where the radical group is not in office, its strength will depend primarily on the power-base in which it is rooted—a trade union, a youth group or, more often, a region. The "favorite son" of a major tribe or region is often in a strong bargaining position. Here one thinks of the Kenya leader, Oginga Odinga, who controls the Central Nyanza province. The youth wings of African political parties also constitute effective pressure groups—especially in single-party states.

But whether the radicals operate as reformers or as revolutionaries, their power is limited by their lack of resources. Apart from finance, they usually need information media and opportunities to extend patronage. In the African situation they also find it of immense benefit to be acclaimed abroad and to be known to

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have strong allies. Resources and opportunities of this kind are not easily available to dissidents inside their own countries; those in power usually take good care to see that these resources and privileges are retained in their own hands. So the leaders of the opposition go "shopping around." They seek funds, scholarships or prestigious tours either for themselves or for their followers, from Western countries, African states, the non-aligned nations, or from the Communists. Where they go is largely determined by their brand of radicalism.

Most of the great nations and some of the smaller ones maintain agencies which, for one reason or another, are willing to provide aid of some kind. Because Western countries are mainly interested in preserving good relations with the present African governments, the amount of support available to dissident radicals is generally limited. And indeed—with the exception of those radicals primarily concerned with civil rights, such as the democratic trade-union leaders—most radicals shy away from the West precisely because they know that Western policies are geared largely to assisting African governments. They therefore tend to look to other African states, to the non-aligned nations (such as Jugoslavia and Israel), or to the Communists.

In their role as "leader-nations," Ghana and the U. A. R. offer special attractions for radical politicians in other countries, especially as they are among the few ready to risk offering open support to dissident movements. By and large, the U. A. R. attracts the exiles from North Africa, while Ghana attracts those from West, East and Central Africa. But President Nkrumah is much bolder than President Nasser in offering himself as the leader of African radicalism. His ideology of *consciencism* is frankly intended to encourage his brand of militant Pan-Africanism and "scientific socialism" in rivalry to all other programs, including those of the Chinese and the Russians. Through the newspaper, *The Spark,* his message is carried weekly to radicals all over the continent, urging them to mobilize a single Africa-wide political movement of workers and peasants dedicated to "the African revolution." These aims are promoted organizationally through the All African Trade Union Federation and the Bureau of African Affairs.

Outside Africa the radicals look mainly to Moscow and Peking, though it is hard to say which attracts more active interest. Generally both capitals are regarded as of equal value as "mar-

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kets" in which to shop. Moscow, however, is much more circumspect than Peking in taking up the cause of dissident radicals—although it is a keen rival in offering support to the liberation movements operating in the Portuguese territories, in Rhodesia and in Southern Africa. The Soviets are inhibited in much the same way as are the Western countries; they, too, are concerned not to estrange the present African governments—a caution that became especially marked after they had burnt their fingers in Guinea in 1962. Nevertheless, they find plenty of opportunities to attract Africans on scholarships and visits; and if they believe the circumstances warrant, they may be willing to risk the displeasure of certain African governments. Their recent role in Zanzibar, where they firmly underpinned the initiative wrested by the East Germans from the Chinese after last January's revolution, strained their relations with President Nyerere. It would appear that the Russians are most willing to take calculated risks when the objective is to outmanœuvre the Chinese.

Peking, though not entirely uninhibited, is much more venturesome in trying to maintain a balance between actively supporting revolutionary elements and strenuously courting governments which they wish to see liquidated. The Chinese tirelessly repeat that with few exceptions (Guinea, Mali, Algeria and Ghana) none of the African governments is truly independent; that their nominal independence can be made real only through violent struggle by the peasants and the proletariat; that there is no alternative to the use of force to liberate the economic resources and energies necessary for real progress. China's own example of how to mobilize the masses strongly impresses radicals who deplore the massive wastage of their own human resources. And although there is no real evidence to show that Peking's efforts are successful in winning the present leadership to China's example of revolutionary struggle, nevertheless the teachings of Mao Tse-tung undoubtedly affect the ideas and tactics of younger radicals.

But in the last analysis, one is left with the overwhelmingly strong impression that Africans are less interested in the ideological teachings of Communism than in the practical support they hope to get from Peking and Moscow. The question arises: Who is using whom? Are the Communists successfully using the African radicals for their purposes or is it the other way around? At times it appears to be the former, but such victories as the

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Communists have had (the Congo rebellion is a good example) usually occur when there is a real coincidence of interests between them and the radical nationalists.

My own view is that African leaders who accept Communist help do so primarily because it suits their own interests to do so; they do not thereby become Communist converts or stooges. But they do undoubtedly feel a sense of gratitude for help received, and this might condition their sympathies if ever they should come to power. It would be well, therefore, to steer a cautious middle way between the attitudes of those who write off all recipients of Eastern aid as Communist stooges, and those who take the view that African leftist radicals can be relied upon to remain strictly non-aligned once they have got what they need from the Communists. This applies only to militant radicals who are not now in power. There is, so far, no evidence at all to support the view that African governments which receive economic or military aid from the Communists become instruments of Russian and Chinese policies any more than they do when taking Western aid. Obviously they are responsive to foreign pressures on particular issues, and some are more responsive to pressures from one side than the other; but on questions which touch the fundamentals of non-alignment, such pressures seldom produce results other than irritation.

V

A few major points should have now emerged. The first is that there is a considerable international involvement in the forces working for and against the survival of the present types of government in Africa and in influencing future leaders. If the governments now in power should continue to lose confidence in the West's willingness and capacity to help them, or if they should fall because of their inability to meet the economic and social challenge facing them, one should expect to see a crop of much more radical governments emerge in Africa. The international orientation of these new radical governments will depend on the relative influence of the revolutionaries who receive backing from the Communists, as against that of the radical reformers who grow directly out of the African nationalist tradition and who have tried to avoid international entanglements.

Even if the present governments should successfully survive, it is probable (especially in French-speaking Africa) that they will

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do so by adopting much more radical policies both in their internal policies and in their external relations. The outcome of the contest for power, therefore, is unlikely to be between moderates and radicals, but between radical reformers and revolutionaries. In African terms the struggle is seen not as lying between Western and Communist influence, but as between different brands of African nationalism and socialism as opposed to foreign ideologies.

One final, perhaps crucial factor contributing to the growth of radicalism is Africa's emotional involvement in the question of color. The anti-colonial struggle was not only a negative repudiation of foreign control and a rejection of European hegemony. It was also a positive assertion of the right and capacity of black men to take charge of their own destiny for the first time in several centuries.

The fulfillment of this historic mission required the removal of all forms of inequality between the former white dominators and the black underdog. Hence the aggressive insistence on an independent African presence in international affairs, the elimination of economic dependence and the Pan-Africanist assertion of a "Hands off Africa" policy not unlike the Monroe Doctrine. Of central importance to the achievement of these objectives is the removal of the last vestiges of "colonialism" in the continent —white overlordship in the Portuguese territories, in Rhodesia and in South Africa. The gravest offense to Africans is the practice of white supremacy on the African continent itself. The practice is symbolized by apartheid. On this single issue there are no "moderates" in Africa; all the leaders are agreed on the need to destroy white supremacy. They are also agreed as to method—direct and active support for the underground liberation movements; diplomatic isolation of South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia; total economic sanctions.

For the African states the struggle against apartheid is a moral crusade. As with all crusaders they insist on a clear-cut division between their allies and their enemies. The Communists support them, albeit for their own particular reasons; the West opposes them—for this is the way Africans regard the West's equivocal policies over Portugal and South Africa.

This total African involvement over South Africa, in particular, has produced a continental climate of opinion that is strong everywhere but strongest among the youth. It is angry. It is re-

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sentful. It is militant. It could become openly racist and vengeful. It is directed not only at Dr. Verwoerd's régime but also against those who appear to support it directly or indirectly. This attitude was expressed in clear terms by the first summit meeting of African heads of state in Addis Ababa in 1963 in a resolution which "informs the allies of colonial powers that they must choose between their friendship for the African peoples, and their support of powers that oppress African peoples."

The crusade against South Africa invests the militant radicals and the anti-Western forces with powerful weapons. The Communists are in a strong position to exploit these emotions in order to cast doubts on the integrity of Western motives in Africa. African suspicions about the Western role in Southern Africa strongly reinforce fears about neo-colonialism.

Most African leaders (including Presidents Nasser, Nkrumah and Nyerere) have publicly stated that neo-colonialism is not confined to the West. But because of the dominance of Western authority over Africa in the past and because of its continuing close involvement with African governments at present, the natural tendency is to associate the major threat of neo-colonialism with the West. This explains (without necessarily justifying) why the United States rather than China was singled out for special attack by the Organization of African Unity for supplying military aid to Prime Minister Tshombe's government. Because of Mr. Tshombe's own past record, anybody who helps him is almost certain to be accused of neo-colonialism by the majority of African leaders.

For the immediate future it is safe to predict that militant radicalism and anti-Western feelings will merge closely as the struggle in the Portuguese territories and South Africa grows sharper. The denouement of this struggle is likely to have a strong influence on the role and orientation of African radicalism.

Today the swing is against the West. It could swing strongly against the Communists if they persist in their efforts to involve Africa deeply in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. How far the swing goes against the West or turns against the Communists will depend to a considerable extent on the way Western policies measure up to the three crucial tests which emerge from this analysis: the challenge of the color clash in Southern Africa, the demands of economic development, and the Pan-Africanist insistence that outside powers not intervene in African affairs, except on terms acceptable to its protagonists.

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GOOD NEIGHBORHOOD

By Lester B. Pearson

A DISTINGUISHED former United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Livingston Merchant, was recently quoted as saying, "Canada is more important to the United States than any other single country." This will startle the average American who thinks of Canada—when he thinks of it at all—as a land of snow, wheat, "Northern Dancer," tourist camps and discontented people who speak French.

Americans would do well to think a little more often and more deeply about their relations with the fast-developing country to the north that lies between them and the Soviet Union—relations which involve partnership on the continent and coöperation in the wider world. At this time, when the United States is entering upon a period of renewed leadership in international affairs under President Johnson—leadership for peace, security and progress —Canadian developments, both domestic and international, can affect the burden of responsibility which the United States is carrying.

Barely 18 months ago I had the privilege of meeting with President Kennedy at his home in Hyannis Port to review the state of relations between our two countries and to discuss broader international issues which were current at the time. I recall his remarking then on the number of changes which could be foreseen on the world scene as a result of predictable retirements, elections and other events then known to be impending.

In the short interval since that meeting more drastic changes have taken place than could have been contemplated at our meeting, including his own tragic and lamented death. Through it all, we Canadians have shared your sorrows and your anxieties. Like you we have attempted to appraise the significance of developments in Europe and in NATO; of the assertion of a growing economic and political role by the "developing countries" of Asia, Africa and Latin America; of the brusque and unexpected change of leadership in the Soviet Union; and of the display of an atomic potential by Communist China. One thing which has remained unchanged amidst the changes has been the close coöperation between our two countries and the continued need for such cooperation. Much may change but this will remain. Our inter-

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dependence may not be equal in both directions. But it is there, and it should be appreciated by Americans. This in its turn requires an understanding of what is going on in Canada.

II

A great deal has recently been written and said both in Canada and abroad about what have been described as Canada's current problems of national unity. The fact that we have a "national" problem has come as a surprise to most Americans who tend to think of Canadians as a steady, sensible, rather unexciting people with few problems. Surprise often leads to exaggeration of what has happened. There is an impression in some quarters that divisions between the two founding peoples of our country, the French-speaking and the English-speaking, are jeopardizing the very future of Canada as a nation; that Quebec is on the point of breaking with the rest of Canada in anger and violence. This is a long way from the truth of the matter, but it makes for exciting reading.

Canada is a very big country, bigger than its neighbor. Yet its geography is very different from that of the United States. Canada has become one country despite geography and not because of it. Most of the Canadian population and nearly all Canada's economic activity, except that related to primary and extractive industries, are concentrated in a relatively narrow ribbon of varying width and density along the United States boundary over a distance of some 3,000 miles. In addition, there are natural features which lend a certain intrinsic coherence to each of several distinctive parts of the country. The Atlantic Provinces are a geographical unit separated to a degree from the rest of Canada by the eastern seaboard states. Forest, river and rock tend to separate the industrial heartland of Ontario and Quebec from the flat expanse of the Prairie Provinces. The Rocky Mountains lend to British Columbia a certain splendid isolation. These geographical conditions have tended to inhibit the rather free-wheeling movement of people from one part of the country to another, which has long been characteristic of the United States population.

In recent years movement between one part of Canada and another has become more commonplace as transportation improved, wealth increased and business and industry developed more complex patterns. But regionalism has remained strong.

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The position of the French-speaking part of the population should be viewed against this general demographic background and not solely in terms of its own particular linguistic and cultural origins.

Our French-speaking citizens possess a civilization and culture which is French both in its source and in its quality. Yet they are completely Canadian. After the original Indians and Eskimos they were the first Canadians. They were the first people from Europe who chose to inhabit and colonize the northern part of our continent. They built a complex and flourishing society in the valley of the St. Lawrence which over the centuries has acquired a true quality and character of its own—a character in which heredity has blended with environment and which, while different from that of neighboring Ontario, is essentially Canadian.

French-speaking Canadians are to be found in the west and in parts of the Maritime Provinces (and indeed in neighboring New England), but the great majority live in the Province of Quebec. In this Province, a great forward movement is taking place in the economic, social and cultural fields. It is a vital movement, and basically encouraging. Naturally, it has important political implications.

The leaders of the Province of Quebec want the widest possible responsibility and opportunity to assist the people of their Province to move ahead. They seek a more widespread recognition throughout the whole of Canada of their language and culture as an essential element of the national life. Separatism within this French Canadian nationalism is a minority movement to which the government of the Province is opposed and which has no significant political identity. It has, however, provoked a certain apprehension among some Canadians, and not only English-speaking, that Quebec's aspirations may prove excessive and lead to national division. This is part of our present problem. Nevertheless, these manifestations of change must be seen in perspective and should not be distorted beyond their actual importance.

The size and status of the French-speaking population and their new feeling of confidence and progress give Quebec's aspirations a special significance at the present time. But in the last analysis I think that the hopes of the Province are not greatly different from those of the people of other regions and other Provinces for a better life and fuller expression of it. I believe that they will become an integral though a distinctive part of the

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aspirations of the vast majority of Canadians everywhere for a genuine Canadian spirit in a united Canada.

The national spirit which now exists has been fostered in recent years by improvement and diversification of the means of communication between the various regions of the country. The national news of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, publicly owned, is as likely to carry across the country a report of a speech in Alberta as of a conference in New Brunswick or a celebration in Quebec. The Canada Council—a public body—supports artistic and cultural activities and exchanges in all sections of the country. But there is nothing exclusive or, I hope, narrowly nationalistic about all this. Whatever may be done to encourage Canadian identity and thinking, we shall never be lacking a full flow of ideas and creative expressions—good or bad—from across the border. This we welcome along with the development of Canadian talent and thought, much of which we would hope might be of a quality which in turn would be able to make an impact on the United States. We do not want a hot-house culture but we do aim at one capable of surviving and thriving on its own merits.

The policy of the Government of Canada is to maintain and strengthen Canadian national unity. It is part of that policy to recognize that the Canadian people have two main national origins; that Canada today is a multi-racial society; and that history and geography have endowed us with a diversity in which an effective federal system of government alone can give significant unity. To this end the present Government of Canada is supporting a policy of coöperative federalism which is designed to ensure that the Federal authority has both the constitutional capacity and the financial means to discharge its responsibilities to the nation as a whole; and that each of the Provinces has the constitutional capacity and the financial means to discharge its responsibilities to its people and to its municipalities. These basic issues, which are common to all federal systems, receive constant attention at both the political and the administrative levels. At the present time we are also taking steps to reinforce the basis of our national life, perhaps somewhat belatedly, by adopting officially a distinctive national flag and anthem, as well as by working out a method through which the Canadian constitution may be amended in Canada and thus become formally, as well as in fact, a truly Canadian constitution. While such measures as these may be largely symbolic, they are none the less significant on

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that account. The underlying facts reflected in such symbols can be of profound importance in the development of a national feeling and identity.

III

These are some of our basic national preoccupations. Canadians are also, as always, preoccupied with their North American neighbor's policies and performances. This was true a hundred years ago when, at the pre-Confederation conferences in Charlottetown and Quebec in 1864, anxiety about the United States—and its continental intentions—was a dominant unifying consideration in the minds of the participants, an impelling reason for bringing the colonies together. Today Canadians are still preoccupied with their powerful neighbor, although perhaps in a different way, as we realize that our two countries are becoming increasingly interdependent.

Of course, Canadians are more aware of this than Americans. While in recent years there has been an encouraging increase in the degree of attention given in the United States to Canadian developments, there is still much room for improvement. A few Americans know Canada well, but many do not know it even a little. This irks us. Indeed a major irritant in our relations with the United States is the tendency of some Americans simply to take Canadians for granted. Most Canadians, on the other hand, know—or think they know—the United States intimately. They certainly have ample opportunity to acquire such knowledge—often the kind that doesn't enhance the reputation of a country. United States publications and radio and T.V. programs command a very large audience in Canada, and our own media carry a great deal of news about the United States. Your recent election—to say nothing about the World Series—was watched with as much absorbed attention and in as much detail throughout Canada as it was in the United States. We are almost always conscious of your existence and of what you are doing. There would certainly be no dissent in Canada to the obverse of Mr. Merchant's statement—that the United States is more important to Canada than any other single country.

The links between Canada and the United States are many and various and strong. These links range from complex joint defense arrangements to membership in the same professional societies and service clubs. Our people come and go and often stay. They

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move from one country to the other in vast numbers and for a host of personal and business reasons. The volume of our bilateral trade is the greatest in the world. Incidentally—though it is more than an incident for us—your transactions with Canada give you a large surplus in your current balance of payments with us. United States investment in Canada is on a very large scale indeed, and a great many Canadian companies are associates or subsidiaries of United States firms. There are also some instances of substantial Canadian investments in the United States. On the inter-governmental level and through various types of inter-governmental machinery, there is an almost unique pattern of consultation and negotiation on the whole range of bilateral questions which continually engage official attention either specifically or generally. In short, a very special and close relationship exists between Canada and the United States with respect to matters of common interest, which excludes very little.

One such matter is the concern of each country in the sustained economic growth of the other. The Canadian economy is so closely geared to the much larger economy of the United States that economic trends in Canada are more deeply influenced by trends south of the border than is the case of any other country. This is a basic fact of life for us. The United States, for its part, clearly has a great interest in economic trends in Canada—its largest customer—where so much United States capital is invested and where so many of its products are sold. It is satisfying that at the present time the economies of both countries are exhibiting sustained momentum with relatively high rates of employment. Last year the Canadian G.N.P. rose 6.6 percent in value terms and it will probably increase by 8 percent this year. This sort of performance reflects hard work and wise management by Canadian producers, and sound economic policies on the part of the Canadian Government.

In the months ahead, as in the past, the United States and Canadian Governments will together be concerned with a whole range of economic questions—some of them specific, others, such as balance of payments and the broad terms of trade and investment, touching the national interests of both countries and related to the whole texture of international economic life. In the latter field the Canadian Government, like the United States Government, is at the present time particularly interested in a satisfactory outcome of the current GATT negotiations aimed

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at achieving a substantial and equitable reduction of trade barriers so as to expand world trade, which is of the greatest importance to the Canadian economy.

In the field of Canada-United States economic relations, within the limits of existing international arrangements there has already been recognition by both governments of the need for each country to follow economic policies which take account of the interests of the other. Joint studies and consultations are already under way concerning the general principles of our coöperation and the problems of particular industries, such as the automotive industry. I am hopeful that this may lead to further progress in the avoidance by each of action harmful to the other and in positive arrangements to promote growth on a rational basis.

In the development and utilization of the natural resources of the North American continent, there are many encouraging possibilities. At our meeting in 1963, President Kennedy and I reaffirmed our governments' desire to coöperate in securing the best use on a broad basis of such resources of the continent as oil, gas, strategic metals and minerals and electricity. Similar views were expressed in my friendly conversations with President Johnson at the beginning of 1964. Both governments have an interest in moving toward a freer flow across our common border of basic materials and commodities of this kind. Each of us can often do better by coöperation than either could do separately to advance its own interests. We should, I think, be more conscious of the great advantages of such coöperation and should make more of our opportunities to promote it.

In the use of water resources, there is a long history of cooperation between Canada and the United States, going back to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the establishment of the International Joint Commission. The two governments are continuing to make good use of that Commission which now finds itself with more current business than ever before. The most significant development in this general field since the St. Lawrence Seaway project was the conclusion last September of the Columbia River Treaty. This was a major breakthrough—after years of frustration—in the field of coöperative arrangements between the United States and Canada for the management of waters flowing through both countries and for the development of hydroelectric power from those waters for the benefit of both countries.

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I can state with assurance that it is in no mean or narrow spirit that we Canadians view our association with Americans as we face the challenge of the development of a continent of which both our peoples are the inheritors. It is a challenge as new and complex as ever faced our pioneer forefathers. In meeting it together, each country has to protect its national interests. But that need not stand in the way of working together for mutual advantage. The national interest can only benefit from such co-operation. It could also suffer from a lack of it through timidity or prejudice. We are bound to be aware, always, of your disproportionate power and your world responsibilities. I hope you will be aware of our growing strength and our determination not to confuse coöperation with absorption.

IV

As Canada and the United States look outward, the difference in power and responsibilities between the two countries is as apparent as in our relations with each other. The United States is a superpower in the classic sense. While some Americans occasionally flatter us by giving the impression that our country should accept responsibility, more nearly parallel with theirs, the fact is that Canada has to relate such responsibilities to her resources. We are not in the middle, or neutral, on the big issues of peace, freedom and security, but we are a middle power in the sense that we do not have the military or economic strength to exercise a decisive influence on those issues. At the same time, our record in two wars and at the United Nations has shown that we are capable of making a sturdy and effective contribution to a common cause and of working in a responsible and constructive manner with others toward the solution of international problems. We accept obligations even if we cannot determine developments.

Canada played a leading part in the formation of the NATO alliance and from the outset has been a strong advocate of the development of an Atlantic community embracing North America and the European nations from which came the forebears of most Canadians and Americans. We believe in this concept, but we would lose interest if it degenerated into merely an old-fashioned military alliance directed by three or four of its most powerful members. Meanwhile, the armed forces which we contribute to the NATO shield in Europe bear witness to our

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determination to continue to bear our share of the burden of collective defense, so long as it is genuinely collective.

At the same time, in the troubled years since the last great war, Canada has developed a special interest in international peace-keeping in many of the world's trouble spots and has played a leading part—with men, equipment, money and ideas—in the effort to make peace-keeping activities effective. The concept as it has developed under the auspices of the United Nations is by now familiar. What it involves, in essence, is international action to contain local or regional disputes and to create the conditions in which solutions can be negotiated at the political level. I think it is generally recognized that these peace-keeping functions of the United Nations are vital if the organization is to play its appointed part in the maintenance and, indeed, the enlargement of peace and security. The readiness, even eagerness, with which countries have called on the United Nations to help keep the peace in an emergency is the best evidence there can be of the increasing extent to which our aspirations for peace and security are being focused on coöperative action through the world organization.

But here, as in other areas, the means at the disposal of the United Nations have not always been adequate to the responsibilities it is being called upon to assume. If these responsibilities are vital, as we think they are, more will surely need to be done to equip the United Nations to keep the peace. Some countries, including Canada, have already set aside standby units within their national forces which can be made available for service with the United Nations. Others have responded readily with men and equipment, with transport and funds in the successive emergencies with which the United Nations has been faced. Last November a conference of 23 nations with experience in United Nations peace-keeping operations was held in Ottawa, at the invitation of the Canadian Government, to enable representatives of these countries to compare experiences, to survey the problems that have been encountered, and to see how, individually, they can improve their response to the United Nations in future situations requiring the service of an international force. Of course, any policy decisions with respect to the U.N.'s peace-keeping capacity can be taken only in and by the United Nations itself. I hope that progress may be made here, but it will be difficult in an atmosphere of cold-war and neo-colonial suspicion.

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Peace-keeping cannot be separated from social and economic development. A world half-rich, half-poor will never be a world at peace. So within the United Nations and outside it, Canada, like the United States, is actively concerned with the economic and social conditions in the developing countries. It is not simply a matter of economics but of something which has had and will continue to have a fundamental bearing on the stability and security of the world in which we live. It is a question both of human brotherhood and of enlightened self-interest. The leaders of the materially less developed countries want to give their people a better way of life and to bring to them the benefits of modern science and technology. We must do what we can to help them. In Canada, we are already channeling a growing volume of assistance to the less developed countries. The Canadian Government was recently able to announce a 50 percent increase in the Canadian foreign-aid program, which now amounts to just under $200,000,000 a year—a substantial figure in relation to our resources.

However important foreign aid is, and will remain, as a means of assisting the economic development plans of the less developed countries, there is no doubt that in the longer term these countries must also be enabled to earn more of their resources for development from trade. Every practicable technique must be brought to bear on the problems of the less developed countries. I see this as one of the major problems that we shall have to face over at least the next decade or two.

As Canada and the United States face these and other international issues, each may with good reason have confidence in the other. Canadian views on specific issues are not always the same as those of the United States. There is not always a complete identity of interest between them, nor will there be in the future. This is because, over the years, we have been developing our own character in Canada, our own external interests and our own judgments, just as the United States has developed its. While we must never ignore the heavy world responsibilities of the United States, we feel bound to speak with our own voice on any problems which are of concern to us. We like to know what our big partners are doing, especially our neighbor. This, however, should not be cause for disquiet. Canadian interests in fact run parallel to those of the United States over a very wide range of

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problems, and our two countries have a fundamentally similar outlook on world affairs. I remember John Foster Dulles once saying to me, a little impatiently, that he would not want to have me along if he was playing golf because I would undoubtedly ask to be consulted every time he was about to putt. He accepted with good grace my reply that I would only interrupt him if he was using a "nine" iron instead of his putter.

In the period ahead I am sure that our two countries will be able to work together closely and effectively. No doubt we shall continue to judge each other more critically than we judge anyone else because we usually expect more of each other; and we know that our friendship is strong enough to stand the test of criticism. What is essential is that we show understanding and respect for each other's views and recognize the overriding interest which each of us has in good relations with the other. That is my concept of how we should coöperate in the period ahead when undoubtedly many changes will occur and many difficult decisions will be required. In that spirit we will continue to give the world an example of good neighborhood.

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SLOW-DOWN IN THE PENTAGON

By Hanson W. Baldwin

IN 1947, the "Bible" of the nation's military contractors—Armed Forces Procurement Regulations—was a slim volume about 100 to 125 pages long. Today, the A.F.P.R., which governs in minute detail all those who do business with the Pentagon, has expanded to four huge volumes totaling something like 1,200 pages, with new ones added daily.

Five to seven years ago, according to a careful statistical average compiled by one major defense contractor, it required four to five months to execute a contract from the time an acceptable price quotation was received in the Pentagon to the time the contractor received the final document. Today, the same contractor estimates that an average of nine to twelve months is needed for the same process; a very few may be completed in 30 days; some may require 23 months.

Parkinson's law of bureaucracy—the less there is to do the more people it takes to do it, and the simpler the problem the longer the time required for the solution—appears to be operating in Washington, particularly in defense contracting. There are many reasons for this state of affairs.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the apostle of "cost-effectiveness" these past four years, must share the blame for many of them as well as the credit for some improved management procedures. But the lengthening delays in the development and production of new weapons started long before he took office, and no one man, no one cause, is responsible.

A rough rule of thumb used to hold that it required about seven years (in the United States) from the gleam in the eye of the designer to the finished operational product. This time span, which has been compared unfavorably with the lead time required for the development and production of new weapons in Russia, has been steadily lengthening, and there is no sign at the moment that the process is being checked.

Even more important, there appears to have been in the first half of the 1960s a definite reduction, as compared to the 1950–1960 period, in the evolution and production of new weapons. The Republicans protest too much when they allege that the Pentagon, under Mr. McNamara, has not produced a single

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new weapons system. But it is at least true that virtually all the major—and most of the minor—weapons systems in operation or in development today (Polaris, Minuteman; B-70, T.F.X. or F-111; AR-15 rifle, etc.) were already in production, development or in preliminary design and specification form back in the 1950s. The Pentagon in recent years has certainly instituted some much-needed management reforms, effected some economies and added considerably to our ready strategic strength and our conventional war and general support forces. But it has probably canceled more development contracts (the nuclear-powered aircraft Dynasoar; the mobile medium-range ballistic missile Skybolt, etc.) than it has initiated new ones.

Two principal and telling criticisms have been leveled at the Pentagon's present policies, trends and procedures by scientists who can be in no way accused of political parochialism.

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, cautioned recently against an attitude that is too prevalent in and outside of the Pentagon—a belief that the technological revolution is over. No one in the Pentagon has ever explicitly stated such a belief, but the attitude of skeptical "show-me-ism" widely held there acts as a very definite brake upon the excited enthusiasm which should energize new research projects. Mr. McNamara's "whiz kids," complete with slide rules and computers, brushed aside the factor of professional judgment or scientific hunch when they took office and their emphasis upon "perfection on paper" and the cost part of the cost-effectiveness formula has definitely slowed the pace of military development.

Behind this attitude in the Pentagon is an even broader trend. Part of it is a belief expressed by many scientists—notably by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner and Dr. Herbert F. York in a recent issue of *Scientific American*—that disarmament, or arms limitation, is the only way to political salvation, and that therefore continued technological military development worsens the situation. This somewhat simplistic viewpoint has had an increasing public and political appeal and indeed has its adherents in the Defense Department. And even so hardheaded a man as Representative Melvin Price, chairman of the research and development subcommittees of the House Armed Services Committee and the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, recently warned that "we are entering a leveling-off period, a

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plateau, in the total dimensions" of the Government's research program. This feeling of disillusionment on the part of scientists, and of fear of economic limitations on future "breakthroughs" in weapons research, comes at a time when the military technological revolution is far from finished.

Despite our present great strength, Dr. Killian has said, we cannot "rest on our oars," thinking the race is won. "We may be only at the beginning of unexampled scientific and engineering achievement," he notes, and the "high confidence" and sheer size of the present research and development effort may "obscure weaknesses still present in our program and lead us once again into complacency."

The second major criticism leveled at present weapons development policies comes from James T. Ramey, Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Edward C. Welsh, acting chairman of the National Aeronautics Space Council. Mr. Ramey in a recent speech urged the Government to rid itself of what he called the "requirements merry-go-round." He pointed out that every new project had to be justified on the basis of "military requirements," and that many promising developments—particularly in space—could never be pushed, or even demonstrated, if development had to wait for the establishment of requirements. Invention has never followed this path; the machine gun and the tank would still remain blueprint dreams if their development had awaited the specifications of clear-cut military requirements. One cannot state a requirement for an inventor's hopes. As Dr. Welsh has pointed out, "If we had required a clear-cut prior mission, we would probably have developed no airplanes, no spacecraft, or, in fact, no wheel."

Other causes for the delays in development and production of new weapons have their roots in the past, well prior to the present Administration, and the responsibility extends far beyond the Pentagon. A $50 billion annual defense budget attracts the eager interests of many government agencies.

The sprawling bureaucracy of Big Government; the control of major military or para-military projects by agencies over which the Defense Department has no direct authority, including the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of the Budget; Congressional legislation and executive regulation—social, political and economic; the tremendous size

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and complexity of the armed forces; over-centralization and over-regulation in the Pentagon; too much service rivalry and not enough service competition—all these and other factors have become built-in roadblocks in defense development and contracting.

Big Government itself is undeniably one of the roadblocks to speedy performance. Everybody must get in on the act, particularly if a new development project involves sizable sums of money or promises numerous jobs, or involves systems or components which must be provided by foreign governments or by other agencies of government.

Development of nuclear weapons and nuclear engines is the responsibility of the A.E.C., yet the only users are the military, and they develop the devices which carry warheads and the vehicles which use the propulsion systems. Over the years, an effective system of liaison by interchange of officers, by committees and other means has made the A.E.C. quickly responsive to military needs, but the mere process of two-headed control slows and complicates the system.

L.A.S.V. (Low Altitude Supersonic Vehicle) provides an enlightening case history of how many heads produce many purposes, and no final results. L.A.S.V. was once hailed as a highly promising project. The A.E.C. was to develop a nuclear-powered ramjet engine and the Pentagon would use the engine to power a pilotless atmospheric missile, capable of indefinite flight (perhaps ten times around the world) at three times the speed of sound. The weapon was envisaged as a possible future successor to, or supplement for, ballistic missiles in case the Russians should develop—as they now appear to be doing—an anti-ballistic missile. In this instance the A.E.C., after overcoming many technical difficulties in its part of the job, was on the verge of outstanding success and was ready to flight-test the engine, when Mr. McNamara, reversing prior judgments—and as Dr. Edward Teller put it, for "the sake of an economy that amounts to less than 1 percent of the Air Force budget"—canceled the project after a prior investment of nearly $200,000,000. Dr. Teller was caustic: "I believe this is the biggest mistake we have made since the years following World War II when we failed to develop the I.C.B.M."

Whether Dr. Teller is correct or not in his assessment of the importance of such a weapon, the fate of L.A.S.V. is illustrative

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both of prevalent negativistic Pentagon philosophy about new weapons systems and of the difficulties of developing new systems under hydra-headed controls.

The creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has provided another type of problem. NASA stemmed from the same kind of political philosophy that nurtured the A.E.C. Atom bombs were too powerful to allow the generals to play with them; ergo, a civilian agency must control nuclear power—and it must be channeled away from nasty military purposes. The same scientific-political pressure groups that advocated this concept helped (with President Eisenhower's approval) to establish NASA, again on the theory that space efforts must be controlled by civilians and that space must not be used for military purposes. The pragmatic absurdities of this point of view are now self-evident; nuclear power so far has been far more important in the military weapons and military propulsion field than in any other way, and the most important applications of space technology have been military—reconnaissance satellites, weather satellites, missile-warning and navigational satellites.

But in the case of NASA, the problem has been compounded. For while the A.E.C. is essentially a research and production agency, NASA is an operating agency as well. From a small, highly efficient aeronautical research agency, it has now expanded into a gargantuan multi-billion-dollar empire, with tentacles all over the country, managing the biggest program on which the United States has ever embarked—to place a man on the moon.

In its early years, NASA was sluggishly if at all responsive to military needs, and the Pentagon itself was inhibited from any effective space developments (though, curiously, the only effective space boosters available were military ballistic missiles). Gradually the liaison, due to Dr. Welsh and others, has been greatly improved. Numerous military officers, active and retired, now hold some of the most important positions in NASA, and in addition the armed forces have furnished most of the astronauts and by far the most important part of the facilities and services used by the agency. The two-headed control still offers difficulties, but today the main stumbling blocks to the rapid development of military space projects are Secretary McNamara and his Director of Defense Research and Engineering,

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Dr. Harold Brown, who in his new political role in the Pentagon has become a remarkably unadventurous scientist.

Often the President's Scientific Adviser, whose contacts with Pentagon and other government scientists cut squarely across organizational lines, has also acted as a roadblock to new developments. He exercises tremendous power without either specific responsibility or specific authority; therefore his intervention often not only delays but confuses. The Adviser's great power stems largely from his White House status; unfortunately around him has grown up a small but important office manned by men more impressive as bureaucrats than as scientists, who represent, in effect, another echelon of delay. The old bogey of "no military requirements" has been invoked again and again by the Defense Department, with tacit support of scientists outside the Department, to stifle projects a-borning, particularly in the military space field.

The Central Intelligence Agency is another organization which has gradually usurped some of what were once primarily military functions. Two factors—the creation of the Agency and its tremendous increase in power, and the creation by Mr. McNamara of a Defense Intelligence Agency outside and above the service chain of command, and directly responsive to him—have greatly reduced the importance of the now emasculated service intelligence agencies—G-2, A-2 and the Office of Naval Intelligence. The service chiefs no longer sit as members of the U. S. Intelligence Board, the governing policy-making organ of the defense community. In operations as well as in procurement the result is still another proliferation of agencies and committees. The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs—a military operation run principally by the C.I.A. instead of by the Pentagon—is one example of the kind of problems this expansion of the executive department can produce. And until recently the C.I.A.—not the Army—was operating the Army's own Special Forces counter-insurgency troops in South Viet Nam.

The new centralized organization of intelligence can also affect weapons procurement, for military requirements must be measured in part against Soviet capabilities; if the centralized control of intelligence reduces those capabilities, obviously force levels and weapons requirements are altered. This is not an imaginary problem. For instance, the strength and speed of mobilization of the Soviet Army has been sharply reduced, in the

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Pentagon's intelligence estimates, during the McNamara administration.

The Bureau of the Budget with its pervasive influence over the source of all power—the dollar—has now developed military "experts" who literally can doom a weapons system or foster its growth. Even Congress' watchdog—the Comptroller-General—has become his own "expert" on tactics and military supply.

Thus the "advice"—and the actual control—exercised on military projects by executive agencies outside the Pentagon is sweeping but almost completely negative. They delay and they criticize and they inhibit; they do not expedite.

Congressional legislation and executive regulation complicate, restrict and delay research and procurement contracts. The contractor must comply with hundreds of laws or executive orders. Accounting procedures, minimum wages, civil rights, veterans' preferences, subcontracting, profit limitations and so on and so forth, all are roadblocks to speed. The Armed Forces Procurement Regulations reflects in its bulk, size and complexity how social, political and economic considerations, as well as those that are military and technical, influence the awards of contracts.[1]

Economic considerations—the need, for instance, to funnel defense contracts into depressed areas—and political pressure—the need to win an election or placate a pressure group—play their part in consideration and delay in contracts. Normally, as the T.F.X. investigation brought out, no major defense contract is awarded without Presidential approval, and the Democratic (or as the case may be, the Republican) National Committee representatives always have their opportunity to urge contractual rewards to the party faithful. The F-111 (T.F.X.) contract went to the General Dynamics Fort Worth plant, although the services in three separate evaluations preferred the Boeing proposal. Many in Washington believe this was the result of political pressure.

[1] A.F.P.R. regulations require the proposals of the contractor to be reviewed before submission by engineering, pricing, auditing, data, legal, civil rights, subcontracting and many other experts, and in turn various Pentagon and government agencies must review the proposals for compliance. Even so, A.F.P.R. regulations are sometimes vaguely worded. A Congressional investigating subcommittee recently requested the Department of Defense to alter those regulations dealing with employee health and recreation expenses. The wording of some of the regulations permitted the charge-off of losses for operating factory cafeterias, and contractors could also charge cocktail parties to the taxpayer if they were billed as "employee welfare."

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All of these practices—all of this red tape—"jest growed" as part of Big Government and a big defense budget.

II

But the major causes of recent delays are to be found in the Pentagon itself, and they stem from the over-centralized organization established by Mr. McNamara and the attempts made to achieve "perfection on paper" before any steel is bent.

Centralization—"unification," the public calls it—has been steadily increasing, particularly since the passage of the 1958 modifications to the National Security Act. But Mr. McNamara has used the power every Secretary of Defense has always had to a far greater extent than any predecessor. There is no doubt that he has run the show. Any major contract must be approved by him; even relatively minor modifications must pass the gauntlet of his numerous assistants.

The checkreins Secretary McNamara has used were, without doubt, needed to halt the proliferation of unneeded weapons systems and the expenditure of billions on projects that turned out to be "duds" or duplications of others.

It is an axiom of sound military research practices that in the early stages two or more parallel lines of development should be followed leading to the same end—a weapons system of given characteristics. In case an unexpected engineering problem of insuperable difficulty is encountered in one developmental effort, the second may offer an alternative. But to avoid unnecessary duplication and expense once the teething troubles are over, one of the two lines should be abandoned and full efforts concentrated on the more hopeful one. In the pre-McNamara era this decision was often left until too late. This was the case, for instance, when the Air Force developed the Thor Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile and the Army developed Jupiter. Because of service rivalries and pressures, both missiles were developed to final "hardware" stage and both were produced in small but expensive quantities, although one virtually duplicated the other and either could have done the job of both. Mr. McNamara, therefore, had some justification for his "show-me" attitude and for the elaborate system he has established of evaluating and analyzing all new projects. But he or "the system" has over-compensated. The "cost" part of the "cost-effectiveness" formula has been emphasized and underscored at the expense of

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speedy development and new ideas. Never in the history of competition have so many been able to say no, so few to say yes.[2]

In the past, technological development and research and procurement contracting were largely decentralized; the individual services were responsible to a major degree for their own weapons development. Service competition, in the happiest sense, produced the air-cooled aircraft engine (sponsored by the Navy) and the liquid-cooled engine (sponsored by the then Army Air Corps) with which the United States fought and won World War II in the air. One without the other would have been incomplete; service competition produced both.

When a new aircraft was required, the service needing it determined the characteristics wanted to perform the specialized missions contemplated. Competitive contracts were then let for a small number of planes, and actual flight competitions between competing companies were held, with the big payoff production contract going to the contractor who built the best plane, as actually determined in the air.

The services formerly had, within over-all policy and budget limitations, a considerable degree of autonomy, and weapons development and procurement were largely decentralized. What can be done when red tape is cut, authority and responsibility are coupled and organization is decentralized to the working levels is shown by the production of the Polaris missile and the A-11 aircraft. The highly successful and extremely complex Polaris was pushed to completion as an operational weapon in about three and a half years, well ahead of schedule. One man, Vice Admiral W. F. Raborn, was given authority and responsibility to cut across organizational lines, and he was fully backed by the Navy and the Department of Defense. There was then no such centralization in the Pentagon as exists now. The A-11, successor to the famed U-2 high-flying reconnaissance plane, was a secret project, amply funded by the C.I.A. and by the Air Force. With ample funds, full authority and responsibility and a high degree of autonomy, Lockheed Aircraft was twice able to produce—in the U-2 and its successor—world-

[2] Management experts and contractors have pointed out that the exercise of centralized control by the Department of Defense over the services requires information and reports from the services. The self-generating and self-defeating nature of the work-load imposed becomes apparent. The tighter and more centralized the control, the more reports that are required. The more authority taken away from the working level, the more paper work that is required from those at the working level to back up their diminished authority.

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beating aircraft in an abbreviated time-span. Similarly, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who wore two hats—one Navy, one A.E.C.—and whose authority therefore spanned the bifurcated organizational structure, was able to produce what was essentially a new weapons system with minimum delay. The key to these and other successful development and production efforts is the coupling of authority and responsibility at working levels.

Today the entire picture has changed violently. Under the law, separate service departments must be maintained and the services cannot be directly merged; Mr. McNamara has merged them "indirectly," as John C. Ries points out in his new book.[3] A fourth service—the Office of the Secretary of Defense—has been built up as an all-powerful apex. It is far more than a policy-making and coördinating agency, as it was originally intended to be under the National Security Act of 1947; it administers, operates, contracts, develops, procures and commands. Super-agencies, superimposed over the service departments, are answerable only to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Former service functions have been assumed by the Defense Supply Agency, which procures items common to the services; by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency (communications, intelligence and security; codes and ciphers, etc.), the Defense Communications Agency (common and long-lines communications) and the Defense Atomic Support Agency. These have added new super-echelons to the Pentagon bureaucracy.

Mr. McNamara came into office intending—he let it be known—to streamline top echelon Defense Department management. There were some 15 Presidential appointees of the rank of Assistant Secretary of Defense or higher in January 1961 when he took office; there are 16 today. There were 11 Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense two years ago; there are about 30 today.

The Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was originally limited by law by Congress to 100 officers, then increased to 400, a specific limit intended to prevent the development of a super-General Staff; it now numbers the full 400, plus another 1,170 military and civilian personnel. The additional personnel are labeled members of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

[3] "The Management of Defense." Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964.

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a euphemism which permits evasion of the legal restriction (with both Executive departments and Congress winking at the extra-legality). This staff, rich with rank, now has three lieutenant-generals or vice admirals assigned to head its more important sections or divisions, and its director—a three-star general—may be given four stars if current suggestions are carried out.

As one would expect with a gigantic staff which tends to generate its own paper work, the work load of the Joint Chiefs of Staff steadily increases—from 887 papers or reports requiring some action by the J.C.S. in 1958 to about double that number today. Something like a de facto hierarchical general staff now exists, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as a kind of over-all Chief of Staff; and it busies itself with the ridiculous and the petty as well as the crucial and important. (The Joint Chiefs, for instance, determine the details of the administration and curriculum of the National War College and other joint service schools and have even solemnly considered such important matters as the advisability of establishing an all-service soccer team which might compete with European all-stars, and the numbers of cooks, and which services should furnish them, for a U. S. headquarters in Europe.) Representative Charles S. Gubser of California has estimated that there are now a total of some 34,000 employees responsible to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (exclusive of separate service departments in Washington). Statistics like these indicate the revolutionary changes that have occurred within the Pentagon in the past fifteen—particularly in the past four—years. As Mr. Ries puts it, the "dogma of centralization" has triumphed.

Many beside Mr. Ries worry about the capability of the present defense organization to withstand the strain of real war or protracted crises. There have been some disturbing signs of faltering and confusion during the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis and one of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents.

The present Secretary of Defense has a computer mind, capable of absorbing and recording immense quantities of detailed data. He also has ferocious energy. The combination of these two qualities has enabled him, so far, to deal with what Mr. Ries calls the "minutiae that floods upward in a centralized organization." But even Mr. McNamara has several times given evidence of strain, and after Mr. McNamara—who? To decentralize the department so that the Secretary could have time, opportunity

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and assistance to cope with major decisions would require a decrease rather than an increase in the staff of the Secretary—something that no democratic bureaucracy seems capable of accomplishing.

The centralized organization of the Pentagon and the accompanying growth of a bureaucracy—particularly in the upper echelons—explain in part the delays in development and procurement of new weapons systems. In effect, responsibility and authority have been separated in the Pentagon. Vice Admiral Rickover gave several instances of delays caused by bureaucracy in testimony to a Senate Committee in 1958. Purchase of nuclear cores was delayed for six months "just because one staff person with no responsibility but with authority had on his own decided" against the purchase. In March 1964, he testified before a House Appropriations subcommittee on the question of nuclear power for a new aircraft carrier. The carrier itself was already approved by both Congress and the Defense Department. The Navy and most Congressmen felt that such a major new investment should be as modern as possible, and that it should be powered with nuclear reactors rather than with oil, even though the initial cost would be considerably greater. But the subject was studied to death. Admiral Rickover testified: "The Department of Defense itself caused much of the delay. They considered the Navy's request to change it to a nuclear carrier for a year. The Department of Defense kept on asking for more information, more studies, more analyses. New studies and analyses are under way now on nuclear propulsion for the next carrier and other surface warships. These studies never end, and we don't build ships."

The services still have the legal responsibility for development and procurement but not the authority to implement their responsibility. Similarly the responsibility for planning and execution has been separated. The Joint Chiefs no longer legally command anything; in the procurement field the services must often execute or carry out procurement plans they have not formulated (*i.e.* the T.F.X.).

In an admirable attempt to promote some much-needed long-range planning in the armed forces and to control costs, Mr. McNamara instituted what is called the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Management Program, often dubbed "The Book." "The Book" tries to chart and elaborate all major details

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of service force structures (including sizes, types) and weapons systems required, being procured or developed, for the next five years. Any significant change in "The Book," including research expenditures, requires consideration by hundreds of people, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary himself, and an elaborate process of justification, review and approval all along the line from lowest to highest echelons. Contracting, budgeting, progress on weapons systems—and even lawn cutting—are programmed and controlled in detail from various echelons of the Secretary's office, with streams of reports required. The services have complained that there is an inherent, built-in inflexibility and rigidity in this system.

In addition to the Secretary of Defense and his deputy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the 1,570 supporting staff, all of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense have become, not de jure, but de facto, line *operators* as well as *staff* assistants. By virtue of authority delegated by the Secretary, they can and do cut across service lines and intervene at the lowest echelons. Two offices, in particular, have a major influence in weapons development and procurement; unfortunately they are too often delaying factors rather than expediters.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Controller) has completely changed its character under the McNamara régime. Charles J. Hitch, the incumbent, has, with the Secretary's approval, applied the methods he developed as an economic theorist at the RAND Corporation to military strategic programming. The cost-effectiveness of various weapons systems is analyzed on paper by his office, and he and his associates have a powerful voice in determining what kind of weapon will go to what service. Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, does another analytical job, supposedly from the technical and engineering feasibility point of view. His analyses are particularly important in the research and development stages.

Any projected weapons system has to run the gauntlet between the Charybdis of Mr. Hitch and the Scylla of Dr. Brown; but many other high and low echelon perils confront it also. The McNamara administration has established "for all large endeavors" (and for some that are not so large) what it calls a "Project Definition Phase" (P. D. P. in Pentagon jargon). In Secretary McNamara's words, "before full-scale development is initiated, the specific operational requirements and the cost

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effectiveness of the system must be confirmed, and goals, milestones and time schedules must be established. . . . All the aspects of a development are tied together into a single plan which defines, for Government and industry alike, what is wanted, how it is to be designed and built, how it will be used, what it will cost, and what systems and techniques will be used to manage the program. . . ."

The P. D. P. represents the Pentagon's search for "perfection on paper" before any operation begins. There is no doubt that it is an attractive theoretical management tool, but there is also not much doubt that it has delayed development and procurement of new weapons systems, and whether or not the end result in the form of "finished hardware" is actually any better or less expensive, it is still too soon to tell.[4] The T.F.X. (F-111) aircraft for the Air Force and Navy has been programmed and evaluated, analyzed and costed in detail on paper in the "P. D. P."; it is still in the development stage and may not be operational for years to come.[5] This plane, which can vary the sweep of its wings (their angle to the fuselage) in flight, was forced into a preconceived and theoretical mold in the P. D. phase. Mr. McNamara insisted, against service objections, that Navy needs and Air Force needs could be satisfied by a single all-purpose plane, which could be flown from land fields and carrier decks on several entirely different types of missions. The attempt to achieve this —in theory and in blueprint form—required many months be-

[4] Stanley Bernstein, of the Raytheon Company, in a paper "The Impact of Project Definition on Aerospace System Management," delivered at the first annual meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (June 29–July 2, 1964), used the Mobile Medium-Range Ballistic Missile as a case history. He pointed out that contractors were expected to meet some 20 different requirements in a final P. D. P. report. ". . . one may consider the several contractors who participated in the M.M.R.B.M. effort," he said. "Even prior to Department of Defense program authorization in January 1962, companies like Hughes, Thiokol, Martin and many others had been engaged in significant engineering efforts. When Program Definition was authorized, originally as a four-month effort, nine prime companies and many subcontractors and suppliers geared for maximum effort. The four months stretched to almost one year. Motivation has to be maintained. The present status of M.M.R.B.M. is clouded. [Since this paper, M.M.R.B.M. has been virtually killed.] Yet the participants must retain a level of interest in order to be ready to proceed if the program should become active. The maintenance of this motivation is a major management challenge. The requirement for stated performance incentive goals will, inevitably, lead to more conservative design and engineering during the Program Definition Phase. . . . P. D. contracts should not be used as a means of postponing difficult government decisions or to decide what kind of military capability is required."

[5] The practice of "super-study" is extending beyond the Pentagon. The S.S.T., or Supersonic Commercial Transport, is now called the "Super-studied Transport." Najeeb E. Halaby, head of the Federal Aviation Agency, recently said that "Whether or not it ever flies, it will easily be the most analyzed project in the Government's history." If so, this is quite a record.

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fore designs acceptable to both services were evolved. The development contract was finally awarded to Convair and the first of the developmental T.F.X. planes is nearing completion. The Navy fears the finished version may be too heavy for carrier decks.

The finest fighter in the world today, the Navy's McDonnell F-4-B Phantom II, which the Air Force is now buying in quantity in a slightly modified version, was the product of flight competition back in the 50s when the P. D. P. in its present rigid form was unheard of, and centralization in the Pentagon had not reached today's extreme. The McDonnell and Chance-Vought aircraft companies, in response to a Navy need for a supersonic fighter of certain given specifications, were each awarded developmental contracts for a small number of planes. The results were then actually flight-tested in competition. McDonnell won, but the Chance-Vought product was also good and was procured in more limited quantities for specialized reconnaissance and other missions for the fleet.

Many believe that this type of flight and inter-service competition produces the best dividends. One service evolves the plane or engine and (after actual competition between several bidders) contracts for and procures the one best suited to its own specialized needs. That one may well be adapted—after it is operational—to the needs of another service.[6] Each gets the type it wants, and a better plane or weapon than if it had been forced, on paper, into a common mold. For there frequently are incompatible requirements between service weapons systems, and the attempt to provide "commonality" in the interest of reducing costs may well increase cost and reduce combat effectiveness.

It is true, of course, that major weapons development projects have become far more complex and costly than they were ten to twenty years ago. In theory, the attempt of the Department of Defense to "define" a project and to refine it on paper before the steel is bent has a great deal of attractiveness. Many authorities who are loud in condemning the delays of the P. D. P. system do not believe it is economically feasible—at least in all cases—to return to the old era of actual competitive service tests. Others, however, think that competitive testing of several dif-

[6] There are countless instances of this kind of adaptation. In addition to the liquid and air-cooled engines and the F-4-B, the Air Force, for instance, uses the Navy-developed Sidewinder and Bullpup missiles.

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ferent models, while more expensive initially, may actually save money eventually, chiefly because it may result in a better product. Eugene E. Wilson, retired naval officer and retired vice chairman of United Aircraft Corporation, wrote in the September–October 1964 issue of *Shipmate,* the magazine of the U. S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, that "the current practice of awarding production (and development) contracts to a single supplier, on the basis of contract guarantees unsubstantiated by competitive prototype performance . . . will not protect a hapless purchaser (the government) willing to risk his all on computation." The fundamental difficulty with P. D. P. is that it has been invoked as an answer to *all* development and production problems, that it is interpreted too rigidly, and that there has been far too much dependence in the Department of Defense on what is essentially a management tool at the expense of judgment and engineering and scientific intuition.

It is only fair to add that recently the complaints of the services and of industry have resulted in a recognition in the Defense Department of some of these faults. A new and standardized procedure for rating, evaluating and selecting the winning contractors in a screening competition has been under preparation for two years and is now being presented—possibly for final approval—to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For any large projects (exceeding $100,000,000 in production costs) authority will still remain at the highest levels; for smaller projects authority may be delegated to lower echelons. The procedure may—but probably will not—lessen the time lag; certainly it will not change the recent emphasis on "perfection on paper."

In the Program Definition Phase of weapons development three high hurdles, in addition to countless evaluation procedures, cause many projects to stumble and fail.

One is the eruption of inter-service rivalry instead of—in the best sense—inter-service competition. A proposal for a new weapon or aircraft by one service is now picked to pieces and studied on paper by all services before even a minor development contract is approved. Now that their former degree of autonomy is restricted and actual development competition discouraged, the services know that the P. D. phase offers a now-or-never chance. Each service may produce a different concept or a different set of desired performance figures; a long "hassle" ensues to try to put them all into one weapons system. This oc-

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curred, notably, in the case of the T.F.X.; it is happening now with the new COIN (counter-insurgency) aircraft which the Marines want to develop. The result is delay, sometimes a compromise as to performance.

A second factor causing delay and difficulties is the attempt by the Secretary's numerous assistants to eliminate what they call "gold-plating," or unnecessarily high performance figures or standards. The attempt is laudable, but it is sometimes carried to extremes, and it has been difficult, as Admiral George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations, pointed out, for men in uniform to adjust to the idea that a ten-mile-an-hour speed differential between our own aircraft and enemy planes may not —in the eyes of the Department of Defense—be important. To a pilot, that ten miles an hour, even though costly in terms of dollars, may be the difference between life and death.

It is in the P. D. phase, too, that the old bogey of "no operational or military requirement" becomes a major obstacle to weapons development. It is invoked at both high and low levels. Mr. McNamara has been rigid—though with some signs of a slight relaxation recently—about the statement of specific needs before development can start. The "operational requirement," as an experienced naval officer puts it, "is another of the paper obstacles which are intended to insure proper planning but which, when operated by people who have no real knowledge of the problems involved, frustrate progress."

In the military exploitation of a new medium, like space, it is completely impossible to define, in the terms required by the P. D. P. evaluations, the need for, or the performance characteristics of, a new vehicle. How can even a prescient scientist predict what usefulness a Manned Orbiting Laboratory will have? Yet the invocation of "no specific operational requirement" has delayed Air Force development of this highly important new project for at least two to three years.

Representative Chet Holifield's Military Operations Subcommittee of the House recently gave its view of what's wrong with the Pentagon. After a thorough study of Mr. McNamara's protracted efforts to merge military and commercial satellite systems, the subcommittee reported that two years had been wasted. It said: "We still detect uncertainty and overeconomizing in the Defense Department approach . . . there has been overmanagement and underperformance . . . too many layers of supervision,

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the lack of clear-cut responsibility . . . and sluggish channels of . . . communication."

Senator John Stennis, in common with many others, has decried the tendency to be negative, to object, to try to refine requirements in too much detail, to evaluate and study too much. Some weapons systems, he has said, "have literally been studied to death." He cites the B-70 (which dates back in inception to 1954) as a prime example of what happens to a weapons system development "when it is subjected to repeated stops and starts and when there is not a strong, orderly and continuous program to bring it to completion." This bomber, designed for long-range, high-altitude flights at three times the speed of sound, has encountered many technical difficulties and is well behind even a revised schedule. This was made certain by off-again-on-again programs in the Pentagon and by the multi-layered, centralized organization there.

Before a final contract for a project is signed and actual development starts, an average of at least 50 signatures or approvals is required—sometimes as many as 100 to 200. Some individuals, required by legal or administrative reasons to sign twice, have had to be briefed twice; by the time the second signature was needed they had forgotten what the contract was about.

It is true that centralization in the development and procurement field, epitomized by the Five Year Force Structure and the Program Definition Phase, was in part the outgrowth of inadequate management by the services of some research and development contracts. It was also the result of the failure of past Secretaries of Defense to exercise the power they have always had by eliminating—not service competition—but duplicatory and unnecessary service rivalry. But the cure has proved worse than the disease.

Healthy service competition can be encouraged and unhealthy service rivalry can be discouraged by:

1. Abandonment of attempts—keyed primarily to costs, not effectiveness—to force service weapons systems into "all-purpose" molds. "Commonality" develops naturally from actual technological accomplishments, not from "P. D. P.'s" or paper plans.

2. Return, in so far as possible, to competition in hardware rather than competition on paper. The end product is almost certain to be better, and ultimately may cost less.

3. Sponsorship, within a service, or by two or more services, of

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competitive research and development projects, all having a common goal, but each following different technological paths to that goal.

4. Definite selection by the Defense Department at the earliest possible stage of the best project; cancellation of the others.

The key lessons for tomorrow are two. Responsibility and authority must be coupled at *working levels* in the management of research and development and production contracts. And there must be a much higher degree of job stability and continuity in management than the rotational policies of the services have made possible in the past.[7]

III

Mr. Ries, whose studious book on defense organization cannot be accused of service or political partisanship, quotes Ernest Dale as writing in the *American Economic Review* for May 1961: "The greatest single bane of management today is its growing absolutism, its refusal to discuss or listen to different opinions." Mr. Ries declares that "fantastic though it may seem, defense reformers have succeeded in turning the calendar back sixty years."

Whether one agrees with this strong statement or not, there can be no basic disagreement with the testimony given to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1949 by Ferdinand Eberstadt, one of the most perceptive students of defense organization. He said: "From shattered illusions that mere passage of a unification act would produce a military utopia, there has sprung an equally illusory belief that present shortcomings will immediately disappear if only more and more authority is conferred on the Secretary of Defense, and more and more people added to his staff. . . . I suggest that great care be exercised lest the Office of Secretary of Defense, instead of being a small and efficient unit which determines the policies of the Military Establishment and controls and directs the departments, feeding on its own growth, becomes a separate empire."

Today the separate empire exists. Parkinson's law must be reversed if the Pentagon is to stop "feeding on its own growth" and if ideas, weapons development and imaginative policies are to be encouraged.

[7] As Representative Melvin Price notes, one reason, for example, that the Army (nuclear) reactor program (a program for developing a small portable nuclear reactor which could provide power in remote areas) has fallen flat on its face is that the Army kept transferring out the managers of the program. There were six different managers in five years.

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U.S.A. AND U.A.R.

A Crisis in Confidence

By John S. Badeau

DURING recent Congressional debates on aid legislation many harsh things were said about the United Arab Republic and its President. One Senator stated that "Col. Abdel Nasser . . . has been responsible more than any other single individual for keeping the political cauldron boiling in the arid, strife-torn Middle East . . . pouring oil on whatever brush fires break out." President Nasser has been equally sharp and critical. Early in 1964 he publicly described American foreign policy toward the Arab world as "not based on justice but on the support and consolidation of the base of aggression, Israel, and we cannot, under any circumstances, accept it."

To be sure, much of this may be dismissed as political talk for the public ear. Nasser, no less than American Senators, has a constituency which periodically must be stirred up and marshaled for support. There is thus little new in the current skirmishing between Arab and American spokesmen—but those who follow U.S.A.-U.A.R. relations closely feel there ought to be. For this increased tempo in verbal attacks comes during a period of notable improvement in relations, when both the United States and the U.A.R., as a matter of basic policy, have been trying to get along with each other.

For both parties the change began in the aftermath of the Suez affair. By its prompt support of the United Nations and its refusal to back the Israeli-Anglo-French invasion, the United States gave practical proof of its impartiality in Middle East quarrels which threatened the peace of the area and the world. This was followed by a quiet mending of relations in the closing days of the Eisenhower Administration. Economic aid to Egypt was cautiously reinstituted and a franker exchange of views took place. President Kennedy supported and expanded this policy, identifying the Middle East as an area vital to American interests. He sought to develop relations with Egypt around points of mutual interest, while recognizing that the United States had, and would continue to have, sharp differences with Nasser.

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In making this approach, the United States paid particular attention to economic assistance. Whatever else the revolution in Egypt stands for, it is the most vigorous attack on the perennial problems of poverty, disease, ignorance and privilege ever seen in the ancient Valley of the Nile. With a burgeoning population (doubled since 1936), severe limitation of arable land ($3\frac{1}{2}$ percent of the country's total area), and limited foreign exchange earnings (chiefly the cotton crop, Suez Canal tolls and tourism), it is obvious that the U.A.R. cannot forge ahead with desperately needed modernization and social advance without substantial foreign assistance.

Here was a point of mutual concern on which closer American-Egyptian relations could be built. On its part, the U.A.R. needed to develop a healthy and progressive society without being captured in the process by the Soviet bloc. But a socially stable and progressive Egypt was also in the interests of the United States, one of whose basic Middle East policies is to contribute wherever possible to tranquility through social progress in this vital region. Political and economic chaos in the Valley of the Nile would have repercussions in the surrounding area. Both in its own right, and as a major influence in the Arab world, the sound economic progress of Egypt is a desirable American objective. American economic assistance, chiefly through the P.L. 480 Food Program, was therefore increased.

Egypt's response to this approach opened a new era in U.S.A.-U.A.R. relations. A cultural agreement was signed in 1962. In 1963, after 11 years of negotiation, Egypt entered into an Investment Guarantee Agreement with the United States, aimed at stimulating and protecting American business interests. On several occasions, notably at the Economic Conference in Cairo in the summer of 1962, the U.A.R. played a moderating role in containing African and Asian extremists. Nasser opposed the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing and shifted his policy away from supporting Gizenga in the Congo. While maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba, the U.A.R. displayed little enthusiasm for Castro and took a reasonably sympathetic attitude toward President Kennedy's showdown with Khrushchev. And for the first time in some years, the controlled press in Egypt gave a fairly objective, often sympathetic, account of American actions.

Against this background of coöperation, the shrill crescendo

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of bitter accusation between American and Egyptian leaders strikes an ominous discord. A popular Egyptian proverb says, "One day it's honey—the next onions." After the good diet of the past three years, are American-Egyptian relations in for a ration of onions? Under the present Administration, the United States made its most determined effort to protect its interests in the Near East through a reasonable rapprochement with the U.A.R. Are all such efforts bound to be fleeting? What is it that interrupts them just when everything seems to be going well?

The answer is not to be found so much in specific policies of the two countries as in the atmosphere within which these take place. At the end of the First World War an American observer reported that "Before all else [the nations of the Near East] need renewed confidence in each other and in us, and in our honest purposes of good." That is as true today as it was 40 years ago. The day of honey in Arab-American relations so easily changes into a day of onions because there is mutual distrust of each other's "honest purposes of good." Actions in themselves relatively minor become objects of deep suspicion because they are seen as cloaks for "imperialism," "neo-colonialism," "pan-Arabism" or the personal ambitions of some Arab ruler. The crisis is often a crisis of confidence, generating a fog of suspicion which chokes good relations and makes it difficult to negotiate a lasting solution to differences.

It is a crisis in confidence which currently threatens American relations with the U.A.R. Although the mutuality of interests continues, the United States is wondering whether in the light of recent events it can trust the U.A.R. to follow a reasonably consistent course of coöperation—or will it undercut vital American interests in the Arab world at its own whim? And can the U.A.R. trust the United States to pursue its present course with continuity—or will the erratic winds of changing administrations and election pressures continually blow American foreign policy off course? It is doubt about these fundamentals of the American-Egyptian relationship which has created a crisis between the two nations.

One reason for such doubts is the very success of recent policy. Each party now finds itself playing an important role in the national interests of the other—a role in which the "capacity to hurt" is large. American food makes a massive contribution to the well-being of Egypt and is a resource on which the U.A.R.

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national budget is currently based. While the country could get along without it (as the aftermath of Suez shows), the withdrawal of our food sales would create a serious economic problem. Moreover, the attitude of the United States influences both government and private credit resources in Western countries upon which the U.A.R. now depends for its badly needed foreign currency assistance. Thus the U.A.R. is nervous about anything which might suggest a sudden shift in American policy and scrutinizes carefully and suspiciously every American statement, fearing the worst.

But the United States also is nervous about Egypt. The U.A.R. and its President are the single most powerful force in the Arab world. With the largest and most modernly equipped Arab army, the most powerful and sophisticated propaganda system and wide appeal among the Arab masses, President Nasser has a potential which cannot be neglected by any nation having interests in the Near East. He has the power to harm American interests to a considerable degree—as the response to his call for liquidating the American air base in Libya shows. It is not simply a matter of power and ambition; Nasser typifies the socially revolutionary and politically self-determining forces which are at work in most countries of the Near East. If these forces, under the spell of Nasser's leadership, are aroused against American interests in Libya, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, they can cause much trouble, even if they might not in the end totally destroy the United States' position.

But this mutual fear is more than a current mood, bred by recent experience. There are, in fact, good reasons for the United States and Egypt to suspect each other—reasons which have a long history. Each nation has a bill of particulars against the other, drawn from the experiences of the last decade. It is this which forms the reservoir of suspicion from which a crisis of confidence is so easily drawn.

II

On Egypt's part, the first count against the United States is the *unpredictability of its policy*. American-Egyptian relations since the Revolution in 1952 amply illustrate this. In the opening stages of the new régime, America was closely and hopefully identified with it, believing that a change in social and political conditions was long overdue in the Valley of the Nile.

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This led to a "honeymoon" policy, when sympathy and identity of interests seemed high.

In 1955 this cordial relation abruptly changed, due to Egyptian arms purchases from the Soviets. Failing to secure military equipment from the West on acceptable terms, Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc. The American reaction was a reversal of policy, which now set itself to contain and separate Egypt from its Arab neighbors. This was the policy of "isolation"—a long cry from the "honeymoon" which preceded it.

This policy failed. The United States was unable to isolate Egypt, the Israeli-Anglo-French invasion of Egypt brought Nasser to the summit of his influence in the area, and it became clear that some new approach was needed. In the aftermath of Suez, America therefore shifted to a line that was "cautious but correct," gradually reinstituting aid and seeking at least minimal normal relations.

Under President Kennedy, this was reinforced and expanded to become a policy of "selective coöperation" built on mutual interests. In no sense was this a return to the "honeymoon," with uncritical support of all U.A.R. policies. Rather it was based upon a sense of mutual needs and a willingness to concentrate on these instead of on the many disputes which had soured past relations.

Thus in less than a decade the United States has followed four different policies toward Egypt. While each is defensible in terms of the conditions which produced it, the effect on the Egyptian is to create the impression that American actions are unpredictable, not built upon clear principles—indeed, not even built upon a consistent view of America's own interests. It is this penchant for change in the American course which makes the Egyptian reserved and suspicious of us, especially during a period when relations are good.

A second cause of Egyptian suspicion is the rapid rise of American power, particularly in and near the Middle East. Prior to the Second World War, the American presence in the Arab world consisted chiefly of missionaries, educators, archeologists and a limited number of businesses, petroleum being the largest. The United States was a threat to no one; it had no bases, no troops, no fleets, and it displayed none of the panoply of power Arabs expected from a great nation.

This changed after the war. Beginning with President Tru-

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man's commitment to the defense of Turkey and Greece in 1947, the United States played an increasing role in the area. Military bases in Morocco, Libya, Turkey and Arabia, the powerful Sixth Fleet always just across the horizon, support for the military establishments of Iran, Turkey and Greece, the landing of Marines in Lebanon—these were disturbing proofs to the Arab that the United States had become a military presence which could interfere with actions of the Arab states whenever it chose. What Great Britain once was, the United States has now become —the policeman of the world. Therefore the spectre of American might *in the Middle East* always lurks just off-stage and Egyptians are convinced that at some unexpected point it will step from the wings to play the dominant role in their affairs.

This fear is fed by a third suspicion—that the United States is too often in league with the forces of "imperialism and neo-colonialism." What the Egyptians mean by this is not (despite the paragraph above) that America will deliberately seek to create a Middle East empire. It is that we are damned by our association with the British and the "reactionary" Arab régimes. As to Britain, many Arabs believe that the present remnants of its historic position in the Middle East are supported by the United States. While at the time of the Suez invasion in 1956 the United States joined in condemning (and thus terminating) the Anglo-French invasion, within a few days we froze Egyptian assets in America, refused to sell food and drugs to Egypt, and ended the CARE program. Obviously, it is argued, America was prepared to support Britain as far as it dared.

This identification with "imperialism" is given more substance by our interests in and association with Arab régimes which the Egyptian considers "reactionary." By this he means the monarchies of the area and their governments which he claims do not represent popular consent or the interests of the people. The Egyptian argument is that these régimes are based upon an economic and political élite who keep power against the best interests of the common masses by coöperating with the foreign power having a stake in the country. He believes that the very character of the régimes in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya (to name the current lot) drive them into subservience to Western, therefore American, power. This is the "neo-colonialism" against which the non-aligned world so frequently agitates as a threat to its untrammeled independence.

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These three causes for distrust are brought to a focus in the problem that most continuously and deeply besets our relations with the Arab world—the question of Israel. There are many aspects to this tangled affair, but as regards American foreign policy the heart of the matter is that the Egyptian (and most of his fellow Arabs) believes that Israel exercises a veto power on American policy toward the Arab world. Whatever understanding of the realities of Arab life there may be in American circles, and however logically American interests can be served by at least an even-handed policy toward the Arabs, the Egyptian is convinced that when the cards are down Israel and its supporters can force the United States to make their interests paramount. Thus the Egyptian believes that no balanced American policy toward the Arab world can be permanent. Sooner or later it will run counter to Israeli interests, and when that happens, the United States Government is powerless to hold to its course.

So runs the Egyptian indictment. But Americans have equally deep suspicions of the U.A.R. Most basic is the conviction that Egypt and its President are compulsive meddlers in the affairs of their neighbors. Both openly and secretly they stir up strife, support dissident movements and seek the overthrow of régimes of which they disapprove. Even Egyptians recognize this and express themselves in one of Cairo's many jokes about the régime. According to the story, when President Nasser went to Algeria last spring, he took with him a number of movie films, one of his favorite forms of relaxation. Among these was "Mutiny on the *Bounty*." After seeing the picture, the President sent a cable to the Foreign Office saying, "Contact the mutineers on the *Bounty* immediately. Tell them we support their cause and any attack on them will be considered an attack on the U.A.R!"

During the past two years there have been five instances of U.A.R. meddling which particularly disturbed Americans. The first was Egypt's support for the coup d'état which overthrew the Imam of Yemen. What began as modest help to Republican forces against the Royalists ended with full-scale military occupation of the country. Egypt eventually had nearly 40,000 troops in the Yemen. A second instance was the dispatch of U.A.R. arms and technicians in support of Algeria in its border dispute with Morocco—and this at a time when Cuba was also getting into the act.

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The third incident was the supply of small arms to the Government of Cyprus during the current civil war on that unfortunate island. While any government has the legal right to sell arms to another government, it seemed that Greek Cypriots had ample quantities of weapons on hand, both for their regular and irregular forces. What reason had the U.A.R. to contribute to an already over-abundant supply except the desire to fan the fires of conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots? And why did Nasser welcome Makarios so warmly to Cairo this summer, unless the U.A.R. is more interested in perpetuating than in calming the Cyprus disorders?

The fourth instance is perhaps the most serious. In February 1964, President Nasser, in a public speech heard throughout the Arab world, called for the ending of British and American base rights in Libya. The response was an immediate public furore in Libya which came dangerously near to ending in the abdication of the King. Once again Egypt was interfering in the affairs of its neighbors, and in a form directly challenging an American interest.

Finally, there is the current Egyptian campaign against the South Arabian Federation and its British sponsors. Here is an area remote from the U.A.R., without visible impact on Egyptian security interests. Whether the Egyptian offensive is a diversionary ploy in the Yemen affair or a more general stirring up of trouble for trouble's sake, it only confirms American opinion that the U.A.R. is always minding someone else's business.

This continuous "keeping the pot boiling" by Egypt causes serious problems for the United States. Not only does it have a number of specific interests in the countries involved, but its policy has been to promote tranquility among Middle Eastern states. We believe that disputes, small in themselves, run the risk of inviting outside interference and so spreading into a major conflict. We do not want to see our friends in Arab countries threatened by Egyptian meddling and we do not intend to have world peace shattered by small-nation disputes.

The second set of American complaints against the U.A.R. is related to the first. Egypt's ability to involve itself in affairs throughout the area is based in part on its military and propaganda strength, and this deflects money from urgently needed economic development. While not massive as modern armies go (about 150,000 men for a population of 28,000,000), Egyp-

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tian forces are the biggest and best-equiped in the Arab world. Their weapons and aircraft are by far the most sophisticated. Egyptian secret activities abroad in the form of subsidies, weapon supply and agents are large and continuous. These efforts are supported and extended by propaganda including subsidies to newspapers, writers, conferences, foreign students studying in the U.A.R. and an extensive multilingual radio program.

All this is expensive. It may be argued that all nations incur such expenses; they are accepted in our chaotic modern world as a necessary part of "national security" which costs us all so much. But the point for Egypt is that it cannot afford the role of a dominant or dominating power in the area and at the same time win its internal fight against ignorance, poverty and backwardness. Remarkable improvements have been made in Egyptian life under Nasser's régime, but it is still touch and go as to whether the Egyptian economy can permanently bear the burden. Why does the U.A.R. insist on incurring a high bill for activities abroad when at least some of this money is so desperately needed at home?

A third general cause for American suspicion toward Egypt is the continuing concentration of political power in personal hands. This is what the American means when he speaks of "dictatorship"—not so much a theory of government (as Fascism or Nazism) as a practical situation in which the fate of society and individuals is determined by one man or a small group of men upon whom the citizenry has no form of restraint.

It was to be expected that in the early days of the Revolution Colonel Nasser and his associates should become the de facto center of power in the country. But if a revolution is to be anything more than a coup d'état, it must eventually broaden its base, diffuse its power and build a rule of law. None of these things appears to have happened yet in Egypt. Laws are promulgated by Presidential decree, there is no provision for a "loyal opposition," and expressions of criticism of government policies are only possible within the very narrow limits set by the Government itself. The press is firmly controlled. At times private citizens are under sharp surveillance (as during the 1962 French spy trials) and "guilt by association" plays a large role.

All this does not add up to a police state in the full pattern so familiar in Communist countries. But it does have a profound effect on society, generating an atmosphere of unpredictability

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and curtailed liberty. In so far as the American sees world issues as involving the principles of freedom and responsibility, he is suspicious of the character of the Egyptian régime and the direction it has thus far been traveling.

This suspicion is related to another American question about the U.A.R., namely its relation to the Communist world. The more extreme statements that Nasser is at least a crypto-Communist and that Egypt is in fact, if not in desire, a Communist satellite can be dismissed as uninformed and wishful thinking. But whatever its intentions, the U.A.R., as Americans see it, has put itself dangerously in fee to the Soviet system. The Egyptian army is equipped from top to toe with Soviet weapons. This makes the nation entirely dependent upon Soviet good will for military spare parts and replacements. In fact, the Soviet monopoly on the Egyptian régime's chief instrument of power—its military establishment—gives the Russians an absolute veto on certain Egyptian policies if they care to use it. Whatever the U.A.R.'s dedication to independence may be, its freedom of action in relation to the Soviets is more sharply limited than it is in relation to the free world.

Added to this is the belief that Soviet and U.A.R. policies in the Middle East too often coincide. A major Soviet objective has been to dispossess the Western powers of influence in the area, thus opening the way for Soviet action. The U.A.R. would appear to serve this through its attack on the British position, foreign bases (which are all Western) and non-revolutionary Arab states with which the West has close relations. Thus, while Egypt does not intend to be a Soviet satellite, its own activities sometimes aid and abet Soviet interests and cause problems for the United States.

Finally, there is Israel. Depending on the knowledge and emotional commitment of the American, his attitude ranges from seeing in Nasser the dragon who will devour Israel as soon as he is strong enough, to the more sober recognition that the U.A.R.'s continued hostility to Israel is the keystone of the Arab attitude which refuses to consider even a remote possibility of peace discussions. This concerns many Americans who are in no sense Israeli protagonists. In so far as the Arab-Israeli dispute is a constant source of tension and conflict, its lack of solution is a constant threat to tranquility, progress and stability in the Middle East. Many Americans want it settled, not because they

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favor Israel or the Arabs, but because they are thoroughly weary of alarms and excursions which periodically set the world's teeth on edge. If the U.A.R. would exercise its leadership in the Arab world for a gradual rapprochement with Israel, everyone would breathe easier.

Accusation and counter-accusation—how much of it is strictly true? Only a detailed study of each issue would answer this, and then it would be seen that there is confusion as to facts and highly questionable judgments in the interpretation of them. But one thing is clear, when all the mythology has been extracted from the mutual causes for suspicion, a hard core of fact remains. Egypt has sound reasons for mistrusting the United States, and the United States cannot help but mistrust it in return. The crisis in confidence is real, not artificial, and it is the chief factor which must be taken into account by both countries if they desire to continue reasonably cordial relations to their mutual benefit.

Can confidence be restored? Given the causes for suspicion recounted above, it may be argued that this is impossible; the gulf is too wide and has been deepened over too many years to be bridged now. This is certainly true for the immediate future. Both parties need to understand and admit that the restoration of confidence is a slow business and that no sudden change in foreign policies will bring it about immediately. For one thing, national as well as personal characteristics are hard to change. Egypt is a revolutionary society and nothing the United States can do will alter that fact. All the problems of dealing with its ebullient and frequently embarrassing activities will continue and must be recognized as part of the given situation. On its part, the United States will not change its character as a leader of the free world with interests that frequently run counter to Egyptian desires. No matter what Egypt thinks or does, America will not place its own and its partners' security in jeopardy by turning a blind eye on any Egyptian activity which causes tumult in the Near East or appears to strengthen the Soviet position.

This is to say that both countries will get along better only if each is more realistic about its capabilities of easily and quickly influencing the other's course of action. Americans are prone to think that they can play God in Near Eastern (and other) affairs, shoring up or bringing down régimes, or by threats and economic pressure forcing the U.A.R. Government to take actions which it judges to be against its basic national interests. And

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Egyptians equally exaggerate their limited ability to put pressure on the United States through propaganda, appeals to revolutionary groups in other countries, or agitation against American positions such as Wheelus Air Base and the petroleum interests at the head of the Persian Gulf. Each country can damage the other, but neither can force a basic change in policy unless it is prepared to resort to overt action—and in this the United States is in the stronger position.

If this fact is accepted, it means that differences and clashes of interest between the United States and Egypt will continue for some time. The problem is not to wipe these out (which is impossible) but to curtail and contain their power to threaten a reasonable relationship between the two countries. For this both sides must be prepared to take some positive steps. For the Egyptians, there must be a greater appreciation that the public image they create in the American mind largely determines what it is possible for the U.S. Government to do. The United States is a democracy, which Egyptians do not fully understand. Neither the Secretary of State nor the President can sustain a policy toward Egypt (even when it is in the best interests of the United States) without some Egyptian help in creating a climate of favorable public opinion. When this climate is unfavorable, it is not because (as alleged by Egyptians) the American press is controlled by pro-Israeli interests or American Senators who are captives of the Jewish vote. It is because of what the Egyptians themselves do. They can now do several things which will help their position.

One is to display more dedication to carrying out their word. Failure to make even token troop withdrawals under the Yemen disengagement agreement has seriously shaken American faith in President Nasser's *bona fides*. Actions taken against foreign companies in Egypt despite earlier agreements and promises have the same effect. In general, Egypt must work to correct the impression of undependability which its actions have generated.

Egypt can also affect the American attitude by emphasizing accomplishments rather than propaganda as its implement of influence in the Arab world. The sound development of the Valley of the Nile economy with resulting success in raising living standards will do much more to win Egypt a good reputation in the Middle East and abroad than strident and vicious radio broadcasts. The real measure of the Egyptian Revolution's place in

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history will not be the extent to which it can outdo other Arabs in invective, but the degree to which it can stand upon its actual accomplishments of a better society. The Egyptian image as a responsible Arab world power has been badly damaged by its unceasing and raucous broadcasts.

Again the American attitude will be affected by the efficiency with which the Egyptian social and economic plans are carried forward. Great changes for good have taken place in Egypt, but great wastage of human and economic resources has also taken place in the process. American economic assistance has been large; but it is difficult to make the case for its continuance unless the Egyptian developmental process is tightened and foreign adventures curtailed in the interest of internal development. Economic conditions in Egypt are not as bad as many foreign observers would like to believe, but they are considerably worse than the Egyptian official admits. If the American is to be induced to continue helping in the remaking of the Egyptian system, he must be given more confidence in the process.

Then there is the difficult matter of Israel, which creates a continuing and most exacerbating strain in U.A.R.-U.S. relations. Americans cannot expect Egypt to change its basic attitudes on this, any more than France can expect the United States to change its attitude toward Red China. But there are several things Egypt can do to ease the situation and thus create confidence in America, particularly in non-Zionist circles. One is to let its actions speak rather than its words. The Egyptian policy toward Israel over the past few years has, in fact, been encouragingly moderate. Nasser's public eschewal of aggressive military action as an answer to the current Israeli utilization of Jordan waters is a case in point. The trouble is that Presidential speeches often outrun Presidential policies. The Israel dispute is unnecessarily dragged in on every occasion and vague verbal attacks on Israel are taken at their face value in Congress and by the American public.

Even more important would be some steps by the U.A.R. toward alleviating the arms race with Israel. It is the American conviction that this can be done without imperiling the basic security of the United Arab Republic. Acceptance of international safeguards in the development of atomic power and some willingness to consider means by which the arms level can be frozen at its present position would create a very favorable world reaction.

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Even if Israel did not respond, or respond fully, Egyptian leadership in this would go far to encourage the great mass of Americans both in and out of government who want only to see peace in the Middle East.

But the task of creating confidence is not Egypt's alone; the United States must also be prepared to make some changes. The first is a greater consistency of approach. American foreign policy toward Egypt has been so erratic largely because Americans—like Egyptians—react rather than act. They do not recognize that it is possible for two countries to oppose each other on specific issues while maintaining a continuing and mutually profitable relation. It is too often an "all or nothing" policy. Either American wheat buys Egyptian compliance to an American viewpoint, or there will be no American wheat. This assumes that the object of American aid is to "bring Egypt to heel," and that when this fails the only alternative is pressure totally to stop the aid program. This seldom works, and particularly it does not work with President Nasser. If the United States desires to protect such national interests as involve the U.A.R., it must be prepared steadily and quietly to pursue a policy that does not fluctuate like the stock market with every political crisis. American policy must be aimed at maintaining a relationship with Egypt, not on seeking pretexts to sever it.

This means that the United States must be more clear-sighted in defining for itself and the U.A.R. what its vital interests are. There is a confusion in the American mind—even among policy-makers—between American interests and what Americans consider desirable. The latter is as broad as the moral values of the particular observer and includes a free press, the parliamentary system, private enterprise—or even the whole gamut of the American political system. Desirable as these may be to the American, they are not *per se* American interests, involving the essentials of national security. It is these latter which are the central concern of foreign policy and the American approach to the U.A.R. must be made consistent with them.

It is as difficult for the United States to decrease suspicions generated by its policy toward Israel as it is for the U.A.R. in the same situation. But the attempt must be made if American interests in the Arab world are not to suffer needlessly. The United States—like the U.A.R.—has certain commitments in the Arab-Israeli situation from which it will not retreat. These in-

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clude recognition of Israel as a sovereign and continuing member of the international community of nations and support for and collaboration with the United Nations in dealing with questions arising from the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Arabs need to understand and respect these commitments, as Americans must do. It needs to be made clear both in Congress and in sections of the general public that the American commitment to Israel is *limited*. Our commitments are not based on the assumption that in every and all circumstances we will come to Israel's aid. Nor is Israel (or any other Middle East state) the chosen instrument of the United States in its policy toward the area. The basic consideration must always be what serves *American* interests in the Middle East. And this must be so regardless of its effect in helping or hurting either Israel or the U.A.R.

This principle is understood in policy-making circles in Washington and, in general, action accords with it. The difficulty lies in the sensitive domestic political situation. Often it is felt that Israel and her protagonists must be placated by public statements, even though these do not herald a shift in American policy. It is too much to expect that all politicians will resist the temptation to drag Israel into their election campaigns as a vote-catching device, but at least responsible government spokesmen can take more care as to the place and content of their speeches. It was unfortunate that President Johnson's first policy statement on the Middle East was made before an organization identified with Israel, just as it would have been equally unfortunate if it had been made to a pro-Arab group. It would also help if American policy decisions involving Israel could be kept out of election campaigns, thus underscoring their character as considered moves based upon American national interest and not merely election gestures.

Difficult tasks are evidently involved for both parties. Many will say, "Why bother to attempt them, when the differences between the two countries are so continuous and exasperating?" The answer is that both Egypt and the United States need each other; their realistic national interests demand reasonably cooperative relations. This is why, despite the strains and vagaries of policy during the past decade, there has never been an irrevocable rupture. In each period of bad relations, as the point of no return approached, both parties paused, took a new tack and tried to repair the breach. In the aftermath of the Soviet arms

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deal the United States did not succeed in isolating Egypt and possibly bringing about its downfall; and Egypt, despite strenuous efforts during the same period, did not permanently hurt American interests in the Arab world. Both found their capabilities more limited than they thought and their mutual interests more powerful than they had admitted. They therefore gradually returned to a policy of fostering better relations.

It is these mutual interests which form the basis of an enduring relation between the two countries. Despite suspicions, clashes and differences in policy, the United States and the United Arab Republic have concerns in common on which a reasonable cooperation can be built. Egypt wants to develop in independence, without becoming either a Western or a Soviet satellite. Similarly the United States, now increasingly recognizing the inevitability (and often the utility) of the non-aligned position of many nations, is concerned to see Egypt independent. Egypt wants a better and more stable social system, with a rise in living standards for the masses of the Nile Valley. Here again American and Egyptian interests coincide; a stable Egypt is very much desired by the United States, for a major catastrophe there would have repercussions throughout the entire Arab world. To improve its economic situation, Egypt needs continuing ties with the West; even if the Soviet connection were to be increased vastly, the Soviet bloc cannot do what needs to be done for the Egyptian economy. And all of Egypt's foreign cultural, intellectual and technical traditions are of the Western world. With them the Egyptian feels at home. To make this Western connection secure in both its economic and cultural aspects, Egypt needs good relations with the United States.

So long as the United States has vital interests in Arab lands and the United Arab Republic has a role of influence and leadership, the two countries cannot escape doing business with each other. The question is whether they can be sufficiently mature, clear-sighted and patient to work out gradually a consistent and mutually profitable relationship.

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BRAZIL: COMPLEX GIANT

By Hilgard O'Reilly Sternberg

FOR the *caboclo* of the Amazon flood-plain, jabbing the blade of his paddle into the silty waters of the wide main stream, or gliding through a tunnel of trees and vines in some small black-water tributary, there is one Brazilian reality. Quite another exists for the northeastern *vaqueiro,* riding in leather armor through the thorny bush of his drought-smitten land. Different images of their country are held by a gold-miner in Minas Gerais, a *herva-mate* gatherer in Mato Grosso, a sheepherder in Rio Grande do Sul, a coffee planter in São Paulo or another of the many regional types of rural Brazil. The factory hand or the construction worker may think back with nostalgia to the countryside from which he came, but now Brazil is to him a throbbing manufacturing center, an urban sprawl, perhaps a hillside shanty town inserted in a beautiful landscape and overlooking luxurious apartment buildings.

There is, indeed, an extraordinary diversity in the land and in the peoples of Brazil. This diversity separates regions of different latitudes, geological structures, land forms, climate and vegetation. It also separates people who live side by side but in different cultural ages—some whose only tool may be a simple hoe, others employing the most advanced technology. And it is precisely in the light of this cultural diversity, interacting with a complex pattern of physical and biotic features, that Brazil's unity appears so surprising.

II

The personality of the country—so hard to pin down—is being molded by the combination and assimilation of very heterogeneous ethnic and cultural components. Inhabited until the sixteenth century by a Stone-Age people, Brazil has been the physically diversified stage for a unique and impressive mingling of Europeans, Africans and Orientals—among themselves and with the aboriginal stock.

Whereas the Spaniards, at the time of the Conquista, were able to cram their galleons with treasures accumulated by the subjugated natives, the Portuguese had to turn to the more prosaic chores of agriculture. In this they were handicapped by

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the fact that the total population of the mother country was only of the order of 1,300,000 inhabitants and that their overseas colonies in Africa and the Orient quite often represented a tremendous drain on arms, money—and men. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the keynote of expansion and settlement came to be miscegenation. Portuguese blood was spread thin, but half-breeds—like the Portuguese-Indian *mamelucos,* fanning out from São Paulo—established the sovereignty of Portugal over literally millions of square miles.

After four centuries, there are still some isolated tribes of Indians, part living in unexplored regions, part being intruded upon by civilization. Sometimes this contact involves bloody conflicts, such as the massacre of July 1962, when the Apuranã, considered to be "pacified" and more or less integrated, butchered seven whites and left more than one hundred wounded in a rubber-gathering area along the Purus river. Notwithstanding such guerrilla warfare, the Indian is being rapidly assimilated and disappearing as an individualized component of the Brazilian population, of which he represents, according to liberal estimates, considerably less than 0.2 percent.

As the Amerinds soon proved to be uncoöperative and inefficient workers—from the point of view of the Portuguese, that is—settlers resorted to slave labor imported from Africa. According to the last available census data, Negroes represent roughly 10 percent of the present population. But four centuries of intermarriage have resulted in innumerable shadings from white to brown to black, and not too much reliance should be placed on this figure or others pertaining to classification by ethnic groups. They are certainly not of much concern to the vast majority of Brazilians, used to a free and easy association among the races.

Starting in 1808, when foreigners were assured the right of land ownership, immigration from Europe and the Orient has occurred in more or less well defined waves, each characterized by the predominance, but not exclusiveness, of one ethnic group. Thus, there was a German, an Italian, a Japanese phase. Some immigrants came to settle as freeholders, like the Germans and Italians in Rio Grande do Sul. Others, like the Italians in São Paulo, arrived to pick up the rudimentary implements which the plantation Negroes dropped upon abolition of slavery. In some cases, small contingents of immigrants caused a cultural impact out of proportion to their numbers. An extreme case is perhaps

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that of the French cultural influence, which has put such a lasting stamp on sophisticated circles of Brazilian urban society and which has practically no substratum of French immigration. Throughout all these periods, Portuguese immigrants continued to disembark in what had been their largest colony.

Regardless of the complexity of Brazil's ethnic and cultural composition, one feels there is a unique Brazilian theme ringing through the country—for all the fascinating variations which are played upon it. It is interesting to notice that the fisherman of the Northeast put out to sea in *jangadas,* a version of the aboriginal raft, or that in many parts of Brazil popular music reflects rhythms harking back to Africa. But such cultural characteristics cut across the different ethnic groups, just as, for instance, certain African religious rites have been adopted by members of the white-skinned population—even by some upper-class whites.

The importance of some immigrant groups derives first and foremost from the fact that they are bearers of culture, capable, even in relatively small numbers, of enriching the Brazilian heritage. It does not derive from their limited contribution to the very rapid growth of the Brazilian population. In fact, it is doubtful if non-Portuguese immigrants and their Brazilian-born offspring represent more than 10 percent of the present population, whose upsurge is mainly due to natural increment. The main factor here is a very high birth rate, which more than offsets a high but rapidly declining death rate.

In 1850, the citizens of Brazil numbered a mere 7,200,000, well below the population of France, Italy or Spain. In 1960, Brazil, mustering 71,000,000 people, had far outstripped these countries and had become, in number of inhabitants, the foremost country of Latin language and—with various enrichments—Latin culture. Should the rate of decennial increase continue around the 37 percent observed in the period 1950–60, Brazil will be pushing the 100,000,000 mark by 1970.

The age structure of the Brazilian population shows a very high proportion of young people in relation to those in the productive ages, who thus have to bear a heavy burden of dependency. This situation is, of course, unfavorable to the accumulation of capital and the economic development of the country. Furthermore, with so many mouths to feed, children and adolescents are called on very early to work as helpers, especially in the rural areas, and are unable to finish—or often even to start—schooling.

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A high rate of illiteracy is, therefore, an added obstacle to the raising of living standards.

To say that the average density of population in Brazil is around 25 inhabitants per square mile (1960 census) is hardly very illuminating, since the people are most unequally arranged over the vast land, with a remarkable concentration along the coast. An outstanding feature of the geographical distribution of Brazil's people is the existence of an immense area which has less than two and a half persons per square mile and which comprises practically all the Amazon region, a large part of Mato Grosso state (along the border with Bolivia and Paraguay) and a section of northern Goiás state in central Brazil. Within this area, one may find single *municípios,* like Caracaraí (in the far north) or Diamantino (Mato Grosso state), each with an area about equal to that of Arkansas, supporting a population of 3,321 and 4,148, respectively; this means a density of merely 0.05 and 0.08 inhabitants per square mile.

Most Brazilians, in fact, live in a belt some 300–400 miles wide, skirting the coast from the eastern bulge of Brazil to Rio Grande do Sul in the far south (where it occupies the entire width of the country) and presenting a major protrusion into southern Goiás. Densities within the belt vary considerably and the involved distributional patterns which result are explained by a web of physical and historical factors. Although some rural patches in this belt may boast densities in excess of 200 people per square mile, they are exceptional, and one still finds considerable areas—some almost literally within earshot of the Atlantic surf—which support scarcely more than a dozen people per square mile.

The pattern of population distribution is not only intricate but rapidly changing, as areas with exhausted soils become relatively depopulated and new pioneer fronts are opened up (as in the state of Paraná, south of São Paulo, whose population increased by over 100 percent in the 1950s). While some "islands" of denser population are relicts of former economic cycles, others are at the receiving end of an unceasing stream of migrants.

One important change, which is occurring all over Brazil—but is obviously not peculiar to the country—is the intense shift of the population toward the city. According to data from the last two censuses (1950 and 1960), it far overshadows, in sheer numbers involved, the push into previously unoccupied or sparsely settled areas. In effect, Brazil's urban population increased dur-

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ing that decade at more than three times the rate of the rural population. The most striking illustrations of this fantastic urban growth are offered by Brazil's two largest metropolitan areas, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, each of which now has more than 5,000,000 people. The phenomenon is observable all the way down the line and does not stop at the level of the state capitals. And, of course, each city has its sibling shanty town, perching impudently on steep slopes, like the *favelas* of Rio; advancing on stilts into tidal ooze, like the *mocambos* of Recife; or swaying gently on the surface of the waters, like the *cidade flutuante* (floating city), which has recently sprouted on more than a thousand rafts, log-jammed in front of Manaus on the upper Amazon.

This mass movement of people from the rural areas to the cities obviously has profound social, economic and political implications. For, as pointed out recently by Professor T. Lynn Smith, the millions of humble folk transplanted from the countryside represent precisely that part of the Brazilian population which is least prepared educationally, economically, culturally and politically to cope with the problems of life in the nation's great metropolitan centers.

Varied are the motives for the farm to city migration. Some are factors of attraction: as Professor Charles Wagley has said, Brazilians are profoundly urban in their hopes, being seduced by the glitter and vivacity of the city. But the value attached to the urban way of life is further enhanced by the dismal prospects facing the majority of rural dwellers. And the majority of Brazilians—notwithstanding the existence of 31 cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants—are still rural, 55 percent of the population being thus classified as late as 1960.

III

The way in which a substantial part of the farmlands of Brazil were occupied has resulted in the erosion, not only of the soil, but of man's legitimate aspirations of finding, in a parcel of good earth, a reasonable living for himself and his family. In effect, when the threshold of the New World was crossed, habits of thrift, learned from thousands of years of agriculture in the limited confines of Europe, were cast aside. Such habits involved a type of agriculture where diversified farming was coupled with the keeping of livestock, and both integrated an unbroken biological cycle. But on the new shores, land was, or appeared to be,

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unlimited. And fertility of the soils was, or appeared to be, assured by the age-old accumulation of forest detritus. Instead of crop rotation, shifting agriculture was adopted and has remained dominant to this day. Under this system, land is cleared, cropped, exhausted and abandoned, and new forests are destroyed and their soil plundered. As the pioneers slash and burn their way through virgin territory, the belt of agricultural production is pushed farther and farther from the markets. The depleted lands are usually given over to extensive grazing, while the settlement of new areas obviously exacts fresh investments and compounds the problem of inadequate and costly transportation.

It is true that certain favorable trends may now be discerned, not the least important of which is the shift from an essentially one-crop economy to relatively diversified farming. The job of applying science and technology to farming has begun; here and there, agricultural "know-how" is changing the traditional landscape of rural Brazil. In the interior of Pernambuco in the Northeast, for instance, contour cropping has been used in one commercial enterprise to conserve soil and precious water; in São Paulo there is increasing acceptance of conservation practices and irrigation of coffee orchards is also receiving recognition, while mechanized wheat farming is producing a sophisticated pattern of agriculture in Rio Grande do Sul.

However, inhibiting customs and attitudes and an unsound institutional framework still prevent the full application of available agricultural technology to the major part of Brazilian farmlands. Thus, for instance, although owners of many big estates are personally wealthy, their agricultural undertakings are for the most part undercapitalized, as shown by inadequacy or absence of farm machinery and insufficient or non-existent storage facilities. Such operators may stretch their financial resources in order to own more land or to take a plunge in non-agricultural enterprises, but rarely consider plowing back a significant portion of their returns into the land they already own, with a view to improving it.

When such questions as low productivity in agriculture, prevalent rural poverty and widespread destruction of natural resources are reviewed, the very root of the problem is sometimes overlooked—that is, the institutional framework of agricultural production. The dominant features of Brazil's agrarian structure are large estates and extensive agriculture. Properties of over

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2,500 acres hardly add up to more than 2 percent of the total number of establishments; yet, some of them are so immense that together they comprise more than 50 percent of the country's farmland.

Areas dominated by the large *fazendas,* or *latifúndios,* where land is used much less intensively than on the small farms, represent effective barriers to cultural, social and technological change. Coöperatives do not thrive there. Illiteracy and mortality rates are high. Vertical mobility is difficult and horizontal mobility the rule.

In a country where 80 to 90 percent of the population active in agriculture do not possess the land they work on, and receive a pittance for their labors, it is not surprising that social unrest should flare up in widely scattered incidents. Tremendous social injustices in the rural areas have offered an ideal medium for the development of great tensions and have favored a climate of subversion, skillfully exploited by agitators and opportunists.

There is crying need for measures which will lead to a more equitable distribution of land and the establishment of a rural middle class in Brazil. Few topics have consumed more ink or spittle during recent years than that of agrarian or land reform. It has been a favorite plank for politicians, and the philosophical-political approaches to the theme range through the entire spectrum, from promoting middle-class family farms to advocating state take-over. What Brazil needs is certainly not a mere redistribution of land, nor letters of marque for indiscriminate invasion of property. A land reform which will permit the greatest possible number of people to own, manage and work their piece of ground must assure the farmer clear title to the land and water rights, credit, technical assistance, coöperative organization and the possibility of developing rural industries—among other things. Meticulous attention to such "prosaic" details—a hallmark of the professional, as opposed to the soapbox approach —will make the difference between accomplishment and utter, demoralizing failure.

Take, for instance, the matter of clear-cut titles of ownership. A profitable lesson can be learned from what is perhaps the most successful of all large-scale pioneering settlement ventures in Brazil—that carried out by a railroad and colonization company in northwestern Paraná state. In order to guarantee future purchasers clear title to the land, the enterprise bought up all titles

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presented—even if it meant acquiring the same tract five or six times. This procedure has paid off handsomely and the development stands out in sharp contrast to most pioneer areas, where land grabbing and unending disputes represent an impediment to rural stability.

In considering a reform designed to oppose at one time the idle, unproductive *latifundium* and the ineffectual *minifundium,* one might ask if it is possible to find in Brazil any real-life situation capable of proving that the proposed targets are actually feasible and not a mere pipedream.

The answer is in the affirmative. There are, indeed, in existence, quite a few undertakings capable of furnishing useful guideposts for such a program. This is the case, for example, with several agricultural enterprises in southern Brazil, like Holambra, a successful Dutch community of more than a hundred families, enjoying a high standard of living in São Paulo, some 75 miles from the state capital. This venture has shown that reclamation of exhausted lands can be turned to good account. Founded on diversified crop and livestock farming and handled on a coöperative basis, the enterprise has recovered a derelict estate and is now establishing a second development. Holambra is recognized as a remarkable success. To find the reasons for this success is the first step in assessing the possibility of its being repeated on a large scale.

One important factor was the attitude of the farmers in regard to the land. Although inexperienced with the problems of subtropical agriculture, they preferred to come to grips with the many difficulties encountered and bend every effort in mastering them, rather than breaking camp and moving on to some other site over the hill. Being literate and accustomed to using the results of scientific agronomic research, they made good use of the information available in the renowned Agronomic Institute, located 25 miles away, in Campinas (1960 pop. 180,000).

Equally important was their ability and willingness to invest capital in their venture. Of course, the choice of a propitious site, with a topography suited to mechanization, and good roads connecting the enterprise with a rapidly expanding urban market (also a source of fertilizer, in the form of garbage) were not irrelevant to the success achieved. Finally, cultural unity has permitted the group to maintain, develop and make good use of their common heritage, and an effective coöperative organization

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has enabled them to combine the benefits of a system of privately owned, family-sized farms (averaging 90 acres) with those of a large and aggressive concern.

IV

One result of the low productivity levels still prevalent in most Brazilian agricultural ventures has been the negligible purchasing power of the rural population. This prevents the country's industry from cashing in on what could otherwise be a significant domestic market. And industry is hungry for expanded markets, for it has grown at a tremendous pace in recent years; in the 1950s industrial income overtook that produced by agriculture.

As manufacturing develops and diversifies, it tends to become more and more concentrated in the southeastern region, long the political heartland of Brazil. Three-fourths of the national labor force is employed in this developing industrial belt, which reaches across parts of the states of São Paulo, Guanabara (the former federal district), Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo. In fact, the growth of the southeastern manufacturing heartland has to some extent been at the expense of the inhabitants of other regions.

Regional contrasts in growth rates between the underdeveloped northern and the vigorous southern halves of the country have long been denounced, and there is even reference to a *paralelo fatídico*, an "ill-omened parallel," which is supposed to partition Brazil into "have" and "have-not" areas. Lest lack of advance be equated with low latitude, in a facile rationale of climatic determinism, it may be added that Rio Grande do Sul, the state of Brazil farthest from the equator, recently showed acute signs of economic imbalance. According to a study carried out by the National Council of Economy, this proved to be the effect of price controls adopted by the federal government which affected farm products and agriculturally oriented industries, the foundation of Rio Grande do Sul's economy.

Deliberate efforts to spread the benefits of industry and counteract its increasing concentration in the Southeast have been embodied in legislation enacted for the Northeast and subsequently extended to the Amazon region. It permits a reduction of income taxes proportionate to amounts invested in industries considered useful in promoting regional development. On the other hand, what promises to be one of the most effective means

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of stimulating the healthy development of medium and small manufacturing centers in the backlands is now getting under way in the Cariri Valley of semi-arid Ceará state, in the Northeast. Here more than 150 springs, issuing from a vast sandstone tableland, permit the concentration of about half a million people in the oasis-like area, where a number of small cottage industries have gradually developed, producing cutlery, fishhooks, leather goods, clocks, muzzle-loading firearms, lace, hammocks and similar handcrafts.

In 1961, Morris Asimow, a professor of industrial engineering at U.C.L.A., became interested in the potentialities of the area, which is now receiving energy from the important Paulo Afonso hydroelectric plant on the Rio São Francisco. With the help of Brazilian and North American students, he made feasibility studies and designed specific small-industry projects for the area. Included were such diversified establishments as a corn-processing plant, a powdered-milk factory and small-scale engineering manufactures with facilities for building sewing machines, electric motors, radios and similar equipment. The ways and means by which these projects were set up and are being implemented are instructive in more ways than one. Plans were not based merely upon the natural resources of the area, but also upon assets which are only too often neglected: human resources—with consideration for the previous training in, and attitude toward, handcrafts already developed by workers and artisans in the Cariri.

The Asimow approach is essentially a grass-roots one and makes for the widest possible participation of the parties most directly interested in the development of the area. The people of the Cariri were not handed something on a platter by a remote authority, paternalistic and, at heart, skeptical about their capacity to go it on their own. The study team, playing a purely catalytic role, pointed out opportunities and the people of the Cariri were quick to take them.

And in so doing they appear to have unwittingly shaken a widely prevalent planning philosophy, by which the initiative of government in the capital-forming process is prerequisite to closing the gap between the two economic halves of Brazil. For people in the Cariri—merchants, farmers and professional groups—proved to have savings which they were willing to invest after being convinced of the viability of the new ventures. Although

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conditioned to the idea of individual or family-owned enterprises, they were willing to try corporative ownership. Forming corporations with from 20 to 300 stockholders, they raised the amazing total of almost one million dollars, about half the necessary capital to get started (the other being underwritten by the federal Bank of the Nordeste).

It is true that implementation of the plan has encountered more difficulties than appear to have been anticipated by its promoters: some individual projects had to be shelved and others are lagging behind schedule. Quite typically, sharply accelerated inflation—freely condoned by a "developmentist" government—has been one of the major obstacles encountered in this attempt to develop a backward part of Brazil. While the working capital was being collected from the individual stockholders, and emissaries shuttled back and forth with never ending paper work, trying to obtain the government bank's approval—and matching loans—prices of required machinery and equipment spiraled out of reach of the nascent industries. When the writer visited the area last summer, additional capital was being underwritten and other adjustments were being made in the light of experience gained since the feasibility studies were completed. Not only were some projects getting into the production stage, but several new industries, totally independent of Professor Asimow's program, had been spawned or had found nurture in the climate of optimism generated by his plan.

If the Cariri pilot project proves to be successful, the basic approaches adopted, with indispensable attunement to local conditions, may blaze the way for accelerating the economic development not only of the Brazilian Northeast but of other underdeveloped areas of Latin America. By providing non-agricultural jobs in rural areas, decentralized industrialization of this type can prevent the inevitable movement of labor out of agriculture from becoming a catastrophic exodus. The shift from the agricultural to the industrial sector can thus take place without a major geographical displacement, without further crowding of the big cities.

V

The natural physical and biotic attributes of an area may be considered, for practical purposes, invariable, but not so man's interpretation of that environment: technological advances may play down disadvantages and maximize assets. Conversely, in-

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adequate techniques may allow valuable resources to lie idle or, even worse, promote their accelerated destruction. The relations of people to land, therefore, are conditioned by a number of cultural, man-made factors: scientific, technological and administrative tools, which are theoretically accessible to all mankind, and the specific institutional framework of a given region or country, which favors or hinders the use of such levers for development.

Time and again, the student of Brazilian geography is made to realize that obstacles arising from the natural environment may be less significant in narrowing the economic capability of a nation than are, for instance, sins of omission and commission on the part of its leaders. And yet, when backward areas are considered—and there are many in Brazil—only too often there is a tendency to explain them in terms of milieu or race. Since nine-tenths of Brazil's territory lies within the inter-tropical belt, the country's future has frequently been assessed in the light of all the still current prejudices concerning the humid low latitudes. Now, Brazil's natural endowments are far from niggardly. There are vast tracts of good arable land, and recent studies have shown that a large part of even the poorest soils—such as the Amazon uplands or the west central plateau—although extremely low in fertility, often have good natural structure and by no means should be written off as useless. They constitute potential farmland, which may be brought into production some day, when it becomes economically feasible to make additional investments in the form of fertilizer and good husbandry. On the other hand, the mineral deposits of Brazil—with metallurgical ores in the front rank—and its vast hydroelectrical potential form an ample basis for the continued development of a powerful domestic industry. In fact, in terms of many leading minerals and of power resources, Brazil's reserves easily place it among the four or five best endowed countries in the world.

In so far as human resources are concerned, it seems hardly necessary here to refute such racial prejudices as conceive some direct relation between underdevelopment and negative innate characteristics of the local population. It is true, however, that the human factor will become fully effective only when girded with the proper cultural and economic equipment. In this connection, the writer always thinks of one particular group of farmers in the Northeast who were observed wreaking great havoc

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on the semi-arid landscape with improper farming methods; their unusual capacity for destruction derived not from some fault, such as laziness, but precisely from a virtue, diligence.

What, then, is missing for the harmonious development of the country's various economic sectors and its varied geographic regions—a development so essential to political stability?

Brazil has undergone the changes from colony to monarchy to republic and has weathered several revolutions in the course of its history. None of these movements effectively demolished the archaic social and economic framework carried over from colonial times. The revolution of 1930 might have ushered in profound structural changes, but Vargas and his successors left virtually untouched the economic and political privileges of the *bem nascidos,* the "well born," in the apt expression used by José Fernando Carneiro, one of the sharpest and best informed observers of the Brazilian political scene.

Consider the case of agrarian reform, which recently ousted President Goulart appeared to champion, much to the distress of absentee landowners who trembled for their latifundia. A 48-page report, now released by the Brazilian National Security Council, reveals the fact, long suspected in some circles, that Vargas' political heir had been going about a little agrarian reform of his own. In his name or in that of members of his family or business associates, he had collected some 1,750,000 acres of land, an area equivalent to seven times that of Guanabara state! And, since this property was made up of widely scattered establishments, Air Force planes were sometimes employed to link the *fazendas* and transport everything from cattle to building materials. Here, then, is another instance of the long line of frauds which have been perpetuated upon the Brazilian people by self-styled champions of the unfortunate.

Instead of prying loose, from an overprivileged minority, control over the actual and potential riches offered by a generous earth, they have woven a mesh of restrictions which have progressively worsened the relation of men and the land. One example of the way in which administrative incompetence added to political manipulation has adversely affected geographical patterns and relationships is that of shipping. With a shoreline of some 4,000 miles, endowed with several excellent harbors, and a population concentrated near the coast, sea-borne trade would appear to be a natural and vital link in Brazil's economy. How-

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ever, the assets of geography were practically cancelled out, as ships and cargo-handling equipment became obsolete and harbors were allowed to silt up. Even more important than such physical impediments to shipping are the institutional distortions resulting from the astute selection of longshoremen and merchant seamen as one of the mainstays of demagogical, "populist" governments. The last few years have witnessed the development of a domestic shipbuilding industry and some improvement of port facilities, but at the same time the new caste of "dockside maharajahs," as they have been called, grew in power and ruthlessness. Exerting a complete monopoly of the shipside labor market, they demanded and obtained from an obliging government extravagant privileges, which set them entirely apart from other, politically less strategic members of the working class. For princely pay, as little work as possible. With ships spending less time at sea than standing by for loading and unloading, with cost of dockside operations increasing day by day, and with pilferage rampant, the sea routes were destined to be abandoned by shippers, largely in favor of quicker, safer—and, all things considered, more economical—transportation by truck. A striking example of this state of affairs was reported in Rio's *Jornal do Brasil* when a certain corporation invited truckers to bid for the job of hauling 20,000 tons of common salt from its salterns on the coast of Rio Grande do Norte to southeastern Brazil. The corporation was: Companhia Comércio e Navegacão, one of the largest coastal shipping companies in the country.

VI

Those students of Brazilian geography who include in their considerations the role of governments in changing the fate of the earth—for better or for worse—will find an overwhelming number of items to set down on the negative side of the ledger, starting with agrarian reform (or rather, lack of same), proceeding to Brasília and going on down the line to a zigzagging, irresponsible economic policy. And yet there are those who believe that the revolution which broke out last March, in the midst of almost complete chaos, actually cut short Brazil's march toward the redemption of the common man. It is certainly a pity that some otherwise judicious observers should be so unwilling to face the facts of life; that they should so naïvely fail to distinguish between the claims of the group recently toppled from power (who

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basked in the image of a progressive government, devoted to social welfare and jousting with the evil knights of reaction), and the reality of corruption, opportunism and political nest-feathering, which so disgusted reform-minded democrats in Brazil. Partly to blame, perhaps, for such lack of perspective is a sort of tacit "conspiracy of silence" on the part of certain intellectuals, lest in recognizing the true character of Brazil's "populist" leaders of recent years they should appear hostile to the banners which the latter so enthusiastically unfurled. Many of these banners are just and worthy, and since they fell into soiled hands, it is time they were retrieved and carried forward.

Of course, there are those who would like to see such motifs safely out of the way and forgotten. These people regarded the recent revolution as having saved them definitely and permanently from the danger of Communism, thus assuring them of the right to continue peacefully to exploit their fellowmen, while proclaiming the need of safeguarding "Christian civilization." They may have rejoiced too soon. For it does not look as if the present government intends to limit its action to a mere house-cleaning, but is bent on effecting structural changes, from the basement up.

In his first half-year in office, President Castello Branco has sent close to 150 messages to Congress, almost half propounding reforms of a social, fiscal and administrative nature. Five of these reforms will require changes in the 1946 Constitution. With respect to agrarian reform, for instance, the proposed amendment would permit payment of expropriated latifundia in government bonds, thus removing the effective barrier represented by the existing constitutional requirement that such payments be made in cash.

Brazil's new leadership seems to have avoided the unforgivable sin of ignoring the count-down and to have understood that the archaic structure inherited from colonial times must be replaced without delay, so that resources—and technology wherewith to exploit them—may become available to the greatest number of people, in all regions of the half-continent.

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TROUBLED INDIA AND HER NEIGHBORS

By Selig S. Harrison

INDIA'S military humiliation at the hands of China in 1962 set in motion a process of internal political deterioration which still continues. The first impact of the unimpeded Chinese advance had brought a temporary surge of fellow feeling and patriotic fervor; but the deeper and more lasting consequence of the rout at Bomdila was the virtual destruction of the unprecedented sense of national confidence so carefully nurtured by Nehru during his years of leadership. What was left of dynamism and élan soon faded away as India's inability to strike back in the foreseeable future became more and more abundantly clear to a demoralized nationalist élite.

Nehru had consistently addressed his domestic and foreign policies to the legacy of self-doubt arising out of the millennial failure of Indian nationalism. The deluge he feared most after his death was a return to the age-old nightmare of balkanization and internecine strife characteristic of India in the prelude to Mogul and British rule. Although his neutralist foreign policy grew out of a complex of factors, Nehru saw it in the last analysis as the emblem of a renascent national pride, a reminder to the heterogeneous Indian people of their new collective identity in international affairs. By projecting New Delhi onto the world stage as a free-wheeling entity pursuing its own national interests, Nehru deliberately held out before Bengalis and Marathas and Tamils a mirror image of themselves as Indians.

The fact that he was riding for a fall dawned on remarkably few of his countrymen during the euphoric years when India played its role as a peacemaker and go-between in the company of the superpowers. Indians did indeed begin to see themselves in an inflated mirror-image as citizens of a country that had already arrived—a country held in universal respect—and to attach increased value to their national identity. This was a great source of strength for Nehru in his efforts to control divisive stresses holding back the Five Year Plans. It provided the unifying momentum for more than a decade of domestic progress under his aegis. When the fall finally came, however, the country was totally unprepared for the shock of self-recognition. The frenetic reaction of India in the two years since has oscillated

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between the extremes of a defeatist abandonment of all dreams of ever attaining great-power status and a stalwart attempt to stride the world stage as if nothing has happened.

If only because he had himself become the embodiment of national self-esteem, Nehru was able to survive the ordeal of 1962 with his personal position intact. Little serious thought was given to discarding him in the most intense moments of reappraisal among the leaders of the governing Congress Party. Even the efforts to circumscribe and redistribute his power were half-hearted until he suffered his stroke early in 1964. The country knew that it shared in the blame for what had happened and rallied around a refurbished image of the leader who symbolized its earlier success. Nehru had little leadership to give in his period of decline, for he was the most demoralized of all by the Himalayan débâcle; but this did not alter the determination of the country to wait out the months with him until the end.

For more than a year the machinery of government ground along aimlessly. Difficult issues were avoided and jurisdictional disputes multiplied. There was a widespread if tacit recognition that only after Nehru was gone, after the succession had been settled and a new political status quo established, would the country be ready to turn its face away from what was past.

II

In some degree the first months of the post-Nehru era have brought a healthy and constructive phase of reassessment. The mere fact of a stable transition provided a revitalizing sensation of reassurance. With no over-arching personality serving as the fount of all national policies, the base of participation in decision-making has widened and a heightened sense of responsibility has spread through the upper and middle levels of the bureaucracy. The monumental and long neglected twin tasks of stepping up food production and controlling inflationary speculation in the grain trade have been given the highest priority by the new Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri. Corruption in Congress ranks has been confronted in places where Nehru chose not to tread for personal political reasons. Inefficiency and waste in public industrial enterprises are now frankly recognized as serious problems demanding drastic corrective measures. Concrete programs for controlling population through mass sterilization, liberalized abortion laws and the subsidized sale of male con-

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traceptives have found influential sponsors and are slowly making their way through the bureaucratic machinery.

But it is one thing to say that the succession has brought with it a healthy ferment in policy-making and quite another to conclude that this gives promise of significant results. While no serious downturn appears to be in prospect in the years immediately ahead, neither does one see signs of strong forward movement. To the question, "Where is India going?", one can only answer, for the present, that it is pottering along with no clear destination yet in mind.

The old vision is gone, and there are few signs pointing to the birth of a renewed spirit of common purpose to take its place. The mood is increasingly one of every man for himself. This can be felt at every turn in the impatient refusal of each sector of the population to accept the disciplines of planned development. Thus the farmer who grows more food shows more determination than ever to hoard it for a time of still greater stringency or to consume it himself rather than to free it for the market in response to pleas from New Delhi. The middleman and trader reacted to the recent food price crisis by creating artificial local scarcities to push prices up, moving operations methodically from one area to another with the police a jump behind. The low-wage consumer in the cities and towns, who has been using his increase of income in recent years to buy wheat or rice instead of coarse grains, refused to shift back during the 1964 pinch despite official exhortations. All this could also have been said of earlier food crises under Nehru, but one detected on this occasion for the first time a note of antagonism and even contempt toward constituted authority.

Perhaps the most suggestive illustration of the limitations confronting Indian leaders today lies in the fact that the interstate movement of food came to a virtual standstill during the 1964 crisis. The have states declined to share with the have-nots. Punjab withheld its wheat from Uttar Pradesh; Andhra took its time before sharing its rice surplus with Madras, Kerala and Mysore; Orissa banned grain exports to neighboring Bengal, and Gujarat stockpiled its peanuts. This was not a case of simple orneriness or avarice. The states are explicitly given control of agriculture under the strict allocation of powers in the Indian Constitution. National programs to boost food production are carried out not through a centrally directed administrative mech-

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anism but by state governments free to set their own pace. Even the power to tax agricultural income is denied to the central government in what is still an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Estimates of the possible yield from effective taxation of the upper 30 percent of the peasantry run from $1 billion per year on up. Yet attempts to reach this potential source of capital have invariably been unsuccessful.

The decision to allocate agriculture to the states was part of an unusually careful effort to balance the claims of the central and provincial authority in all spheres. Educational policy has also been placed in the hands of the states, which is leading to an intellectual Babel as universities go their separate ways in determining whether to replace English with ten different regional languages. In strictly constitutional terms, the Indian Constitution is neither unitary nor federal but something in between, most accurately described by a term such as "quasi-federal." The central authority has great residual powers and holds a financial rein over the states. As a practical political matter, however, the amount of rope given to the states offers a standing invitation to resist central direction.

Centrifugal tendencies had already become menacing in Nehru's lifetime. In a sense, the succession has ratified the shift of decisive political influence from New Delhi to the provincial capitals. Shastri came to office as the creature of a coalition of southern and coastal state Congress bosses in a straightforward political bargain stipulating plainly that he keep his hands out of the states. Unlike Nehru, he is not in a position to appeal effectively to people in all parts of the country over the heads of the party panjandrums. If a state does not wish to offend a local interest and declines to fall in line with a national policy, Shastri cannot do much about it.

This immobilization of the central power would inhibit even a vigorously assertive leadership which exploited existing constitutional authority to the limit. Given the permissive arrangements evolved among themselves by the Congress leaders, India could well be headed for a stalemate in development. Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover have sketched the general lines of the race between population growth and economic development in their definitive study for the World Bank. By 1986, according to their projections, the population is likely to climb from the present figure of 475,000,000 to 775,000,000. A multiplying pop-

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ulation, moreover, means a proliferating legion of job-seekers clamoring for industrial employment expected at the very most to double every decade. Unless India shows a downward trend in the birth rate by 1966, a trend which progresses to a 50 percent decline by 1981, the rate of increase in the standard of living will remain fixed at slightly less than 1 percent per year under the most favorable assumptions of economic development.[1]

It is a measure of the pervasive atmosphere of futility and defeatism that anti-government forces are proving impotent to make anything of such explosive political material. The kaleidoscopic splits among Communist and Socialist factions have left party rank-and-filers bewildered. Little common ground exists on the right between the modernist, business-oriented Swatantra (Freedom) Party and the Hindu traditionalist Jan Sangh (Peoples) Party. The Congress, comfortably ensconced in Parliament with 370 out of 510 seats and faced with no significant concerted opposition, looks confidently to the 1967 elections.

Nevertheless, the surface placidity of the Indian political scene could be misleading. There is a slow-burning change in the public temper going on underneath as the country searches for some compensatory source of political identity to fill the void left by the humiliation of 1962 and the departure of a charismatic leader. It is as if the passing of Nehru has stripped a veil off the body politic. One encounters an ostentatious return to "things Indian." Astrologers who used to visit their ministerial clients by the back door are now frankly accepted as part of the political landscape. The editor of the English-language New Delhi *Statesman* took a look at what had been there all the time, behind the Westernized façade, and exclaimed at the wife of the new Prime Minister "cooking the meals for the whole household herself, the most modern thing around her a gas burner, the hearth overlooked by plaster casts of the gods."[2]

The traditionalist tone in social patterns has a political parallel in the slow stirrings of a coarse-grain nationalism which is frankly, even belligerently, Hindu in its inspiration. This is evident not only in the increased influence of the Jan Sangh but in the sea change within the Congress itself. Shastri comes out

[1] Ansley J. Coale and Edgar Hoover, "Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries: A Case Study of India's Prospects." Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, esp. p. 273.

[2] Pran Chopra, "The Changing Climate of Indian Politics." New Delhi: *The Statesman*, August 15, 1964.

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of the traditionalist wing of the party in Uttar Pradesh state and was originally brought into the National Congress leadership by Nehru as one of the more adaptable representatives of the old guard. Soon after his selection last year, as it grew clear that he did not have in mind a Pakistan settlement relinquishing Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, Shastri and the Jan Sangh entered into a quiet non-aggression pact. The new government has been largely exempt from attack by Sangh leaders, and in return the Congress no longer pairs the Hindu right with the Communists as a threat to the nation.

Although Shastri, a man of moderation and tolerance, berated the Sangh for its excessive zeal in opposing the Indian visit of the Pope in December and personally displays none of the bigotry of the Hindu right in his attitude toward the Indian Moslems, he does not range himself frontally against Hindu chauvinism as Nehru did. No obstacles are placed in the way of Sangh members joining the party and no particular importance is attached to retaining the participation of spokesmen of India's 48,000,000 Moslems in Congress councils. It is increasingly clear that secularism as Nehru conceived of it died with him.

III

By and large, the case for nationalism in the first decade of independence could be reduced to the austerely rational proposition that unity offers the only route to modernity. Yet even Nehru, in appealing for a "composite" Indian identity blending Hindu and Moslem cultural influences, clearly implied that the generalized ideal of modernity required the extra accent of a specifically Indian theme. The intermittent attempt on the part of a scattering of Hindu and Moslem intellectuals inspired by Nehru to define a secular "national" culture constituted an implicit acknowledgment that something was lacking. And the failure of the attempt to win significant support for a hybrid nationalism was a summons to Hindu chauvinists to redefine nationalism in their own terms.

The historic inability of Hindu society to throw up its own pan-Indian political institutions and in more recent centuries the humiliating memory of the long dominance of the Moguls have left a searing mark on Hindu attitudes today. Aurangzeb's repressive policies toward his "infidel" subjects had produced the first rumbles of a Hindu political response in the rise of Shivaji

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just when the British arrived on the scene. In the ensuing quest during the colonial period for an answer to their plight, the leaders of Hindu thought were divided into two camps. Tagore argued that India need not be ashamed of its political failure, which was simply the price paid, as it were, for the achievement of spiritual and cultural greatness. The fact that India had established a Universal Society over so vast and diverse a subcontinent made up for the failure to erect a Universal Empire. Indeed, he maintained, India would lose what was best in its nature if it sought to imitate the Western model of an integrated nation-state.

But the suggestion that Hindu society was incapable of rivaling Western-style nationalism on its own ground found an answer in the Hindu nationalist credo of Vivekananda, Aurobindo and Tilak, who declared that India's gift to the world is Hinduism and that Indian nationalism should be the political expression of Hindu religion and culture. Despite the rise of a later leadership in Nehru and Gandhi committed to a secular nationalism, the tradition of the early Hindu revivalists lived on, finding a strong echo in the aggressive, mystical nationalism of Subhas Chandra Bose—Nehru's only significant rival for leadership of the Congress.

Nehru was unable to make secularism more than a thin overlay on the vast Congress organization with its base in orthodox rural India. The face of the Congress could be seen in the hard-line Hindu attitude of Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the Tammany-style wheelhorse who built the Congress machine and played a pivotal part in the ruling party triumvirate with Gandhi and Nehru. To Sardar Patel, Moslems were a necessary evil in the Congress and the country, to be tolerated but not to be given the kid-glove treatment accorded, or so he thought, by his two colleagues. He was outraged by the threat of a separate Pakistan. Ironically, though, it was Patel in the end who clinched the creation of Pakistan by taking the position in Congress councils that the new state would never be viable. It would be good riddance to get at least some of the Moslems off his hands, if only temporarily, and would teach them a lesson. At best, they would ultimately have to come back on Hindu-dictated terms; at worst, India could enforce its dominion over its weaker neighbor.

The prevailing Hindu view that the new Moslem state would be short-lived was expressed by the Congress president at the

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time of Partition, Acharya J. B. Kripalani. A strong, economically successful India, he said, "can win back the seceding children to its lap. The freedom we have achieved cannot be complete without the unity of India."[3] It was deeply exasperating to most Hindus that a Moslem state should be created in part of the motherland envisaged in the ancient Hindu scriptures, and it was deeply frustrating that at the very moment when Hindus were to rule over Moslems for the first time in their history, so many of the Moslems should escape their appointed fate.

Patel's legacy rests with one of his erstwhile lieutenants, Morarji Desai, former Finance Minister and Shastri's opponent in the contest for the succession. Standing implacably against all concessions to Pakistan, Desai said recently that "whatever may be the provocations, we should maintain our attitude so that one day they will be put to it and will have to make friendship with us on proper terms."[4] What many Congress leaders say in private, the Jan Sangh goes on to say plainly, noting with regret "the existence of Pakistan on Indian territory" and observing that "this situation has given rise to a number of problems. Bharatiya Jan Sangh will aim at bringing India and Pakistan together by ending their separation."[5]

The dominant note in the Hindu attitude today is that Hindus have a natural right to rule in modern India as a form of long-overdue retribution for the sins of the Mogul overlords. It is not enough that a unified state with a Hindu majority—clearly dominant over a Moslem minority now reduced to 11 percent—has been established at long last in the Indian subcontinent. The fulfillment of Indian nationalism requires an assertion of Hindu hegemony over the Moslems of the subcontinent in one form or another. Most Hindus would be satisfied with an acquiescent Pakistan within an Indian sphere of influence, some hope for a confederation, and a vocal few would welcome an excuse to annul Partition by force. Only a hardy band of Westernized intellectuals and Congress moderates think in terms of a settlement with Pakistan, taking into account Pakistan's own internal compulsions. India appears emotionally incapable of assuming the benign posture which might be expected of her as the overwhelmingly larger of the two neighbors.

[3] *Congress Bulletin*, July 10, 1947.

[4] Morarji Desai, address before the Indian Council on World Affairs, recorded by All-India Radio, September 16, 1964.

[5] Bharatiya Jan Sangh, "Principles and Policies." New Delhi, 1964. Translated from Hindi.

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IV

Pakistan is not reacting out of some unreasoning hysteria or paranoia in charging that India wants the dominant position in their relationship. This is indeed the overwhelming fact of life confronting Rawalpindi. But it does not necessarily follow from this that India should be viewed as the big bad bully and Pakistan the brave little Belgium of the subcontinent.

In Pakistan the need for an external diversionary symbol to hold together a spiritless body politic is, if anything, more conspicuous than in the case of India. The indeterminate character of her own nationalism leaves Pakistan with India as the indispensable rallying point for diverse regional and social groups. This is most vividly seen in the paralyzing conflict between a dominant western wing and a more populous Bengali eastern wing set off by itself in the midst of Indian territory 1,000 miles from the rest of the country. There are few points of contact between the volatile, rice-eating Bengalis with their linguistic kinship to the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal and the wheat-eaters of the West Pakistan plains. Although Islam provides a nominal link, most Bengali Moslems view their position under Rawalpindi as that of a colony subject to economic imperialism and the alien rule of a predominantly Punjabi civil service and military.

Cutting across regional divisions is a fundamental controversy over what Pakistan is to be, which amounts in effect to a disenchanting debate over why Pakistan was formed in the first instance. Is it enough to say that the *raison d'être* for Pakistan was the desire to escape Hindu domination? The more satisfying proposition is that Pakistan was to be a monument to the Islamic way of life, but the country has been unable to arrive at a consensus as to what this means. Modernists who wanted the commitment to an Islamic state to be nothing more than a statement of values, and traditionalists pressing for more explicit theological sanctions, wrangled over constitutional language from the inception of Pakistan in 1947 until early 1956. What emerged then as the Constitution was hailed by the traditionalists as a victory. But the 1956 Constitution was declared void when Ayub took over two years later and to this day no national consensus has been established on the nature of the state.

The inability of Pakistan to move toward a positive and constructive nationalism focused on internal tasks aggravates what

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would in any case be the difficult adjustment of a small power living next to a considerably larger neighbor. Indian control of the Moslem-majority Vale of Kashmir stands as a denial of the two-nation theory on which Pakistan was founded and nurtures a persistent sense of national insecurity. Frustrated and at loose ends, Pakistan searches restlessly and endlessly for a degree of recognition and respect out of all proportion to its size. It huffs and puffs and still finds to its understandable despair that India is bigger. Each provocation from Pakistan, each gesture of self-assertion and defiance serves to strengthen the demand in India to put Pakistan in its place. The two countries feed each other's obsessions in a vicious circle of challenge and response. It is in the nature of the situation that India as the larger of the two powers would have to be the first to display political maturity and large-heartedness in order for a process of accommodation to get under way. Yet the forces of moderation are forever on the defensive as the Hindu parties point with alarm to each new act of real or imagined insolence in Rawalpindi.

Historical circumstance has provided several recent moments of lost opportunity in Indo-Pakistan relations which are not likely to recur in such rapid succession soon again. The rise of a pragmatic military man to power in Pakistan was one such occasion. Ayub at the outset of his régime was in a peculiarly strong position to override opposition to a settlement within Pakistan, but Nehru's rejection of his overtures out of hand quickly gave the initiative back to the hard-liners. Another brief intermission in the sequence of mutual recrimination came when India showed a fleeting awareness of its stake in friendship with Pakistan following the Chinese border incursions. Before this feeling could gain momentum, however, Pakistan had started on its intensified diplomacy in Peking. By the time Nehru, near the end of his life, made his dramatic moves for a rapprochement, public opinion in both countries had already hardened along new and seemingly impenetrable battle lines.

Evidence has accumulated since his death to indicate that the Kashmir settlement envisaged by Nehru presupposed a larger Indo-Pakistan accommodation based on confederal relations between the two countries. This was rejected by Ayub out of fear that even a limited confederation with adequate safeguards would imply separate status for East Pakistan in the new grouping. Indeed, the mere rumor that confederation was in the wind

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touched off backstage demands on the part of East Pakistan for separate treatment in any negotiations.

Tensions between India and Pakistan have undoubtedly been made more abrasive by the pressures of the cold war and the active involvement of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the subcontinent. Pakistan has been able to acquire a disproportionately strong power position relative to that of India through alignment with the United States. As an ally permitting the use of its territory for strategic intelligence purposes, Pakistan has commanded from the United States an economic and military aid subsidy much larger than her size would otherwise warrant. Rawalpindi has been emboldened by this to think big and to press for Indian concessions from a position of artificially induced strength.

Paradoxically, the special character of the relationship of the United States with Pakistan has also prolonged and reinforced Indian intransigence. The responsible inner group in the Indian leadership has come to think of Pakistan with its exclusive military dependence on Washington as an American presence in the subcontinent. This is so even now, despite the new Rawalpindi-Peking relationship. It is believed that the United States is in a position to frustrate any sustained Pakistan military adventure through its intimate ties with the military, its control of spare parts and petroleum imports. The net effect of the American role has been to give India a false sense of stability and to make a meaningful bilateral dialogue with Pakistan seem superfluous. Washington is left to worry about its problem child, and India feels free to stand its ground without facing up to the potential implications of the Rawalpindi-Peking liaison.

In contrast to the United States, which stumbled almost inadvertently into the Indo-Pakistan arena and makes periodic efforts to bring the two protagonists together, the Soviet Union has played a deliberately divisive role in South Asian relations. The use of the veto on the Kashmir issue has been the cutting edge for what has become a broad Soviet commitment to a "progressive" India as against a "reactionary" Pakistan. This has placed the United States in an extremely awkward position as each instance of Soviet support for India prompts demands for equally unequivocal backing from Pakistan. Much of the motive behind Pakistan's increasing assertion of independence from the United States comes from the fact that the United

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States holds to the anti-Communist basis of the alliance and seeks to remain above the battle in Indo-Pakistan disputes.

It seemed for a time as if the United States might find itself forced onto Pakistan's side as against a Soviet-backed India in a South Asia polarized along cold-war lines. Once having entered into the 1954 military-aid pact with Ayub, then the army commander, the United States found itself automatically catapulted into an expansion of the aid program when Ayub later took over political control of the country. By 1962, India had signed the first of what was to become a series of military aid agreements with the Soviet Union. There seemed to be no way to arrest the process of polarization short of an abrupt American disengagement from Pakistan until the Chinese invasion of 1962. The United States was then given the opportunity to resolve its dilemma through the positive step of a military assistance program in India rather than a negative withdrawal from Pakistan. At present, the United States has a more symmetrical relationship to the two countries than it has had in the past, but the special nature of the Pakistan link has been sharply underscored in the American refusal of Indian requests for supersonic aircraft, air-to-air missiles and heavy tanks, all of which have been given to Pakistan.

Some chance would appear to exist that the United States and the Soviet Union will in time see their interests in South Asia as overlapping rather than competitive. Among other things, it is possible that the Soviet Union will grow tired of its restrictive commitment to India on the Kashmir issue and will seek to emulate the United States by maintaining a presence in both countries. Moscow has already made exploratory overtures to Rawalpindi in an effort to exploit Pakistan's dissatisfaction with its American link and to checkmate Chinese inroads. In his visit to New Delhi in June 1964, Soviet President Mikoyan went so far as to suggest directly to Shastri that it was time for India and Pakistan to seek a settlement of their disputes.

From Pakistan's point of view, a more disinterested Soviet posture has a certain appeal as a means of weakening India. But it is not clear what Pakistan might be prepared to give in return. Although there is widespread anti-Western sentiment in the country, and a new spirit of Asian self-assertion seeking an outlet in an independent foreign policy, Pakistan standing on a similar footing with Washington and Moscow would command a sum

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total of aid from both considerably smaller than what is now forthcoming from Washington. The Pakistan interest would appear to lie in perpetuating its unilateral aid subsidy as long as this proves possible.

Even in a more relaxed international climate marked by parallel Soviet and American policies toward the Indian subcontinent, the Indo-Pakistan conflict might still persist as a noisy constant of the world scene for many years to come. What the superpowers want will not necessarily be determinative. Yet to the extent that there is, in fact, any chance for a process of adjustment between India and Pakistan, it would appear to depend on their foreign policies growing closer together in response to external developments. This could come in the form of a Soviet entry into Pakistan, or a partial American disengagement from Pakistan, or from both occurring simultaneously. Or it could come from a modified Indian policy on the China border dispute. Only if international realignments force the two countries into similar postures toward their common neighbors is the cycle of suspicion likely to diminish.

V

It is the pivotal importance of Pakistan in the Indian scheme of things which explains why New Delhi attaches such special importance to its relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet stand on Kashmir has been the old standby available to the Indian leadership when confronted with the charge that India has no true friends in the world. On more than one occasion, moreover, Soviet leaders have strongly implied that Partition should be undone. Indian opinion is peculiarly sensitive to periodic suggestions that Moscow may re-assess its attitude, and if New Delhi shows signs of wavering on issues affecting major Soviet interests, Moscow need only cast a nod in the direction of Rawalpindi to induce clear thinking.

The ideal world of Indian nationalist dreams is one in which Pakistan remains aligned and India has the Soviet Union all to herself; and in which the Soviet Union and the United States both continue to be at odds with China indefinitely. India sees herself in this situation as the focal point of a grand alliance against Peking. So long as the Soviets, in particular, play their appointed part, India is spared the possible necessity of becoming exclusively dependent on the American nuclear umbrella.

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Just as India has a psychological vested interest in a stalemate with Pakistan, so there is utility in the China impasse as a factor keeping alive Soviet and American interest in New Delhi. This is not to say that the onus lies on India for perpetuating the border dispute or that a stabilization of the cease-fire would significantly reduce long-term Chinese military pressures. India has understandably been in no mood to add a diplomatic humiliation to what has already been suffered on the battlefield. But one should not overlook the larger context in which India sees its relations with Peking. Indian leaders have built their whole foreign-policy structure on the concept of a geopolitical community of interest between India and the Soviet Union with respect to China. "We are their second front," Nehru once said, "and they are ours."

The two-year diplomatic tug-of-war over the Indo-Soviet MIG transaction illustrated the strength of the Soviet position in India. India was motivated mainly by the belief that the MIG program would drive a wedge between Moscow and Peking and in so doing reinforce over-all Soviet ties to New Delhi. Beyond this, Soviet planes, unlike U.S. military aid, were to be provided without strings; if Pakistan attacked, India would have an interceptor force equipped with Sidewinder-type air-to-air missiles as a counter to Pakistan's U.S.-supplied F-86s and F-104s. There is little doubt that the Indian Air Force would have insisted on acceptance of the technically superior F-104 if the United States had acceded to Indian requests for supersonic aircraft when the subject was first under serious discussion in 1963. The way was clear for the United States during the period of more than a year after the Indian clash with China when Moscow backtracked on its original licensing offer. But once the Soviet Union had resolved its doubts and a choice was available, the forces in the Indian Government favoring a continued effort to get Americans planes were swept aside.

The attractive power of the Soviet relationship for politically conscious Indians is heightened by the identification of the Soviet Union with the national aspiration for industrial independence. While the United States has provided indispensable underpinnings for industrial growth in the fields of power and transportation, the Soviet Union has stolen the political thunder with two steel mills, a heavy machine-building complex and a series of oil refineries, dramatic symbols of modernization and state power.

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It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of the fact that Soviet-assisted heavy industrial development falls in the public sector of the Indian economy. Public enterprise enjoys great popularity in India despite the administrative lapses and corruption in some of the government's economic ventures. The reason for this does not lie, as often suggested, in the perverse Fabianism of a few doctrinaire bureaucrats. It reflects at bottom the deep distaste felt throughout most of Indian public opinion toward the dominant family and caste groupings presiding over Indian private business. The public sector symbolizes national progress, equally shared, as against unbalanced development in which disparities in wealth multiply.

With economic-aid commitments totaling slightly more than $1 billion and a line of credit for military aid approaching $300 million, the Soviet Union has grown so involved in New Delhi that it is difficult to imagine any wholesale disengagement as part of a shift in emphasis to Pakistan or a moderation of differences with China. What cannot be ruled out, however, is that Moscow will begin to taper off future investments in India while extending its activities to Pakistan as well; and India as a weak and dependent state will have no choice but to take its medicine.

The early cold-war days of the Indo-Soviet relationship, when Moscow needed Nehru's New Delhi as a front in addressing the uncommitted world, seem far off. India is cast today in the status of a client in its dealings with the superpowers. Instead of striking an elusive, equidistant pose midway between the extremes of commitment, the object now is to remain as near as possible to both of her patrons while displeasing neither. "Equidistance" has been replaced by what an Indian statesman has called "equal proximity." "Non-alignment" has been succeeded by "bi-alignment."

VI

The Indian desire to avoid exclusive dependence on any one external power is a healthy sign indicating that there is still some nationalist spirit left in the body politic despite the bruising experience of 1962. Far from deploring Indian ties to Moscow, the United States might well applaud, recognizing that ultimate Indian reliance on the West for food and military support acts as a powerful restraint on the pro-Moscow lobby in New Delhi. It might even be said that relations between India and the

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United States would be subjected to unbearable strains should the Soviet Union decide for internal or external reasons to reduce its commitments in the post-Nehru period. For in such a situation the United States could become over-committed to the solution of Indian internal problems which do not lend themselves to management from the outside.

If there is any one principle which should guide American policy in developing societies, with their inchoate nationalisms and their intractable economic problems, it is that the responsibility for success or failure should rest clearly with the countries concerned. It should be cause for alarm rather than satisfaction when national leaders throw their arms too enthusiastically around our neck. We are then being asked in effect to perform miracles which we are not likely to perform. Limited responsibility is implicit in the mere act of extending any aid at all, and most certainly so when the amounts are those of the American aid program in New Delhi. But the location of ultimate responsibility can be kept clear so long as the amounts do not loom too large compared to the resources mobilized by the country itself and to the aid given by other powers.

The desirability of staying loose and avoiding unnecessarily deep involvement in situations basically beyond our control applies with special force to the field of military aid. Our military aid relationship with India has been on politically sound ground precisely because the United States has not assumed what should properly be Indian responsibilities for training and shaping the Indian armed forces. During 1963, however, when the United States still thought that the Soviet Union could be preëmpted from the military aid field in India, some of those concerned with the aid program in New Delhi and Washington were restive. It was the natural American instinct to want to see the job through in a close collaboration bordering for all practical purposes on a military alliance relationship.

This is a case of not being able to stand prosperity. Here, for once, the tail does not wag the dog. In Pakistan the United States is committed to the maintenance of certain specific force levels and to a broad objective of "modernization" which can never be fully realized in a period of changing weapons technology. The possibility of graceful disengagement is virtually foreclosed in such an open-ended arrangement, even when some of its underlying assumptions are challenged as in the case of

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Pakistan's flirtation with Communist China. By contrast, the military hardware given and sold to India is parceled out with a close eye on the evolving Indian posture toward China, toward Pakistan and toward the Soviet Union. It serves its continuing deterrent purpose with respect to China. It assures a balance between Western and Soviet influence in the Indian armed forces at a time when the military is an increasingly important domestic political factor. But the United States retains its bargaining power as well as the opportunity for a flexible response in the event that China is induced at some point to reduce expansionist pressures.

It appears unlikely that the United States will ever be faced with the need to decide on the wisdom of an alliance relationship with India short of a massive Chinese military thrust. To the extent that Moscow-Peking relations permit a continuing Soviet commitment in New Delhi, India, as we have seen, is likely to seek to retain its Soviet links and will be inhibited accordingly in its security ties with the United States. It is even possible that, at the behest of Moscow, India would move toward a cease-fire agreement with China, once persuaded that the Soviet Union is in a position to restrain Peking as the result of an ideological truce within the bloc. The alternative line of policy which enjoys the most significant support is not alignment with Washington but a sweeping program of militarization—including the development of an independent Indian nuclear deterrent. Powerful groups in the armed forces and leaders of the Hindu nationalist Jan Sangh were demanding an independent deterrent even before the Chinese nuclear test in October. The Indian atomic energy czar, Homi Bhabha, makes a persuasive case to show that India is in a position to produce a stockpile of 50 ten-kiloton bombs in five years, at a manageable cost of $52 million, and goes on to suggest that the know-how now being acquired with French help in rocketry for weather observation could be adapted to make intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

The United States cannot realistically base its policies on the expectation that India will become an integral participant in the American strategic system in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. Indian and American interests are complementary, not identical, and the most that we can expect is an acknowledgment of overlapping objectives. Thus India has begun to give tacit recognition to the legitimacy of a U.S. nuclear presence

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in the Indian Ocean; and in the larger global arena, India is making a conscious effort to avoid working at cross-purposes with the United States, though there are likely to be times, as on the issue of U.N. payments, when the Soviet Union is given the benefit of the doubt.

What we can properly ask of India is a decent respect for American interests as a global power and a corresponding acceptance of the fact that India at this stage of development is restricted to the status of a regional power. But this would logically presuppose, in turn, an American willingness to take a dispassionate view of Indian regional ambitions and to let South Asian power relationships develop unimpeded. It would require in particular a clear definition by the United States of the assumptions governing military assistance to Pakistan.

Although our military aid program is nominally addressed to the threat of Communist aggression, Pakistan has frankly pressed for a recasting of the alliance to imply the objective of a military balance of power with India and Afghanistan. The United States has never met this issue head-on. In their 1961 communiqué, President Kennedy and Marshal Ayub agreed in deliberately ambiguous language that Pakistan could use U.S. military aid to maintain its "security," and Ayub no longer bothers with the pretense that Pakistan is motivated by anti-Communism in continuing the alliance. What Pakistan now seeks to establish is a self-perpetuating aid relationship implicitly dedicated to bolstering its power position vis-à-vis India and a veto power over the nature and scope of Indian military expansion. Washington finds itself called upon to deny India supersonic aircraft; and when Moscow, predictably, steps into the breach, this is then cited as renewed reason for replacing the U.S.-supplied Pakistan subsonic fighter force with supersonic planes.

The interest of the United States would appear to lie in a scrupulous detachment from local power rivalries in South Asia. It is not the responsibility of the United States to maintain some arbitrarily determined balance of power between India and Pakistan, and it would not be within our power to control the terms of their relationship indefinitely should the attempt ever be made. If aid levels fixed in proportion to the size of the two countries help India to realize its natural margin of economic and military superiority over Pakistan, this is not the fault of the United States. It is inherent in the situation created by

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Partition. The test of U.S. friendship with respect to Pakistan can only be whether we are making an adequate contribution to the fulfillment of Pakistan's own power potential.

In both India and Pakistan the basic long-term interest of the United States in stable development has been obscured by the expedient importance of short-term interests associated with the cold war. The exaggerated image of India as a country that counted in a closely divided world struggle led Washington to give importance to New Delhi largely in terms of its international role. Pakistan, too, became a factor in American policy at a time when global war seemed an imminent possibility, which implied that it would be forgotten once tensions subsided. Yet as the passage of time has made clear, the ultimate stake of the United States lies in what happens inside the two countries.

India compels attention not because it is a great power, but precisely because it is so far from being one. There is a long and dangerous road ahead as the country seeks to create a viable nationalism in the face of staggering historical odds. The shadow of Chinese nuclear power dampens the stoutest spirits. Failure lurks on every side, and the costs of failure, it is all too clear, would be paid in the end not only by India but by the responsible international community. Nor would India's failure be Pakistan's triumph. Disarray in New Delhi with its attendant strains on Hindu-Moslem amity would precipitate a chain reaction of strife reaching across the border.

Balkanization in the Indian subcontinent would set the stage for a prolonged conflict between Soviet, Chinese and American interests, with the advantage in such a situation going to those nearest at hand. It is to help forestall this possibility that the United States is playing out its role in the South Asian drama.

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COMMUNIST RULE IN EASTERN EUROPE

By John Michael Montias

BY the end of the 1950s, it looked to all the world as if Eastern Europe were safely back in the Communist fold. The Hungarians were still stunned by the defeat of the revolution; the irascible Poles were finally subdued; the Czechs were laboring under the most severe repression since the death of Stalin; the Rumanians and the Bulgarians seemed, as usual, to be bearing their yoke with docility; the Albanians were too few, too far and too inconsequent to deserve the world's solicitude. Jugoslavia was effectively quarantined by Moscow and her revisionist influence was at an ebb. The 1956 interlude was over. It was hardly possible to detect at that time the forces that a few years later were to challenge the renewed order and breed confusion and disarray in the Communist ranks.

The events of 1956—from the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in February to the end of the Hungarian general strike in December—had more profoundly altered the nature of Communist rule in Eastern Europe than was believed at the time. Khrushchev, in his speech at the Congress, had condemned rule by terror; by his accusations against Stalin, he had also, in effect, acknowledged the fallibility of party leadership. Terror, in the sense of wanton repression for deeds not condemned by law, has ever since been abandoned in Eastern Europe, except in Albania, which rejected the principles of the Twentieth Congress. The revelation of Stalin's follies, reinforced by criticism of Gottwald, Rakosi and Chervenkov in their respective countries, undermined the faith of Communist Party members in their chiefs everywhere; at the same time, the de facto acknowledgment of errors in the past policies of the party made it increasingly delicate to bar public discussion of present policies.

In June 1956, the Poznan riots, which were set off by economic demands, demonstrated to the ruling régimes the political risks they took in neglecting their people's welfare. This lesson has been learned: henceforth, the necessity of at least maintaining the population's level of living was to act as a dominant constraint on the formulation of economic policies in the area. More important still, the Polish and Hungarian events of October and November 1956 exposed the dangers of halfhearted measures of

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liberalization. When discussions about the "errors of the past" are launched, there is no end to the recriminations they arouse; once they do get started, it is as dangerous to try to bring them to a sudden stop as to let them run their course. Hence the necessity for exerting delicately graduated pressure to bring turbulence under control—as the Poles and Czechs have understood so well in recent years.

The same fateful year also witnessed the first initiatives of the Chinese Communists in East European affairs, starting with support for Polish and Hungarian independence in October and ending by appeals for international solidarity in December. China's potential interference in East Europe has caused the Soviet Union to exercise a good deal more restraint in its policy toward its erstwhile satellites than in the days of its unchallenged predominance. Finally, the Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956, "On Friendship and Coöperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States," proved to be a more serious declaration of Moscow's intent to put its relations with the people's democracies on a new, more equalitarian basis than might have been expected from the circumstances at the moment of its issue, five days before the second Soviet intervention in Hungary.

In the summer of 1958, the Soviets quietly withdrew their troops from Rumania. Less than six months after this event, which went virtually unnoticed in the West, the Rumanian party leaders made their first open bids for Western credits, began to manifest a less coöperative attitude in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) and apparently resolved at their November plenum to reduce the dependency of Rumania's foreign trade on the Soviet bloc. The effects of this reorientation were to become noticeable first in 1960.[1]

In 1960 and 1961, the Sino-Soviet dispute became envenomed, while relations between Moscow and Belgrade gradually improved. The Albanian Communists, motivated primarily by their fear and hatred of Jugoslavia, began to veer toward the Chinese line from 1959 on. Then, after a purge of their own ranks in the summer of 1960, they came out squarely in support of the Chinese stand at the Moscow Conference of the following November. The Soviets promptly moved to isolate Albania diplomatically and to harm her economically. Soviet-Albanian trade fell by a third

[1] For details, see my article "The Background and Origins of Rumania's Dispute with COMECON." *Soviet Studies*, October 1964.

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from 1961 to 1962, then was virtually discontinued in 1963. None the less, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania maintained or increased their volume of trade with Albania during these three crucial years. None of the Soviet allies followed Moscow's lead in cutting off trade relations altogether—in contrast with the well coördinated boycott imposed on Jugoslavia by all Cominform members after the 1948 break.

In 1962 and 1963, the Rumanians hardened their opposition to the efforts of the U.S.S.R., East Germany and Czechoslovakia to reorganize COMECON as a supranational body with greater authority to coördinate and deploy the resources of its members than in the past. The Rumanians' diplomatic initiatives and their virtual declaration of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1964 gave Moscow notice that Rumania's autonomy would not be limited to the economic sphere. This year also, Gomulka and Kadar showed their reluctance to support the Kremlin's call for a preparatory conference of Communist parties, which would consecrate the split in the international workers' movement. They were, and presumably still are, apprehensive lest, once China and her allies have been severed from the Soviet bloc, the Russians will be in a position to reimpose tighter controls on the East European parties that have taken advantage of the dispute to increase their power for manœuvre.

II

A key question now that Nikita Khrushchev has been deposed is whether the gradual loosening of ties between the U.S.S.R. and the East European Communist powers was due to his gratuitous inclination to allow the former satellites more latitude or was the necessary consequence of changes in the real environment in which Soviet policy must operate, such as shifts in the balance of power, the Sino-Soviet dispute and internal developments in each country. An examination of Khrushchev's role in the events of the last eight years will hardly support the assertion that he consciously promoted autonomy inside the bloc or that he even tolerated it any more than he thought he had to. His blunt interference in Polish affairs in October 1956, his part in suppressing the Hungarian revolution, his influence in bringing about the purge of Anton Yugov and other Bulgarian party leaders in 1961, and his personal efforts to transform COMECON into a supranational coördinating body, against the will of its less developed

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members, all betray his intent to consolidate the Soviet bloc under Moscow's aegis.

On the other hand, there is no denying that Khrushchev tried to conciliate his allies and to create an *esprit de corps* in the bloc that was missing in Stalin's day, and that in so doing he achieved some measure of popularity in the higher spheres of the East European parties. There is evidence, reported by the correspondent of *Le Monde,* Philippe Ben, that at the time of the June 1957 showdown in the Soviet Party Presidium at which Khrushchev's opponents almost overcame him, Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz and his entourage were afraid of the coming to power of Molotov and other diehards who would be less tolerant of Poland's autonomy. Khrushchev also demonstrated at times more willingness than some of his colleagues to come to terms with Tito and to facilitate his rapprochement with the bloc (*i.e.* the 1963 incident when he caused the May Day slogans to be amended *after publication* to include a greeting to *socialist* Jugoslavia). Finally, if, as some observers have speculated, it was on order from Khrushchev, against Brezhnev's opposition, that the Togliatti Theses were reprinted in *Pravda* on September 10, 1964, this might also indicate a more liberal attitude toward democracy in the bloc than was held by the men who have replaced him.

In view of this scattered and partially contradictory evidence, how are we to interpret the reactions of the Czech, East German, Hungarian and Polish party leaders to Khrushchev's dismissal? Were the kind words they had for Khrushchev after his departure tokens of gratitude for his personal role in liberalizing Soviet relations with their countries? If they had really feared a resumption of Stalinist methods of control, they would have hesitated to antagonize the new Kremlin leaders by praising the man who had just lost the power struggle. A more likely explanation of their attitude is that they wished to convey to Brezhnev and his associates that the autonomy they had achieved during Khrushchev's tenure of office was an accomplishment which could not be reversed, and that far from expecting a Soviet attempt to curb it, they intended to enlarge it in the future.

For the time being, I think we may proceed on the assumption that objective forces rather than Khrushchev's personal inclinations weakened Soviet influence over Eastern Europe. Unless the new masters of the Kremlin are willing to take chances, they will also have to accommodate themselves to the present situation

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and perhaps even tolerate a further decline in Soviet hegemony over the affairs of the Communist world.

Now that the nations of East Europe have attained a significant degree of independence, their internal problems will play a more decisive role than in the past, when the Kremlin could remove an unpopular leader at will to assuage discontent (*e.g.* Hungary's Rakosi in 1953) or stood ready to bail out its allies with economic aid at the first sign of impending revolt (as in the wake of the Poznan riots of June 1956). If Khrushchev had been able to depose Novotny and replace him with a more popular leader in 1959 or in 1960—as the Albanians claim he tried to do with the help of Rudolf Barák—the position of the party in Czechoslovakia might not have deteriorated as far as it has. Neither would matters have come to this pass if the Soviets had supplied economic aid in 1961 or 1962 when the Czechs needed it so badly. (Instead, Czechoslovakia at present lends capital to the Soviet Union for the development of its iron ores.)

What holds the European Communist bloc together is no longer Soviet power over the lives and careers of the highest party officials of the people's democracies, but a more or less loosely woven web of ideological, economic and political threads. From this it follows that ties which are now close, due to a coincidence of interests, may be sundered tomorrow if a shock or disturbance from without happens to break up this fortuitous harmony. Internal forces may then set in motion centrifugal tendencies which would have been kept in check in the days when Bierut, Rakosi and Chervenkov ruled their satrapies at Stalin's sufferance.

The consequences of national autonomy will be felt especially sharply when one or another of the Communist Party chiefs of Eastern Europe dies or retires and leaves a wide-open field for his succession. Since the Soviets will no longer have a decisive voice in the appointment of the new Party Secretary, the ensuing struggle among contenders for the post is likely to be even more protracted and complex than when Poland's Boleslaw Bierut died in March 1956.

The special relations of the East European states to the U.S.S.R. may even aggravate rather than damp down their internal disturbances. Those that choose to back the Soviets in their struggle with China must tune their propaganda against dogmatism, condemn Stalinism and heed the revisionist currents from Moscow, even though domestic conditions may call for quite dif-

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ferent policies. Thus, the anti-Stalinist tenor of the C.P.S.U.'s Twenty-Second Party Congress in November 1961 could not be ignored in Prague. It heartened the anti-dogmatic forces in the Czechoslovak party, who could now confound conservative officials with quotations freshly wafted from Moscow. When Slovak cultural periodicals, which distinguished themselves in the last two years by their independence from party controls and by their ideological boldness, heaped showers of praise on Khrushchev, they did so neither by force of habit nor on order from above, but because, rightly or wrongly, the Slovak party intellectuals saw in the Soviet Premier an ally against the dogmatists in their own party. Gheorghiu-Dej and Enver Hoxha, unlike Novotny, can take or leave a Soviet thaw and rule their country as they think best.

Indeed, the Rumanian and Albanian Parties have, by and large, maintained tighter controls over their respective populations to the present day than did those who remained faithful to Moscow's leadership in the Chinese dispute. Their leaders may have been wary of the risk that de-Stalinization would boomerang in their countries, where the party is still weak and can maintain itself in power only by an outward show of strength and severity. Furthermore, once these Balkan leaders had resolved on an independent course vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, they had to tighten their hold on the party and on the press to avoid even the semblance of international factionalism, which the Soviets might use as an interim wedge to regain their dominant position. It may be recalled in this connection that Tito's régime did not begin to loosen its totalitarian grip until nearly two years after the Jugoslav break with the Cominform. It is probable that once the Rumanian Government has won a measure of popular support by catering to the nationalistic feelings of its subjects, it will be able to launch a more clement policy. (The recent political amnesty, the rehabilitation of a few prewar historians and sociologists, and a more nuanced attitude toward Western literature in recent months may be the harbingers of this new course.) In Albania, this trend is less likely, for the party is more fundamentally committed, nationally and internationally, to a hard "Marxist-Leninist" policy.

There is no more reason now than before the overthrow of Khrushchev to expect that any countries of Eastern Europe will defy Moscow and either join the Chinese or declare neutrality in

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the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus Ulbricht must have Russian support to stay in power. Gomulka feels that Poland must be closely allied to the Soviet Union in order to contain Western Germany and to safeguard the Oder-Neisse line. The Czechoslovak Communists at the present time are concerned mainly about their difficult economic situation; they have well in mind that if the Soviet market for their machinery products were cut off, the economic structure they have built over the last 15 years would collapse (the drastic curtailment of trade with China in 1961 already dealt a heavy blow to the Czech economy). Kadar's Hungarian régime, which was put in power by the force of Soviet arms, can only look to Moscow to defend Hungary's vital interests in the Balkans, more particularly in Transylvania, where the Hungarian minority has apparently been subjected to discrimination and repression at the hands of the Rumanians in recent years. And the Bulgarians, who have a long tradition of loyalty and subservience to Russia, which Moscow has kept alive by generous economic aid, can also be counted on (although they were once tempted to follow Chinese shock methods in their economic policy).

III

Since the Communist parties in the countries that have remained faithful to Moscow cannot exploit nationalistic aspirations and popular desire for independence to nearly the same extent as Rumania and Albania, they must resort to other means to win the minimum degree of support necessary to run a modern state, where terror has been abjured as an instrument of domestic policy. It is not surprising, in view of the variety of political and economic conditions obtaining in this group of countries, that different techniques have been used at various times to achieve this aim. (This lack of uniformity, as we shall see, gave disaffected intellectuals in the "hard-line" countries the opportunity to challenge the existing order by making invidious comparisons with the policies of the more liberal régimes.) Not that the usual means of persuasion through education and ideological propaganda were abandoned in any of these states. Much effort was indeed devoted to the traditional methods. But these are blunt instruments, of doubtful effectiveness in the short run, and to which more sophisticated citizens have become anesthetized.

The first element of diversity has been the occurrence, at vari-

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ous times in the several countries of the Soviet bloc, of periods of liberalization and repression, in contrast to the pre-1956 era when the correlation was nearly perfect. Since 1961, for instance, the Czechs and the Slovaks have been enjoying a remarkable relaxation of political and cultural controls, while Poland's Communist leaders have been busy whittling away the freedoms granted to the population in October 1956. In Hungary, a novel situation has arisen, which does not have the characteristics either of a "thaw" or of a decompression period; Kadar's government has maintained a fairly tight clamp in the ideological sphere, while making substantial concessions to the Hungarian people concerning such matters as license to travel abroad, personal freedom from persecution, promotion of non-Communists to important posts and access to university education on the basis of merit rather than class background. These concessions were not wrested from the government by a clamoring press or by a turbulent populace; they were vouchsafed to widen support for the régime—with considerable success, if we may judge by travelers' reports. Even in countries such as East Germany, where leaders have the reputation of being staunch Stalinists, there have been occasional measures of leniency in the arts and debates in the social sciences which have gone far beyond what was permitted a decade ago. Although these clemencies may be promptly withdrawn—when the aspirations toward greater freedom which they engender threaten to get out of hand—they serve to remind intellectuals that the state is not entirely deaf to their pleas. In every country allied to the Soviet Union, a significant degree of interaction between the rulers and their subjects marks the progress made since Stalin's day, when the lines of force ran only one way—from the top down.

Wladyslaw Gomulka has banked mainly on the German danger to keep the Poles quiescent, and he has done this with remarkable skill. In their public propaganda, the Polish Communists have played up every incident they could find that would keep alive Polish fears of German *revanchism*. At the same time, supporters of the régime quietly spread the rumor that only a policy of wholehearted collaboration with the Soviet Union would keep Khrushchev from making a deal with Germany at Poland's expense. This *raison d'état*, though of doubtful validity, has restrained many anti-Communist Poles from opposing their government. President Novotny, similarly, has exploited the unguarded

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statements of Bonn officials on the Sudeten problem to evoke the traumas of the Munich accord and its aftermath. (Bonn's refusal to repudiate the accord has, of course, helped to lend substance to this propaganda.)

As a matter of fact, Novotny, harassed by opposition both within and without the party, has been in need of every issue he could find to keep himself afloat. He has already thrown overboard a great deal of ballast, including his old-time colleague Viliam Siroky, who was dismissed as Prime Minister in 1963. His characteristic way of dealing with intellectual unrest is, on the one hand, to discredit intellectuals by playing on the feelings of envy, self-conscious inferiority and class animosity harbored by workers and by the party's rank and file against people more educated than themselves; and, on the other hand, to court mildly revisionist artists, scientists and professors by granting them state prizes, trips abroad and financial help. In exchange, these intellectuals are expected to keep their discussions within reasonable bounds and particularly not to air their unorthodox views beyond the confines of their professional organs. It is all right, Novotny says in effect, for the philosophers to cast an occasional doubt on the dialectics, for the painters to depart from realism, and for the historians to stray from the old party line, but this must be done with discretion, away from the public glare. What he seeks to avoid, above all, is any sudden contact of the intellectuals with members of other professions and with the public at large, such as occurred in Poland and Hungary in the summer of 1956. Unfortunately for the party leadership, as the professional organs, especially the cultural weeklies, become less orthodox, they begin to attract many new readers, and it becomes increasingly difficult to prevent the dissemination of subversive ideas among the different strata of the population.

Although, as we have seen, party authorities can now select among a wider range of alternative policies to combat resistance to their rule than before 1956, the effectiveness of their tactical moves is hedged about by two increasingly serious disabilities: the loss of momentum of the official ideology and the lack of personnel qualified to "put across" the régime's policies. Orthodox Marxism-Leninism no longer holds the initiative among intellectuals; it is no longer able to stem the encroachments of Western rational and secular thought. It is too abstract, inflexible and generally unpalatable to serve as an appropriate vehicle for enlist-

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ing the coöperation of workers, peasants or intellectuals to work for party goals. Worse yet, the party functionaries charged with ideological affairs in the Central Committee, who are themselves mediocre men of no standing in the intellectual population, can no longer find—as they did between 1945 and 1953—first-rate adepts to transmit and elaborate their dictates in cultural fields or the social sciences. The philosophers and social scientists of talent, such as Gyorgy Lukacs in Hungary and Joseph Chalasinski in Poland, learned their lesson under Stalinism and will not again debase their professional standards for the sake of party-mindedness. There is no one to take their place. The government must rely on compromised second-raters such as the philosopher Adam Schaff and the economist Bronislaw Minc in Poland or the Marxist critics Ladislav Stoll and Jiři Taufer in Czechoslovakia, who did what they were told in 1952 and can be relied on to continue to do so now. (After 1956, Schaff attempted for a while to satisfy both the wolf of party exigency and the lamb of revisionist aspirations but ended up serving the wolves when the lines were drawn.)

There has been no change in the old guard because the able scholars and writers of the next generation—*e.g.* in Poland, the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski and the economist Wlodzimierz Brus; in Czechoslovakia, the philosopher Karel Kotyk, the aesthetician Oleg Sus and the sociological economist Rudolf Selucky; and a whole Pleiad of economists in Hungary—think for themselves and will not act as mere transmission-belts for party dictates. The others, the ones lacking in self-respect, usually do not have the minimum prestige to police the arts and sciences successfully. The intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have developed a more discriminating sense of moral responsibility in recent years than in the confused aftermath of World War II; social ostracism, to an increasing extent, is the penalty reserved for those who infringe the rules of common decency, who collaborate beyond the requirements of duty or give in too easily to party pressures. A remarkable instance of these high moral standards is the defiant attitude of 22 out of the 34 Polish intellectuals who signed the notorious "Letter to Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz" earlier this year and who are still resisting party pressures to repudiate their politically harmful initiative. (A majority of the dozen signatories who gave in to these pressures were university professors and other de facto public servants

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whose livelihood could more easily be threatened than that of writers and critics.) The tumultuous welcome recently accorded by a large group of Krakow students to one of the writers who held his ground shows that, unlike in the Stalinist era, an enlightened public can now express its appreciation for those who still dare to champion civic virtues.

There is an exception to the clear moral demarcation I have just referred to. The Slovak Communist intellectuals who were purged for nationalist deviations in the early 1950s, led by L. Novomesky and G. Husak, are still inflamed by their enthusiasm for Communism and are doing everything they can to instill new life into the party. These men have achieved a significant measure of popularity in Slovakia, though apparently more by virtue of their nationalism than of their Communism. It remains to be seen whether their political position is stable and whether they can influence the party stalwarts to move toward a more liberal policy. If not, the same choices may eventually confront them as did their revisionist predecessors in Poland and Hungary after 1956: they will either have to abandon politics and take up scholarly pursuits or capitulate and serve the party bureaucracy, with the concomitant loss of their popularity.

The bonds of solidarity that have been forged of late among intellectuals in the various Communist countries who share similar problems in their relations with party authorities are one of the distinguishing marks of the present period. Nonconformist Soviet poets and writers have received warm support in several cultural journals of Eastern Europe. Almost as soon as *L'Express* in Paris published Evgeny Evtushenko's politically candid biographical sketches, which caused a furor in Moscow, they were reprinted in the Slovak periodical *Kulturny Zivot*. Evtushenko is also said to be a cultural hero among young people in Hungary. The Czech literary journal *Plamen* was used last summer by an East German writer as a platform to complain about dogmatic critics in East Berlin and about the cultural isolation of his fellow-citizens. By far the best documented and most perceptive article on the troubles in Czechoslovak agriculture appeared under the name of a Czech author in a Polish periodical. An article by the Czech writer Josef Hoffmeister, describing the new freedoms enjoyed in Hungary, created something of a sensation in a Prague literary journal in the summer of 1963. Every blow against totalitarianism in one country is apt to be exploited by intel-

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lectuals in the rest of the bloc. And even Communists outside the bloc can on occasion serve as a liberating influence, as witness the impact of French Communist writers such as Roger Garaudy on Czech intellectuals in connection with the discussion on Kafka and alienation under socialism.

The relaxation of international tensions has been another factor making for instability in the Communist states. The party cannot as easily justify harsh policies and the imposition of strict ideological discipline by invoking the threat of imperialist war or the dangers of infiltration by spies and other "class enemies." The increasingly free access of East Europeans to world information—via the radio, tourists from abroad and more or less legally imported literature—imposes restraints on official propaganda, which must take into account these alternative news media. People cannot be deceived about living standards in France or Italy or about economic integration in Western Europe. More important still, the collectivized farmer of Slovakia knows that his Polish colleague on the other side of the border is still plowing his own land.

The rebirth of nationalist sentiment presents one of the most powerful threats to the uneasy balance of Communist rule. The nationalism of minorities challenges the principle of centralized government, as witness the Slovak opposition to control by Prague. But it may also irritate relations between states, as in the case of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Despite nearly 20 years of government and party efforts to rewrite history from a class viewpoint and to extirpate from the minds of citizens the antagonisms that have plagued Eastern Europe for hundreds of years, the old animosities live on, passed on from one generation to the next by word of mouth. The Czechs cannot forget that Poland seized Teschen after Munich (though the area is theirs again); the Hungarians deplore the loss of Transylvania; the Rumanians covet Bessarabia, the Bulgarians northern Dobrudja and parts of Jugoslav Macedonia. In the last year or so, some of these latent conflicts have pierced through Marxist historical writings. Slovak historians, in conjunction with their struggle for a fundamental revision of the official party attitude toward the Slovak uprising of August 1944 and toward the alleged deviations of the Clementis-Novomesky-Husak faction condemned during the Stalinist period, have brought into question the whole nexus of Czech-Slovak relations before, during and immediately after

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World War II. Rumanian historians, in this case undoubtedly at the behest of their authorities, now play up the role of the Rumanian Communist Party, and of Gheorghiu-Dej in particular, in the liberation of their country and more or less implicitly deprecate the Soviet contribution to this effort. An editorial article in the August 1964 issue of *Lupta de Clasa,* organ of the Rumanian Workers' Party's Central Committee, claims that Ana Pauker and V. Luca, who were "living in emigration during the war," disapproved of the local Communists' support of the conspiracy that led to the overthrow of the Antonescu régime in August 1944, on the pretext that if it had not been for the insurrection, power could have been taken over by the working class "immediately"—upon liberation by the Soviet forces?—instead of having to be shared with the bourgeoisie in the next couple of years. It may be surmised that the Pauker-Luca views were shared at the time by the Kremlin. In any case it is evident that the history of the liberation of Rumania is an important cause of friction between Moscow and Bucharest today.

Even pre-World War I history is now becoming a source of friction in the area. The pointed discussion that took place between Hungarian, Rumanian and Soviet historians at the Budapest Historical Congress of May 1964 on the decay and disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire disinterred various controversial issues, which also have their contemporary overtones. The Hungarians and the Soviets, for instance, rejected the Rumanian contention that the workers and peasants of the oppressed nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire aspired toward "unitary national states." When the successor states actually came into being, one Soviet historian observed, they also included national minorities, which were sometimes forcibly "unified" (*e.g.* the Ukrainians in Rumanian Bukovina). P. Hanak, a Hungarian participant, expressed doubt as to whether the breakdown of the Empire in 1918 into independent states "had brought about favorable conditions in every respect, from the point of view of the further struggle of the working classes and oppressed peoples." He also denied that the "unitary national states have solved—even comparatively speaking—the many pernicious problems inherited from the past." He warned that these historical problems, far from being only of "museum value," involved the "question of coexistence among the Danubian peoples and their international democratic coöperation" (*Valoság,* No. 7,

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1964). These clashes cannot be entirely attributed to a concerted attack on Rumanian nationalist deviations; similar, though apparently more muted, divergencies divided Czech and Hungarian historians on the origins of the first Czechoslovak Republic.

While these frank exchanges are perhaps more healthy than the past practice of glossing over controversial issues, there is a risk, in the short run, that mutual recriminations may upset the superficially harmonious relations among the Danubian states and lead to a resurgence of the petty feuding that proved so disastrous, both economically and politically, in the inter-war period. The members of COMECON have already had considerable difficulty smoothing over the conflicts of interests in their midst, especially between the more and the less developed countries of the area; the organization might not survive a crisis of exasperated nationalism.

It would be a mistake for Westerners to indulge in smug jubilation at the first sign of disintegration in Eastern Europe. In the long run, it will better serve the cause of peace and freedom if tensions in the region can be resolved and if the individual countries of Eastern Europe, forgetting the rancors of the past, can move toward a closer political and economic unity. This is a time when the Western allies might begin to formulate a constructive and responsible policy toward Eastern Europe—as the region might emerge a few years hence if present trends continue.

IV

Among the disruptive forces in the bloc, economic failures have perhaps had the most powerful impact. They are particularly serious when they occur in conjunction with a malaise in the party or with some other source of dissatisfaction; for they then intensify splits in the party and promote the relaxation of ideological pressure that normally accompanies disunity. Conversely, if the party can pride itself on the simultaneous attainment of high rates of industrial growth and of increases in the population's living standards, party differences tend to be resolved and ideological struggle is apt to be waged with greater vigor (as in Czechoslovakia in 1958–1959 and in Rumania in 1958–1962).

This conjecture is related to the existence of what a Czech economist recently described as "the economic semicycle," in virtually the first analysis made by a Soviet-bloc economist of economic fluctuations in socialist countries (*Planovane Hospo-*

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darstvi, No. 9, 1964). The political aspects of these fluctuations can easily be tacked on to his economic analysis. The "semicycle" begins in a period of unusually favorable circumstances—after a period of recovery from war damage, after two or three years of good harvests, or where various "tail-ends" of investments have recently been completed and have added to present-day capacity at little cost in terms of presently available resources. Plans are drawn up for the next few years in the "subjective expectation" that these favorable conditions will be maintained. But bottlenecks and other obstacles soon arise, which imperil the fulfillment of these ambitious plans. To salvage the plans, pressure is put on labor to increase its productivity, wage controls are tightened and party calls for heightened discipline go out into the land. The ideological offensive now picks up momentum; there is no more room for dissension or even for discussion of larger issues—for example, of faults in the economic system. All efforts must be mobilized to achieve immediate goals. Later, as the crisis deepens, the initial plans may be abandoned. If this decision is taken, investments are trimmed; the pace of expansion slackens; and the pressure in the system lets up. This is the turning point where a period of liberalization is most likely to set in. If, on the other hand, the party is still unified behind its leadership and if there is sufficient hope that the plans can be salvaged, then the economic and the ideological offensive will continue to be waged until success has been achieved.

To describe the social mechanism that translates economic crises into political thaws, I shall use the recent example of Czechoslovakia, where a many-sided connection can be traced between the economic difficulties that came to a head in early 1962 and the internal disunity that manifested itself at the same time.

1. Party unity was undermined by divergences in the Central Committee, and probably in the Presidium itself, on the causes of the failure of the Third Five Year Plan (1961–1965), which proved to be unfeasible almost as soon as it was launched (it was finally abandoned in mid-1962). Ota Sik, a member of the Central Committee and perhaps the most influential theoretical economist in the party, revealed in December 1963 his fundamental disagreement with Novotny on this issue. He argued that the reforms instituted in 1958 in the Czechoslovak economic system had failed because they did not go far enough toward decentraliza-

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tion, whereas Novotny had claimed that the reforms had gone too far, or at least that their misapplication had led to a "weakening of the central direction of the economy." The views of Jaromir Dolansky, an old-time economic expert on the Presidium who lost his post as vice-premier in September 1963, apparently were more consonant with Sik's position than with Novotny's.

2. The party Presidium, which is said to have worked on the directives of the Third Five Year Plan and to have "systematically discussed its chief problems," lost prestige in the eyes of lower functionaries when the plan failed. If party chiefs and high government officials can err by such a wide margin, then blind conformism cannot be expected of the rank and file.

3. Party officials in the National Committees (local state organs), who shared responsibility with managers of enterprises for the fulfillment of the plans, although the final version of the plans had been elaborated by central agencies without local participation, threw back the blame for failures on higher authorities. An official in the Pilsen district, for instance, attacked the Minister of Heavy Industry at the Twelfth Party Congress (1962) for incompetent meddling in the affairs of the Lenin (ex-Skoda) Works and for flagrant ignorance of the enterprise's production and financial problems.

4. The reshuffling of manpower and the dislocation of output attending the economic slowdown deepened the cleavage between Slovakia and the Czech lands. (Industrial output and the volume of construction both fell in 1963.) There was a widespread feeling in the Slovak party, and in the Slovak population at large, that the ministries in Prague were discriminating against Slovak plants in distributing scarce materials and in ordering shutdowns. The Slovak Communists began to complain that Novotny was practicing a "Beneš-like" policy with respect to Slovakia. The appointment of Josef Lenart as Premier in September 1963 helped to placate the Slovaks who wanted "their" man in the government to defend Slovak economic interests.

5. The procedures used in dismissing superfluous workers and in assigning them to labor-deficit sectors (construction, mining and state farms) also had political repercussions. In Slovakia, the selection of workers to be laid off followed strict class principles. The first to get dismissed were the close relatives of farmers who had a piece of privately-owned land and who had not fulfilled their compulsory deliveries to the state. Last to be let go were

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faithful party members. These practices antagonized the population and widened the chasm separating it from the party.

The economic crisis in Czechoslovakia represents perhaps an unusually clear case. At times the casual sequence may be more complex. The Polish repression of 1959, for instance, was not only linked to the party's attempt to overcome the economic setbacks of that summer, as some observers have argued, but also to Colonel Monat's defection, which precipitated the return of harsh disciplinarians, such as Kazimierz Witaszewski, to the Central Committee *apparat*. Actually the repression had begun in earnest in 1958 after a year and a half of economic successes; it was accompanied by an acceleration of the investment program, which was itself largely responsible for the economic difficulties that cropped up in 1959.

While economic fluctuations are of less magnitude in the Soviet Union than in Eastern Europe and play a smaller role in determining changes in the political climate, it is at least worth mentioning that three of the most oppressive periods in Soviet history—the first collectivization campaign of 1928–1930, the great purge of 1937–1938, and the *Zhdanovshchina* of 1948—followed a general uptrend in economic conditions.

V

The model sets in perspective a few interrelated factors from among the multitude of forces conditioning Communist rule in Eastern Europe. We have seen that the penetration of ideas subversive to the official ideology, the resurgence of nationalism both inside and outside the party, the relaxation of international tensions, and the looser links that have been knitted in recent years between Moscow and its former satellites have also been undermining the stability of the present régimes.

In the past, Communist leaders could delude themselves that the internal disruptive forces were due to the vestiges of bourgeois mentality. In the long run, they believed, every citizen born and bred in a socialist state would be so imbued with Communist principles that he would automatically comply and conform to party rule. But such data as have been collected on the attitudes and beliefs of young people in Eastern Europe give no ground for this optimism. In spite of their Communist education, youths, of whatever social origin, whether in Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, cannot be induced to accept cant as a substitute for

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wisdom or varnish for truth. They will not accept at their face value the superficial explanations and excuses of the party for the vicious repressions of Stalin's day. (In Czechoslovakia, no one forgets that the most important trials of Slovak Communists accused of nationalist deviations took place after Stalin's death.) Moreover, their Communist elders can no longer effectively convince them with arguments about the dismal state of affairs that prevailed during the economic depression of the 1930s or during the Nazi period, because they have no direct memory of this antediluvian past. The best the party can hope for is the "depoliticization" of students, such as has occurred in Poland in recent years; but even then the intellectuals who will be drawn from the ranks of these students will necessarily be engulfed by politics, if only to fight the encroachments of the party on their professional activity.

If this diagnosis is correct, the party leaders of the East European states that have cast their lot with the Soviet Union cannot look forward to any substantial improvement in the political climate under which they rule. Can they contain the tide of popular demands for radical reforms in Communist society without falling back on terror? The evolution of the situation in Czechoslovakia in the next year or two should be instructive in this respect. During the summer of 1964 Novotny and his aides seemed to be moving away from persuasion and appeals to Communist conscience, which have borne little or no fruit, toward "administrative measures." Organizational and administrative moves are of course a long way from any reversion to terror; nevertheless, if the opposition keeps on growing, particularly in Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany, the options facing the rulers may narrow with time as the number of even halfway competent intellectuals willing to collaborate with the party dwindles and as mild punitive measures become increasingly ineffective. If the present party leaders eventually choose to resort to violence rather than give up power to more liberally inclined men in the party, a cataclysmic escalation of social tensions, such as occurred in 1956, would seem to be inescapable.

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A BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIET FOREIGN AID

By Marshall I. Goldman

AMID the various anniversaries of the last year, one seems to have passed unnoticed. It was just ten years ago that the Soviet Union embarked on its program of economic aid to neutralist countries. Beginning with a grain elevator and highway program in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the Bhilai Steel Mill in India, Soviet promises of aid mounted rapidly until they reached a peak of more than $1 billion in the year 1960. In terms of gross national product, this was as much as the United States was providing at the time. Subsequently, however, in late 1961, promises of Soviet aid diminished and remained insignificant until late 1963.

The ten-year mark is an appropriate point at which to evaluate the program of Soviet aid which in that period has totaled $3.5 billion. Heretofore, Soviet successes in foreign aid have usually been so breathtaking that they have not only overshadowed the much less dramatic American projects, they have also eclipsed Soviet shortcomings. The coming of age of the program reveals, however, that the Soviets have also had their failures. To their surprise, they have encountered almost all of the problems which have frustrated us, plus some that we have been spared.

II

The Russians have a knack for the spectacular. What success they have had in foreign aid has come from concentrating on certain key projects which are often industrial in nature. These major impact projects not only excite the imagination but often have productive and visible results. The workmanship and administrative efficiency that go into completing these showpieces are good, indeed often better than are found in the U.S.S.R. itself. The steel plant at Bhilai is one of the largest and most successful in all of the underdeveloped world. The decision to build it came after West Germany and Great Britain had also agreed to build steel mills for India. Resolved to win the competition, the Russians not only shamed the West Germans into offering a lower interest rate, but completed their plan much faster and built their mill more cheaply than either the English

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or Germans did. Although the German and British plants are technically more complex, most Indians agree that the Soviets have outperformed their competitors.

The success of the Soviets at Aswan is even more impressive. World opinion was dubious when they assumed the financial and physical burden of building this dam immediately after the Americans and the World Bank had refused to do so. On the upper Nile, 100-degree heat was regarded as the norm and the granite to be moved defied the finest drills in the world. Nevertheless, the Russians helped excavate more than ten million cubic yards of dirt and rock so that the first stage of the dam could be completed on schedule. Ultimately the dam will have a water storage capacity double that of the combined resources of the Grand Coulee Dam in Washington and the Kuibyshev Dam in the U.S.S.R.

When they do not undertake industrial construction, the Soviets like to erect showplace monuments in capital cities. Centers like the Polytechnical Institutes in Conakry, Guinea, and Rangoon, Burma, are conspicuous and more attractive than comparable institutes in the U.S.S.R. itself. The same can be said for the Soviet-built hospitals in Djakarta, Indonesia, and Phnom Pehn, Cambodia; the hotels in Conakry and Rangoon; the stadiums in Djakarta, Conakry, and Bamako, Mali. The beauty and impressiveness of many of these structures and the resulting political and psychological impact compensate for the fact that they do not make a direct economic contribution.

The Soviets also take pride in their training of native technicians. Some are sent to the Soviet Union and some are trained on the job. Immense patience is required; but the Russians normally feel that training is more important than speed. Nevertheless, they have trained their replacements at the Bhilai Steel Mill so quickly that there are fewer than 50 Russians left there, in contrast to more than 250 foreigners at the companion German plant. Even so, the German plant has more technical breakdowns and is far behind the Soviet plant in meeting performance targets.

When a project is singled out for priority handling, the full resources of the Soviet Union are often put at its disposal. Accordingly, after it was decided to help construct the Aswan Dam, 50 top specialists of the Research Department of the Hydroelectric Planning Administration were assigned to solve the necessary engineering problems. To complete the dam before the onset

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of the spring rains, extra equipment was rushed to the site. The Bhilai Steel Mill received similar attention from the steel specialists in the Soviet Union. In such cases, the specialists in the field often have authority to make decisions without referring to Moscow. If it is necessary to obtain a decision there, the answer is usually fast in coming.

The Russians also tend to be pragmatic about their aid policies. While they prefer to lend to the state, they will also lend to private firms, as they are doing in the case of watch, tractor and prefabricated housing loans in India. Furthermore, they provide gifts as well as loans. For example, Afghanistan has received over $500,000,000 in Soviet loans, but also $150,000,000 in gifts. Almost all Soviet aid to the Asian countries of Nepal, Burma and Cambodia has been in the form of grants.

However, it is in the field of public relations that the Russians are at their best. Their preference for impact projects and their sense of timing create exciting drama and win applause from the recipients, their own people and even their competitors. Because there is no need to seek time-consuming approval from any legislative body, the Soviet Union was able to announce its willingness to finance the Aswan Dam immediately after the Americans refused to do so. They reacted in the same way after the United States decided against financing the Bokaro Steel Mill in India. Similarly, no sooner did the French proclaim that they would no longer help Guinea than the first Russian promises of aid went off to Conakry; similar promises were made to Tunisia when the French bombed the naval base at Bizerte. In fact, the absence of a new Soviet aid agreement in the wake of an international crisis or realignment of power is a rarity. The 15-month delay between Algeria's assumption of independence in July 1962 and the issuance of a Soviet loan in September 1963 provided one of the first clues that the Soviet Union had cut back on its whole aid program.

To keep their projects constantly in the news, the Russians employ a variety of techniques. One of the most effective is their habit of sending top officials to make on-the-spot inspections. Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Brezhnev have visited most of the Soviet aid projects in Asia and Africa. They also make sure that Soviet factories and their employees who supply the components of various aid projects are properly praised for their contribution in much the same way that American firms are praised for

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their role in space or military achievements. These techniques serve to focus both domestic and world attention on Soviet aid projects and make them household words. In contrast, most Americans are unable to name a single American aid project and few seem to know about such spectacular American accomplishments as the Volta Dam in Ghana, the Sharavati Dam in India or the Gresik Cement Plant in Indonesia. Clearly the Russians have something to teach us here.

III

The major Soviet triumphs at Aswan and Bhilai, along with several other projects, have helped to create the general impression that the Soviets are more adept at handling foreign aid than we in the United States. A close look at American and Russian aid projects in Africa, however, reveals that just as we have had our successes which no one seems to have heard about, the Russians have had their failures which have gone unnoticed. Moreover, as more and more of their programs are completed, the shortcomings become more and more evident. The Russians are beginning to learn only too well that foreign aid can pose a variety of challenges.

Some of them are by no means unique to the Soviet Union. To begin with, economic aid to underdeveloped countries, whether from the U.S.S.R. or the U.S., is inherently difficult to render. Most developing countries do not as yet have the resources to implement complicated foreign aid schemes easily. They lack qualified manpower, supporting equipment and sufficient supplies. Since there are few if any qualified subcontractors, the donor must be prepared to undertake the most elementary production and construction tasks on its own. This makes it difficult to adhere to schedules and standards.

The tropical climate in most developing countries further complicates the process and jeopardizes even simple operations. Proper maintenance is a problem even in temperate zones, but in Africa and Asia it is a major challenge. Thus Russian-built roads wash away in the rains of Indonesia and Russian equipment rusts on the docks of Guinea, Ghana, India and Indonesia. Even when machinery has been installed, heat and humidity accelerate the normal process of deterioration and hamper repair work. In the 100-degree sun of Mali, a useless Soviet crane, its hoist separated from the cab, sits impotent at the portal of the

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Russian-financed stadium; apparently there are no suitable repair facilities nearby and it is too enervating to attempt to make repairs manually. Similarly, after only a week's work, two Soviet bulldozers lie disabled outside the Russian-financed coke oven in Helwan, Egypt. Nearby, one of the plant's two boilers, only two months old, is completely scorched; the other is still operating, but it too is partially burnt. Even the successful Soviet operations at Aswan and Bhilai have been affected. In the frantic drive to complete the first stage of the Aswan Dam before the onset of the spring rains, safety measures were discarded. It was necessary to remove large quantities of dynamited rock before it could be determined that all the charges had been properly detonated. As a result, more than 220 lives were lost. Even at Bhilai there have been blemishes on the impressive record. The 40,000 Indians mobilized to build the mill refused to accept the fact that only about 7,000 could be retained after the completion of construction. This led to a hunger strike and the slogan: "We built the plant—now you are throwing us out." The plant is still plagued by jurisdictional strikes among the unions.

Finally, the personality of the local leaders is often unsuited to cope with complicated programs of economic development and foreign aid. Most of the leaders in Asia and Africa have risen to power through political action and revolution and as a result tend to prefer the excitement of agitation and speechmaking to the tedium and frustration of investment and construction. The crowd roars when President Sukarno promises to "Crush Malaysia." Who can be so aroused about a fertilizer plant? Foreign aid projects are not usually glamorous, provision of money and manpower for them is not popular and the results may be slow in coming. Long-term investment may even be dangerous if an increase in taxes is required. As a result, the economic development side of the budget is sometimes neglected. Indonesia's failure to supply its share of development funds goes a long way in explaining why, after six years of frustration, Soviet aid to Indonesia has not resulted in the completion of a single industrial project.

IV

The inherent difficulties of working in underdeveloped countries are made even more acute by the fact that the Russians are still relatively new to the business of foreign aid. Often they are

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too eager to please and find it hard to say *no* to countries that have been rejected as poor economic and political risks by the West. In such cases promises of Soviet aid are good for public relations, but they often involve the Soviet Union in uneconomic projects. For example, in their efforts to win the confidence of Guinea after the French withdrawal, Moscow virtually agreed to do whatever Guinea asked. As the Soviet Ambassador said, "Guinea was in such a state of economic and psychological shock, we felt we could not refuse her requests." Accordingly, the Soviet Union loaned Guinea $2,000,000 to build a sports stadium. Mali also asked for and is receiving a similar stadium. It was in Indonesia, however, that the Russians outdid themselves with an impressive $12,500,000 athletic complex for the Asian Games. While the stadiums are all attractive and make beautiful political and sports arenas, they do not do much for economic development nor do they generate the foreign funds or commodities which are needed to pay back the Russians. The same seems to hold true of the Russian-built hotels in Africa and Asia. The 120-room hotel in Guinea, for example, stood empty from April to October 1964 waiting for someone to run it. Burma resolved a similar problem with its Russian-built hotel in Rangoon by bringing in an Israeli firm as manager. Now, however, the Israelis have been expelled and the Burmese refuse to allow tourists in their country for more than 24 hours. Consequently the 219-room luxury hotel with its Otis elevators and Westinghouse air conditioners is three-quarters empty and unable to meet expenses.

There are numerous other instances where the Russians have been in too much of a hurry to give themselves time for proper studies. In their rush to complete the first hydroelectric power station in Nepal, they chose a dam site which is only 40 feet wide. As the river flow is subject to seasonable fluctuations, it can be used at full capacity only four months a year; the rest of the time it runs at one-third or two-thirds of capacity. Their inexperience was further demonstrated when they built a radio station on a hillside near Conakry, Guinea. The hill turned out to be rich in iron ore, and thus poor in radio transmission. They are now building a superphosphate plant at Tjilatjap, Indonesia. The plant is about one-fourth completed, but so far no one has been able to find any sulphur or phosphate for the plant to process.

The Russians often assume that what works at home will also

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work in other countries, which explains the relatively large size of some of the factories they have built. They are used to planning to meet a large potential demand for the goods produced. While this may be the proper policy in countries with large populations such as India, Egypt and Indonesia, it is not suitable for others like Guinea, Ethiopia and Nepal where the markets are much more limited. These countries are concerned lest the under-utilization of Soviet-built plants for which loans must be repaid may ultimately put a severe financial burden on them.

In their eagerness to succeed and please, the Russians have sometimes forgotten that it may be hard for some of the countries to repay their obligations. The first installment on several Soviet loans is now falling due. Guinea, Egypt and Indonesia are having financial troubles and have had to ask for refinancing or debt postponement. Frequently the repayment of aid loans is made even more complicated by the need to repay military loans which have also been extended by the Soviet Union.

V

The Soviet task is made even more difficult by the fact that neither the quality of Soviet equipment nor the logistical methods used are always the best. Thus the Egyptians say that the breakdown of the bulldozers and boilers at the coke plant in Helwan was not due to the climate or lack of maintenance, as the Soviets claimed, but to the poor quality of Soviet equipment. It was found necessary to supplement Soviet machinery at Aswan with Swedish drills, English trucks and American caterpillar tractors. Except at Bhilai, native engineers working on Soviet-financed projects invariably assert that they would prefer American equipment to that provided by the Soviet Union. In some cases this may be due to the higher efficiency of the American equipment; in other instances the Soviet machinery simply may not work.

To some extent the Soviet reputation suffers because the Soviet products are not made or adjusted for the requirements of the southern hemisphere. There are desert and tropical areas in the U.S.S.R., but most Soviet equipment is produced for temperate or arctic zone conditions. This explains why tractors were sent to Guinea and Mali with sealed cabs through which an exhaust pipe was passed to provide extra heat. (The Russians did not, however, send snowplows.) Furthermore, the Russians sometimes

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do not produce the equipment which many aid-receiving countries need, as, for instance, machinery for refining cane sugar or rolling normal size cigarettes. To fulfill their commitments in Nepal, they were forced to purchase cane sugar and cigarette equipment from Czechoslovakia. (They apparently profited from the experience of their East German colleagues who presented Indonesia with a beet sugar plant even though Indonesia has only cane sugar.)

Soviet quality is frequently made to appear much worse than it actually is because the goods are often damaged in transit. Packing and transportation within the Soviet Union are still surprisingly inefficient, and the bad results are compounded when goods are shipped long distances abroad. The Soviet merchant marine is handicapped by its need to keep Cuba afloat. Unlike American exporters, whose trade volume warrants the maintenance of regular routes, the Russians must ship at irregular intervals, depending on when the shipping is available. If their goods arrive before they are required, they must be stored on docks. Since most underdeveloped countries are short of warehouse space, the goods must stand in the open, exposed to tropical weather. In combination with the Soviet substandard packaging methods this explains why the docks of Russian-aided countries are frequently loaded with rusting equipment. It also accounts for the cement which has hardened not only on the piers of Burma, but also of Guinea, Ghana and the Sudan. Furthermore, because production schedules are not always planned efficiently, components are not always shipped in the proper sequence. The construction of the Tjilegan Steel Mill in Indonesia is a prime example of this. One of the first pieces of equipment to arrive at the Djakarta docks in late 1962 was the stand for the mill's heavy rollers. However, this part of the mill is not scheduled to be installed until everything else is in place. The completion date, originally planned for 1964, has now been postponed until 1966. In the meantime this 60-ton instrument continues to sit on the open dock.

Criticisms are also heard about Soviet administrative procedures. While the Soviet Union is generally faster than the United States in announcing a new loan, it is slower in implementing the project once the agreement has been signed. Priority projects continue to be expedited, but only a limited number of activities can be classified as such. In order to prevent chaos, it

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is necessary to establish standard operating procedures, and as the volume of aid increases this leads to bureaucracy—as inevitably in Moscow as in Washington. Accordingly, there are delays and complaints. The Egyptian engineers working with their Russian counterparts at the coke furnace in Helwan complained that not even small changes in design could be made without checking first with Moscow.

When it comes to endeavors of a type which the Russians have been unable to carry on successfully at home, their foreign aid is almost always unsuccessful. They have undertaken agricultural programs in India, Ghana and Indonesia, but so far with no hint of success. The Soviet-aided farms have been unprofitable and the Soviet agricultural equipment has on the whole proven to be inappropriate. Foreign aid is difficult enough when the giver is a master of the technology involved, but when the giver has not yet solved his own problems the results are likely to be unsatisfactory.

VI

Like the United States, the Soviet Union has discovered that acceptance of its foreign aid does not necessarily assure acquiescence in its policies, friendship or even gratitude. This has been made painfully clear to the Russians in China and in the former satellite countries of Jugoslavia, Albania and Rumania. It is now happening in the neutralist countries as well. During the Cuban missile crisis, Guinea denied the Soviets permission to land Cuban-bound planes at the Soviet-aided airport in Conakry, nor did it hesitate to expel the Soviet Ambassador after he was caught interfering in its domestic affairs. Soviet economic aid has not helped to convert any country to Communism. Egypt and Algeria willingly accept hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet aid while continuing to arrest their native Communists. In fact, the repression of local Communists may begin long after Soviet aid has started. After conducting a large and apparently successful aid program in Iraq, Soviet aid officials watched helplessly as the Iraqis reversed their political orientation and started to execute or jail Iraqi Communists.

The Russians have also found that aid to one country creates resentment in neighboring countries. The Somalis denounce Soviet aid to Ethiopia (and vice versa); Sudan is jealous of aid to the U.A.R., and aid to India arouses the hostility of Pakistan

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and Afghanistan. The Chinese were particularly displeased by such aid. Significantly, the tenth anniversary of Soviet aid to Afghanistan and India coincides with the Soviet refusal to grant any new loans to China. It was in late 1955 and early 1956 that the Chinese were first forced to export more to the Soviet Union than they imported. This was one of the earliest manifestations of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Nor does foreign aid in any way guarantee the Soviet Union eternal gratitude. China may be an extreme case, but China is not just unappreciative or uncoöperative; it is openly hostile. Despite economic loans in the past of more than $1 billion, the Chinese are now doing everything they can to limit the power and destroy the reputation of the Soviet Union. Sometimes the economic rivalry is open, as when the Russians accused the Chinese of sabotaging their efforts to build the Penauti Dam in Nepal; they said that by stealing rocks from the existing roadbed in order to construct their own road nearby, the Chinese made it impossible for them to bring in the necessary supplies for the construction of the dam. The Chinese have also resorted to racist appeals to undermine Soviet efforts. In Yemen they reportedly boasted that Chinese aid was superior to Russian aid because "men of the East" understood one another and worked better together. Their most humiliating affront to Moscow, however, was in warning other underdeveloped countries of the dangers of taking Soviet aid. Hinting that their own experience was unhappy, they asserted that the Soviet Union used foreign aid in an effort to dominate the economies of the recipient countries and relegate them to an inferior position as suppliers of raw materials. They further accused the Russians of ignoring the sovereignty of developing countries and interfering in domestic affairs. The Chinese have now been joined in criticism by the Rumanians and North Koreans who also assert that the Russians have frustrated their efforts to build an independent economy. And the North Koreans claim that the Russians sold them exports at prices that were higher than those of the world market while it imported goods from Korea at prices that were lower.

While foreign aid has considerable support from Soviet citizens, periodic complaints are heard that the money could just as well be spent at home. The Russian's heart may swell with pride when he sees pictures of Soviet cars in the streets of Guinea, but he nevertheless resents the fact that he must wait for years before

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he can buy a car for himself. Similarly, the dock-workers of Odessa refused to load butter destined for Cuba when their own stores were empty.

VII

After a decade of experience, what is to be the future course of Soviet aid? It seems clear from the virtual cessation of foreign aid commitments in late 1961 that the Soviets have been studying the question. Up to that date, at least, they obviously felt that the successes of the program far outweighed its failures. It provided the Soviet Union with a substantial leverage in international affairs and created favorable publicity throughout the world. It probably is not too much to say that it made neutralism possible. Until 1955 there was no place to turn to for economic help but the West. Soon, however, the Soviets discovered that neutralism seemed to be a dead-end street for them. Their aid helped make a country politically independent and in some cases economically stable, but nowhere did it lead to Communism. Furthermore, while the sociological and political impact of many Soviet projects was favorable, the economic value sometimes was not. There are already signs in Guinea and Mali that the economic shortcomings are even beginning to affect the propaganda successes.

Other considerations as well may have brought about the retrenchment in 1961. The Soviet satellites resented the aid being given to non-Communist countries. Every steel mill or oil refinery sent to a neutralist country meant that there was one less available for the Communist bloc. Albania and China were the most outspoken about this, but it is unlikely that they were the only ones to have felt this way. It was also late in 1961 that strains in the Soviet domestic economy first began to show. As the rate of growth in the industrial sectors slackened, and in agriculture even turned negative, it was clear that the Soviet Union could no longer afford to be so generous. The rather large and urgent demands imposed by Cuba intensified these troubles.

It was somewhat unexpected, therefore, when the Russians again started promising large sums for aid. Though it is unlikely that they will match the record level of 1960, they did commit themselves in late 1963 and early 1964 to $226,000,000 for Algeria, $280,000,000 for the U.A.R., several million for the Bokaro Steel Mill in India and smaller sums to Kenya, Pakistan, Cyprus,

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Tanganyika and Nepal. Two factors help explain this change, one having to do with the nature of foreign aid itself and one having to do with the international situation. First, the Russians seem caught up in what might be called the "quicksand" effect. Once they begin an aid program it is not easy to withdraw. Even though they have already promised the U.A.R. more than $500,000,000 worth of aid, they were apparently forced to extend another $280,000,000 because the Egyptians were unable to repay existing debts and were in dire need of additional funds. To do otherwise might have jeopardized the positive political effects of all Soviet aid in the past. Moreover, there is reliable evidence that this latest Soviet loan was granted over the strong objections of Soviet economic advisers. An equally if not more important factor in producing the Soviet decision was the determination to continue the advantage Moscow has had over Peking in being able to win favor with the help of economic aid. Just as countries in the past have successfully played the United States off against the Soviet Union, now they are playing the Soviet Union off against China.

The Russians may have been so busy re-assessing their successes and failures of the last decade that perhaps they have failed to notice the anniversary of their first aid program. Clearly they have learned much. They seem to be moving away from economically useless stadiums and hotels and wherever possible encouraging projects which have more economic rationality, including some that are financed on purely commercial terms. There may also be fewer large loans in the immediate future. One of the criticisms of Khrushchev was that he sometimes overcommitted his country. None the less the new Soviet leaders cannot abandon their program and most likely would not if they could. But surely one of the most painful lessons for all the Russian officials must have been the discovery that mistakes in foreign aid are not an American monopoly.

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General: Political and Legal

THE END OF ALLIANCE: AMERICA AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. By Ronald Steel. New York: Viking, 1964, 148 p. $3.75.

A former American Foreign Service officer argues with considerable skill though not always persuasively that the conditions which underlay the creation of NATO have changed vastly in subsequent years, that it may have outlived its usefulness and that American policy must not be wedded to past postures and premises. Criticisms of his argument have been directed chiefly to his treatment of the implications of thermonuclear weapons in the general power picture. A stimulating and controversial work.

A STRATEGY OF INTERDEPENDENCE. By Vincent P. Rock. New York: Scribner, 1964, 399 p. $7.50.

An ambitious and serious effort to devise a strategy, and an international setting for it, that may help control international conflict and more particularly the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The author's basic premise is of international society as a rapidly developing community.

THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA. By Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 273 p. $4.95.

A critical appraisal of the West, its limitless creative and destructive energy, its internecine conflicts and its devastating impact on the rest of the world. The prognosis is not very hopeful.

THE NEW CONCERT OF NATIONS. By C. M. Woodhouse. Chester Springs (Pa.): Dufour, 1964, 103 p. $2.95. (London: Bodley Head, 10/6.)

A brief but forceful book by a Conservative M.P. and former Director-General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs calling for effective international action to replace the current disequilibrium among nations.

REMNANTS OF EMPIRE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE END OF COLONIALISM. By David W. Wainhouse. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 156 p. $3.50 (Paper, $1.95).

A close look at what remains of the process of decolonization, with particular attention to the role of the United Nations and the policy issues for the United States. The author was closely associated with the background of these issues as a State Department official.

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WORLD PRESSURES ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Marian D. Irish. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1964, 172 p. $4.50 (Paper, $1.95).

Eminent scholars here analyze the requirements for U.S. foreign policy to meet the present-day challenges of Europe, Britain, the Communist bloc, colonialism and dictatorship, South Africa, Latin America and Asia. Their essays were originally presented at the Florida State University's 1962–63 lecture series.

THE ATLANTIC FUTURE. Edited by H. V. Hodson. London: Longmans, 1964, 129 p. 25/.

Conference papers on the Atlantic community, education, nuclear arms and other themes relating to British-American relations.

THE FOUR FACES OF PEACE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK. By Lester B. Pearson. New York: Dodd, 1964, 267 p. $4.95.

A compilation of speeches on peace and international affairs by the Canadian Prime Minister.

THE FOURTH DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY: EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS. By Philip H. Coombs. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 158 p. $3.50 (Paper, $1.95).

A former Assistant Secretary of State puts the case for a much greater emphasis on the human side of foreign policy. He assesses past efforts and advocates a considerable expansion of America's cultural contacts with other nations—Western, neutral and Communist—as an essential means of attaining the goals of American foreign policy.

POLICY PERSPECTIVES. By Henry M. Wriston. Providence: Brown University Press, 1964, 178 p. $5.00.

The former President of Brown University and of the Council on Foreign Relations has selected from his recent writings nine perceptive pieces on public policy, education and foreign affairs.

WORLD COMMUNISM: THE DISINTEGRATION OF A SECULAR FAITH. By Richard Lowenthal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 296 p. $6.00.

A leading Western student of Communist affairs, now Professor of International Relations at the Free University, West Berlin, traces what he takes to be the irreversible disintegration of world Communism over the years since 1955. Originally appeared as "Chruschtschow und der Weltkommunismus" (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1963, 245 p. DM. 9.80).

THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT. By William E. Griffith. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, 508 p. $7.95.

The Director of the International Communism Project at M.I.T. aims "to summarise, document, and give a brief and . . . preliminary analysis" of developments in Sino-Soviet relations from 1962 through November 1963. He concludes that "the rift has now attained a dynamic of its own out of which only polycentrism can result."

COMMUNISM IN EUROPE: CONTINUITY, CHANGE, AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. VOLUME I. Edited by William E. Griffith. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, 406 p. $12.50.

In this volume on recent changes in European Communism, especially in con-

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nection with the Sino-Soviet rift, the editor contributes a general introductory chapter; Viktor Meier, Hansjakob Stehle, François Fejtö and Giorgio Galli write on Jugoslav, Polish, Hungarian and Italian Communism, respectively.

BOOKS ON COMMUNISM. Edited by Walter Kolarz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 568 p. $4.80.

A very useful annotated bibliography of some 2,500 English-language publications.

HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE. By Fred Charles Iklé. New York: Harper and Row (for the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University), 1964, 274 p. $5.95.

A nice analytical study of "the process and effects of negotiation between governments." The author, now on the M.I.T. faculty, is interested in the theory of negotiation, but the book is grounded in a useful exploration of practical experience.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE AGE OF DETERRENCE. By George E. Lowe. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, 324 p. $6.75.

The author, presently in the Foreign Service, discusses the U.S. debate on strategy and defense theory since 1952. His reduction of the various positions to the dual classification of Utopian and Traditionalist is hardly helpful in dealing with a subject of such intricacy.

FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE FROM INDOCHINA TO ALGERIA. By Peter Paret. New York: Praeger (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1964, 163 p. $4.95.

A brief study of French strategic thought on how to fight the type of subversive war experienced in Indochina and Algeria.

THE FORTRESS THAT NEVER WAS: THE MYTH OF HITLER'S BAVARIAN STRONGHOLD. By Rodney G. Minott. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, 208 p. $4.95.

A harsh and not altogether persuasive indictment of American military intelligence which at the end of the last war took seriously the possibility of a German "redoubt" in Bavaria. The author claims that this was a gratuitous miscalculation which weakened our postwar political position in Central Europe.

THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN. By David Irving. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, 255 p. $4.95.

A clinical reconstruction of the bombing of Dresden on February 13 and 14, 1945, during which time British and U.S. bombers killed 135,000 people. The author (along with many others) does not believe that the raids were justified or contributed to the military effort of the Allies.

THE BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD. By Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964, 364 p. $5.95.

This personal and relatively candid account adds to our knowledge of the battle despite its obvious adherence to the Khrushchev line.

PRIDE AND POWER: THE RATIONALE OF THE SPACE PROGRAM. By Vernon Van Dyke. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964, 285 p. $6.50.

A political scientist looks into our space program to ascertain the political motives involved in its initiation, support, organization and implementation.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND SPACE LAW. Edited by Mortimer D. Schwartz. South Hackensack (N.J.): Rothman, 1964, 176 p. $6.75.

Papers presented at the conference of June 18–20, 1963, at the University of Oklahoma where legal and scientific experts met to discuss ways "to close the gap between science and law."

SCIENTISTS AND NATIONAL POLICY-MAKING. Edited by Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964, 307 p. $7.50.

A symposium on the activities of natural scientists in a growing number of areas of national policy.

General: Economic and Social

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND AMERICAN TRADE: A STUDY IN ATLANTIC ECONOMICS AND POLICY. By Randall Hinshaw. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1964, 180 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

This concisely written study covers the whole range of American trade relations with the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association. In examining the economic interest of the United States in European integration, it takes account of broad political factors. The last chapter explores major alternatives for the future of American trade policy.

THE EURO-DOLLAR SYSTEM: PRACTICE AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES. By Paul Einzig. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 162 p. $6.00.

An indefatigable English writer on financial questions gives us the fullest account yet of a major innovation in international finance. Looking at both concrete operations and broader implications of the Euro-dollar system, he finds it on balance a gain.

MONEY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER. Edited by J. Carter Murphy. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1964, 110 p. $3.00.

Three broad discussions of international monetary problems followed by two more technical studies of exchange rate issues.

TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE KENNEDY ROUND. By Stanley D. Metzger. Fairfax (Va.): Coiner Publications, 1964, 119 p./104 p., $5.95.

A valuable legal exposition of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, with sensible political and psychological commentary, followed by relevant documents.

THE COMMON MARKET: FRIEND OR COMPETITOR? By Jesse W. Markham and Others. New York: New York University Press, 1964, 123 p. $3.00.

The false antithesis of the title is not pursued in the three lectures which emphasize competition within the Community, American investment and U.S. exports.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WORLD TRADE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CHATHAM HOUSE CONFERENCE, BELLAGIO, 16–24 SEPTEMBER 1963. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 241 p. $4.80.

In advance of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development a group of economists from a number of countries, under the chairmanship of Andrew Shonfield,

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explored the central issues of trade between industrialized and underdeveloped countries. This valuable volume includes their papers, conclusions and a summary of the discussion.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND CHANGE. By H. W. Singer. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 295 p. $7.50.

A U.N. official who has long been deep in development work draws together studies made over a period of years. He examines major theoretical and practical problems of development and includes a number of papers on Africa and Northeast Brazil.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Marion Clawson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1964, 462 p. $7.50.

A collection of ten essays resulting from the 1963 Resources for the Future Forum on natural resources and world-wide economic growth.

LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS. By Gerald M. Meier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 572 p. $7.00.

Well-selected excerpts from the literature organized around some major questions.

FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By Antonín Basch. New York: Macmillan, 1964, 334 p. $6.50.

A long-time official of the World Bank analyzes the accomplishments and problems connected with the three main sources of development financing: private and government savings in underdeveloped countries and foreign aid.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY PROBLEMS, 1957–1963. By Per Jacobsson. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1964, 368 p. $2.50.

Includes most of the major speeches made by the late Swedish economist while he was Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund.

ABUNDANCE FOR WHAT? By David Riesman. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 610 p. $6.50.

This selection of Mr. Riesman's essays, written in the main during the last decade, covers a very wide variety of topics, but tends to cluster around two main themes—the cold war, and the problem of living in a society of economic abundance.

EDUCATION, MANPOWER, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT. By Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 229 p. $7.50.

This is a major effort to define the manpower needs of countries in different stages of development and the requisite priorities for education and training.

LABOUR IN THE TROPICAL TERRITORIES OF THE COMMONWEALTH. By B. C. Roberts. Durham: Duke University Press, 1964, 426 p. $6.25.

A specialist in the field of industrial relations traces the history of trade unions and their effect on the political evolution of the territories formerly in the British colonial empire. He also writes at length on the development of labor policy and administration, labor law and industrial relations. Treatment is by subject rather than by area.

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The United States

CONDUCT OF THE NEW DIPLOMACY. By James L. McCamy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 303 p. $6.50.

An admirable analysis of problems faced by the Executive Branch in administering U.S. foreign policy. The author, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, argues convincingly for quality of administration and personnel. "American diplomacy is holding its own, in many cases doing very well indeed, but it could be much more successful if it were better administered in the executive branch."

A GUIDE TO NATIONAL DEFENSE. By Lieutenant Colonel Patrick W. Powers. New York: Praeger, 1964, 326 p. $6.95.

A guide for the citizen to the U.S. defense program, its direction, employment, support and possible roles.

THE PRESIDENT AS WORLD LEADER. By Sidney Warren. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, 480 p. $6.95.

A highly readable analysis of the new responsibilities faced by the American presidents since Theodore Roosevelt. The evaluation of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's approach to foreign policy during his terms in office is of particular interest.

CONGRESS: THE SAPLESS BRANCH. By Joseph S. Clark. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 268 p. $4.95.

Senator Clark, liberal Democrat from Pennsylvania, has written a crisp, well-informed volume on the workings of both houses of Congress and offers many suggestions for reforms to increase the efficiency of Congress. He is acutely aware that these reforms will not come about until a concerned and informed public is ready to insist on basic changes.

THE JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 2 v. $20.00.

These first two volumes of Mr. Lilienthal's private journals provide an absorbing and very important contribution to our picture of the Roosevelt-Truman era. They are well written and remarkably frank about the author, his friends and his foes. The first volume, 1939–1945, covers the latter part of his directorship of the Tennessee Valley Authority; the second volume, 1945–1950, his experiences as first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Later volumes will continue this important record into the 1950s.

REMINISCENCES. By General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 438 p. $6.95.

These personal memoirs, written shortly before his death, reveal much about the personality of the late general, one of America's greatest military leaders, and provide a good deal of material for the historian, though as a source the book must be used with caution and checked against other military records.

HERBERT HOOVER. By Eugene Lyons. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 444 p. $5.95.

A largely rewritten and expanded biography first published in 1948.

AN AMERICAN EPIC. VOLUME IV: THE GUNS CEASE KILLING AND THE SAVING OF LIFE FROM FAMINE BEGINS, 1939–1963. By Herbert Hoover. Chicago: Regnery, 1964, 322 p. $7.50.

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In this fourth volume of his series on American efforts to combat famine caused by war, the late President writes of the program started in 1939 to aid the small democracies and carries the story on through postwar international efforts to provide relief from starvation.

ECONOMICS OF THE KENNEDY YEARS, AND A LOOK AHEAD. By Seymour E. Harris. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 273 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Useful as a straightforward review of major issues of economic policy, with emphasis on the points of view the author shared with other Kennedy advisers, the book is more interesting for its sidelights on the economic education of a president and who influenced what decisions.

TAGEBUCH AUS WASHINGTON. By Thilo Koch. Hamburg: Wegner, 1963–64, 3 v. DM. 29.40.

A German journalist's diary of the Washington scene from January 20, 1961, to December 10, 1963.

The Western Hemisphere

IN DEFENCE OF CANADA: FROM THE GREAT WAR TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION. By James Eayrs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964, 382 p. $7.50.

An extremely well-documented study measuring the role of the Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force in the 1920s and early 1930s. This is the first volume in a new series, "Studies in the Structure of Power: Decision-Making in Canada," sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of Canada.

RENEGADE IN POWER: THE DIEFENBAKER YEARS. By Peter C. Newman. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964, 414 p. $7.50.

A critical examination of the years in power—1957 to 1963—of Canada's buoyant, controversial Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker. Mr. Newman successfully depicts the many contradictions in the character of the Conservative leader.

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF CANADA. By Pierre Camu and Others. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 393 p. $12.50.

This reference book contains a wealth of information and data on Canada's natural and historical setting, on economic geography in general, and on the 68 individual regions into which the authors have divided the country.

THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS. By George Wythe. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964, 251 p. $5.50.

This is a sober and analytical study of hemispheric relations and the complex problems posed when one of the partners is so overwhelmingly dominant.

AMERICAN EXTREMES. By Daniel Cosío Villegas. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964, 227 p. $5.00.

Essays by an influential Mexican intellectual examining some of Latin America's internal and external problems. In the author's view, while the United States has increased its political and economic hegemony in the Western hemisphere, it has also "become the most persuasive exponent of the worst faults of Western civilization and the weakest exponent of its best achievements."

EXPLOSIVE FORCES IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by John J. TePaske and Sydney Nettleton Fisher. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964, 196 p. $4.75.

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This collection of papers, from a conference held at Ohio State University in 1962, deals with institutional and social forces responsible for change in Latin America. Of particular interest are those studies dealing with the church, by John J. Kennedy; the military, by Edwin Lieuwen; and "The Culture of Poverty," by Oscar Lewis.

POLITICS OF CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead. New York: Praeger, 1964, 258 p. $6.00.

A well-balanced collection of essays by prominent Latin American specialists, including Gilberto Freyre, Charles Wagley, Germán Arciniegas, Richard M. Morse, Víctor L. Urquidi and Stanley R. Ross.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT 1917–1963. By Rollie E. Poppino. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 247 p. $5.95.

This is a thoughtful and academic study of value to the serious student of Latin American affairs.

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1962. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Organization of American States), 1964, 444 p. $8.50.

This statistical study of the Latin American economy is prepared annually in the Department of Economic Affairs of the Pan American Union. This volume notes the progress made in developmental planning, tax and agrarian reforms, and economic integration by those nations participating in the Alliance for Progress.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA. By William Withers. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 307 p. $6.95.

With qualified optimism, the author surveys present Latin American economic conditions. He concludes that the defeat of Communism in the hemisphere depends upon intelligent U.S. leadership and upon the ability of Latin America's middle class to follow the Mexican policy of "combining Latin American nationalism with capitalism and socialism in a workable combination emphasizing capitalism."

INTEGRACIÓN DE LA AMÉRICA LATINA. Edited by Miguel S. Wionczek. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1964, 381 p.

In this valuable collection of essays leading economists from the Western hemisphere, Europe, Asia and Africa examine the problems of economic integration in Latin America. Includes an extensive bibliography and the text of the treaty establishing the Central American Common Market.

HISTORIA DEL MOVIMIENTO OBRERO EN AMÉRICA LATINA. By Víctor Alba. Mexico City: Libreros Mexicanos Unidos, 1964, 598 p.

A survey of the Latin American labor movement in which the author examines underlying ideological currents and the resulting labor organizations in the individual Latin American countries.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS. By Franklin D. Parker. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 348 p. $6.75.

A general historical survey of Central America stressing contemporary developments in each of the five republics; optimistic about future economic and political integration.

PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO. Edited by Raymond Vernon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 324 p. $6.95.

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A supplement to Professor Vernon's "The Dilemma of Mexico's Development" (1963), this collection of essays examines more closely the nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors of the Mexican economy.

THE VENEZUELAN DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE REGIME OF RÓMULO BETANCOURT. By Robert J. Alexander. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964, 345 p. $9.00.

A prolific writer on contemporary Latin American developments examines the "democratic left" in Venezuela and notes that agrarian reform has been the most fundamental economic and social change brought about by Betancourt's democratic revolution.

Western Europe

EUROPE ASCENDANT: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF UNIFICATION. By George Liska. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, 182 p. $4.50.

Drawing rather heavily on historical analogy, Professor Liska of Wesleyan tries to establish some general conclusions about the conditions of European unification and its possible forms. The result is an interesting and suggestive book that gives higher marks to de Gaulle than most American treatments of the subject. Europe's relations with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the underdeveloped countries are prominent elements in the analysis and the speculation.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD. By Max Kohnstamm. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1964, 82 p. $2.50.

An impressive Dutchman who has devoted years to European integration at the side of Jean Monnet here puts the whole process in historical perspective for Americans, and also looks ahead.

A NEW EUROPE? Edited by Stephen R. Graubard. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 691 p. $8.50.

This symposium of 26 essays, written by leading figures from academic and public life on both sides of the Atlantic, deals with some of the central aspects of Europe's cultural, social and political transformation. A valuable introduction to the study of contemporary Europe.

DIE INTEGRATION DES VERKEHRS: EUROPÄISCHE ERFAHRUNGEN UND PROBLEME. By Jacques Stohler. Basel: Kyklos-Verlag; Tübingen: Mohr, 1963, 180 p. DM. 16.50.

Unifying transportation sounds easy and is in fact very difficult. This book shows why and also provides a thoroughgoing review of what has been done so far in the Common Market.

NACH DEM UNTERGANG DES ABENDLANDES. By Herbert Lüthy. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1964, 453 p. DM. 24.80.

The author, a well-known Swiss historian, has collected a number of his essays, written over the last 20 years, on subjects ranging from Hitler's death to Brecht's, from the end of European colonialism to the demise of the Fourth Republic. The essays reflect a fine intelligence and perceptiveness.

EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, 1939–45. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964, 663 p. (New York: Macmillan, distributor, $17.50.)

This second volume on European wartime resistance contains the documented papers presented at the Second International Conference on the History of the

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Resistance Movements held in Milan in 1961. The reports are in French and in English.

A START IN FREEDOM. By Sir Hugh Foot. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 256 p. $4.95.

Sir Hugh's autobiography is an eloquent tribute to the final decades of the British colonial period, to British efforts to leave something of value to people about to receive independence, and to Britain's continuing concern for the well-being of new nations. Sir Hugh's own career with the British Colonial Service started in 1929 in Palestine; his final post was as Governor of Cyprus. He is now again at the United Nations.

LABOUR'S NEW FRONTIERS. Edited by Peter Hall. New York: London House and Maxwell, 1964, 180 p. $7.50 (Paper, $3.25).

Ten essays, by men close to the Labor Party, who try to define Britain's problems and Labor's possible answers, and who seek collectively to remedy what one contributor calls the "constrictedness of imagination and aspiration" prevalent in British society today.

PURPOSE IN POLITICS. By Harold Wilson. Boston: Houghton, 1964, 270 p. $4.95.

The speeches and articles which Britain's new Prime Minister collected for this volume illustrate his style and thought. He elaborates his rather mild conception of socialism and his views on Labor's economic and foreign policies.

PROCONSUL IN POLITICS: A STUDY OF LORD MILNER IN OPPOSITION AND IN POWER. By A. M. Gollin. New York: Macmillan, 1964, 627 p. $12.00.

An important and thorough study. Lord Milner's role in the First World War and his response to the Russian Revolutions of 1917 are of particular interest.

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DU GAULLISME. By Paul Reynaud. Paris: Julliard, 1964, 269 p. Fr. 15.

An important and eloquent indictment of de Gaulle's foreign policy, by an erstwhile supporter and former Prime Minister. He views de Gaulle's European course as a disaster and concludes that his policies are inspired by chimeras and resentments. A translation has appeared under the title "The Foreign Policy of Charles de Gaulle" (New York: Odyssey Press, 1964, 160 p. $3.95).

COMMUNISM AND THE FRENCH INTELLECTUALS, 1914–1960. By David Caute. New York: Macmillan, 1964, 412 p. $10.00.

The most detailed and judicious study of the relations of Western intellectuals to Communism yet written. The author, a young English historian, sets the story in the broadest context and even tries to assess what happened to the work of individual intellectuals because of their adherence to Communism.

LA MAL-AIMÉE. By Joseph Barsalou. Paris: Plon, 1964, 333 p. Fr. 16.50.

A political history of the Fourth Republic, focused largely on the men who ran it, and on the Communists and Gaullists who sought to wreck it. The author, a leading journalist, acknowledges its many achievements, especially in the domestic sphere.

CRISIS AND COMPROMISE. By Philip M. Williams. Hamden (Conn.): Shoe String Press, 1964, 546 p. $11.50.

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A brilliant and highly readable analysis of the political machinery of the Fourth Republic, by an English scholar who knows France exceptionally well. This book encompasses entirely revised parts of his earlier "Politics in Post-War France" (1954) and the addition of 11 new chapters.

LES CONSÉQUENCES D'ORDRE INTERNE DE LA PARTICIPATION DE LA BELGIQUE AUX ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1964, 366 p. Belgian Fr. 400.

Distinguished civil servants and academics contributed to this pioneering study of the effects of Belgium's participation in international organizations on its domestic institutions. Particular attention is paid to the several divisions of the government, including the judiciary, and to such non-governmental groups as political parties, trade unions and the press.

OFFENSIVE ENTSPANNUNG: MÖGLICHKEIT FÜR DEUTSCHLAND. By Peter Bender. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1964, 172 p. DM. 9.80.

An important and provocative plea for a different West German policy toward East Germany. The author argues that only a stable East Germany could become more liberal—hence Bonn should contemplate possible means for increasing contacts with East Germany. *Der Spiegel* has serialized large parts of this controversial tract.

THE BURDEN OF GUILT: A SHORT HISTORY OF GERMANY, 1914–1945. By Hannah Vogt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 318 p. $6.00.

A candid survey, originally designed for German students.

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, 1918–1933. By Richard N. Hunt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 292 p. $7.50.

This careful account of the internal machinery of the largest democratic party in Weimar Germany explains the weaknesses which beset the party and thus burdened the first German Republic.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND NAZI GERMANY. By Guenter Lewy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964, 416 p. $7.50.

A major contribution to a bitter and important controversy. The author, a political scientist, had access to some hitherto unused sources. He more often indicts than explains Catholic accommodation to Hitler's régime.

JUGEND, EROS, POLITIK. By Harry Pross. Berne: Scherz, 1964, 520 p. Swiss Fr. 28.

A sensitive study of the German youth movements of the last 60 years.

THE ITALIANS. By Luigi Barzini. New York: Atheneum, 1964, 352 p. $6.95.

A highly entertaining, civilized but ultimately quite serious and even somber appraisal of Italian life today, by a distinguished journalist and Liberal deputy in the Italian Parliament.

LE PARTI DÉMOCRATE-CHRÉTIEN ITALIEN. By Thierry Godechot. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1964, 303 p. Fr. 37.60.

An important, scholarly inquiry into the various aspects of Italy's leading party.

INTEREST GROUPS IN ITALIAN POLITICS. By Joseph LaPalombara. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 452 p. $8.50.

A political scientist examines the impact of Italian interest groups on politics, with particular emphasis on the Confederation of Italian Industry and on Catholic

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Action, and relates his findings to the surprisingly elaborate theory of interest groups which his colleagues have developed.

THE SIX-LEGGED DOG: MATTEI AND ENI—A STUDY IN POWER. By Dow Votaw. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 172 p. $4.00.

This is a good start toward understanding the blend of politics, finance and entrepreneurship exhibited by Italy's government-owned energy corporation and its first president, the late Enrico Mattei.

THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL DELGADO. London: Cassell, 1964, 234 p. 36/.

Rambling thoughts and recollections of one of Salazar's leading opponents, now in exile.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SCALING THE WALL: TALKING TO EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by George R. Urban. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964, 303 p. $7.95.

An interesting mélange of pieces on ideology, literature, politics and economics in Communist Eastern Europe, largely a selection of broadcasts from R.F.E.'s "radio university." An English edition appeared under the title "Talking to Eastern Europe" (London: Eyre, 1964, 303 p. 25/).

STUDIEN ZUM WIRTSCHAFTSWACHSTUM SÜDOSTEUROPAS. By T. Surányi-Unger. Stuttgart: Fischer, 1964, 216 p. DM. 29.50.

On economic growth in Communist Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania.

THE SOVIETS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, 380 p. $7.50.

A useful and well-documented study of post-Stalinist Soviet policies and actions in those agencies and commissions of the U.N. having chiefly to do with underdeveloped countries.

THE RISE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE. By Jan Librach. New York: Praeger, 1964, 382 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.50).

A useful outline, by a former Polish diplomat, of the history of Soviet foreign policy.

ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND SOVIET POLITICS: OR, WAS STALIN REALLY NECESSARY? By Alec Nove. New York: Praeger, 1964, 316 p. $8.50.

A welcome collection of perceptive and informative papers by a leading British student of the Soviet economy. The general theme is indicated by the title and subtitle.

THE RED ARMY. By Edgar O'Ballance. New York: Praeger, 1964, 237 p. $7.50.

A concise, though somewhat uneven history and appraisal of the Soviet armed forces, by a British officer and military author.

RUSSIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. By S. V. Utechin. New York: Praeger, 1964, 320 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

A concise introduction to Russian political thought from medieval times to the present.

THE STORY OF A LIFE. By Konstantin Paustovsky. New York: Pantheon, 1964, 661 p. $10.00.

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Vivid memoirs of imperial Russia, war and revolution by a leading and respected Soviet writer, now in his seventies.

THE TRANSFER OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS: A STUDY OF CZECH-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1933–1962. By Radomír Luža. New York: New York University Press, 1964, 365 p. $7.50.

A member of the Czech government-in-exile during the war discusses the historical background for the Czech expulsion of the Sudeten Germans in 1945.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA. VOLUME ONE. By Ivan Avakumovic. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1964, 207 p. 60/.

This first volume of a scholarly history carries the story up to the beginning of 1941, by which time this singularly faction-ridden body had been purged and Bolshevized.

COMMUNISM IN RUMANIA, 1944–1962. By Ghita Ionescu. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 378 p. $7.20.

An able, scholarly and much needed study which provides a history both of the Rumanian Communist Party, one of the least known in Eastern Europe, and of Rumania's vicissitudes under the Communist régime.

BULGARIEN HEUTE: ROTES LAND AM SCHWARZEN MEER. By Heinz Siegert. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1964, 269 p. DM. 19.80.

A Viennese journalist's informative account of contemporary Bulgaria.

The Middle East

ASIA: AWAKENING OF A WORLD. By François d'Harcourt. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964, 295 p. $6.95.

A French journalist's depthless but lively narrative of an exploratory journey in 1961 from Galilee to Japan.

THE ARABS: A NARRATIVE HISTORY FROM MOHAMMED TO THE PRESENT. By Anthony Nutting. New York: Potter, 1964. 424 p. $6.00.

This well-written chronicle in the kings-and-wars tradition may be open to criticism in details of fact and interpretation but remains a useful general history of this "volcanic" and "unpredictable" people. The author, who resigned as British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in protest against Eden's policy during the Suez crisis of 1956, has also written "Lawrence of Arabia."

INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. By Z. Y. Hershlag. Leyden: Brill, 1964, 419 p. Gldrs. 64.

An important study in a relatively neglected field designed to provide a framework for further researches in economic history of the modern Middle East and a background for the author's own forthcoming volume on the present-day economic structure of the region.

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN, IRAN AND TURKEY. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964, 454 p. (New York: Macmillan, distributor, $7.50.)

Prefaced by an account of the structure of science in Western countries, these papers presented at a 1962 symposium provide brief accounts of scientific activities

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in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, scientific collaboration, and recommendations for the future.

THE KURDS AND KURDISTAN. By Derk Kinnane. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1964, 85 p. $1.95 (Paper).

A well-done introductory essay with a chapter on the war in Iraq bringing the story up to mid-June 1964.

THE NATIONAL INCOME OF IRAQ, 1953–1961. By K. Haseeb. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 184 p. $6.75.

The author, Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq, combines unreliable official statistics, private information and shrewd judgment in arriving at this estimate of the Iraqi national income. Of interest to those concerned with the Middle East and with the process of economic development.

PERSIA REVISITED. By Anne Sinclair Mehdevi. New York: Knopf, 1964, 271 p. $4.95.

The author of "Persian Adventure" writes with perceptive and affectionate charm of her numerous Persian family after 11 years away.

INDUSTRIAL FINANCE IN IRAN. By Richard Elliot Benedick. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1964, 274 p. $5.00.

A first-rate study of the financial sector of a developing economy and at the same time an intimate portrait of modern Iran.

IMPERIAL OUTPOST—ADEN. By Gillian King. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 93 p. $1.40 (Paper).

A brief examination of present realities and uncertain future prospects of the British position in Aden, ending with the question: Is this base really necessary?

ABU DHABI: BIRTH OF AN OIL SHEIKHDOM. By Major Clarence Mann. Beirut: Khayats, 1964, 152 p. L.L.15.

A modest initial history by a U.S. Army officer.

NATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION IN EGYPT. By Christina Phelps Harris. The Hague: Mouton (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1964, 276 p. Gldrs. 22.

A careful study of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the militant fundamentalist organization dedicated to radical nationalism and reform on an Islamic basis ("The *Qur'an* is our constitution!") that very nearly wrested control of Egypt from Colonel Nasser and his revolutionary government in 1954. The movement was suppressed in Egypt, but as Professor Harris points out, the problem of finding a workable synthesis between Islamic precept and modern need remains.

L'ÉGYPTE NASSÉRIENNE. By Hassan Riad. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1964, 249 p. Fr. 13.50.

An Egyptian Marxist examines modern Egypt and Nasser's "petit-bourgeois" régime with a critical doctrinaire eye.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE RISE OF CHINA. By Wayne A. Wilcox. New York: Walker, 1964, 144 p. $4.50.

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A specialist in South Asian affairs describes his book as "essentially a critique of Indian foreign policy which argues that India since independence has forfeited regional security in the interest of international status." He relates India's heritage, policy and position to the entire South Asian international system and shows the effects on that system of the rise of Red China.

OUR CREDULITY AND NEGLIGENCE. By A. G. Noorani. Bombay: Ramdas G. Bhatkal, 1963, 167 p. Rs. 3.

Mr. Noorani is an Indian constitutional lawyer and specialist in Sino-Indian relations who, at the request of Indians for Victory, made an extensive study of the legal and historical events leading up to the military invasion of India by Communist China. The result is a documented critique of India's policies from the Tibetan affair in 1950 to the invasion of India in October 1962.

INDIA AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA. By Sisir Gupta. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, 155 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $6.00.)

Mr. Gupta, Research Secretary at the Indian Council of World Affairs and one of India's best scholars in politics and foreign affairs, after analyzing the assumptions and motivations of India's foreign policy, discusses past attempts at coöperation with other Asian states and the problems impeding successful regional integration. A small but important work.

EIGHT NATION MAKERS: SOUTHEAST ASIA'S CHARISMATIC STATESMEN. By Willard A. Hanna. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 307 p. $6.50.

Biographic interpretations of the key figures in the making of modern Southeast Asian history and society.

MÉMOIRES: L'INDOCHINE DANS LA TOURMENTE. By Général d'Armée Paul Ély. Paris: Plon, 1964, 363 p. Fr. 18.50.

The first of three projected volumes of memoirs covers the General's years as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (October 1953–June 1954) and as Commissioner-General and Commander-in-Chief (1954–1955). Particularly important for evaluating the roles of the U.S. and France in the conflict.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY, WITH EMPHASIS ON VIET-NAM. By R. W. Lindholm. Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 1964, 139 p. $4.50.

The Dean of the University of Oregon Business School spent considerable time, from 1952 to 1961, as economic adviser to Southeast Asian governments. This book, drawn from his lectures and writings, discusses first the general problems of development faced by all emerging nations and then the problems of taxation policies, land reform and finance in Pakistan, Korea and especially South Viet Nam.

INDONESIA. By Bruce Grant. Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 190 p. $5.50.

A highly readable, undocumented political interpretation of Indonesia by an Australian journalist, based largely on articles he wrote during 14 visits to the country. He notes the weakening opposition to the Sukarno government and "an acceptance, short of fervent support, for Sukarno."

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EAST

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ASIA. Edited by Kenneth Berrill. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 434 p. $12.00.

Papers submitted at the International Economic Association meeting held at Gamagori, Japan, together with summaries of discussions of the papers by economists specializing in growth and development in East Asia. Emphasis is on Japan and India.

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA. By William L. Tung. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964, 408 p. Gldrs. 36.

A former official and professor under the Nationalist régime outlines his country's twentieth-century constitutional development and governmental structure to 1928, and then analyzes Nationalist and Communist political ideologies, institutions and programs.

COMMUNIST CHINA: THE EARLY YEARS, 1949–55. By A. Doak Barnett. New York: Praeger, 1964, 336 p. $6.95.

A leading student of contemporary China bases this book on his reports written on the Mainland at the time of the Communist takeover of China, and later from the vantage point of Hong Kong. He covers the period from late 1949 to early 1955: the period of reconstruction, development of the First Five Year Plan, and the first years of the transition to socialism. An August 1964 epilogue describes the slackening pace of the revolutionary struggle and concludes: "In sum, while China today is vastly different from what it was in 1949, it is still only a nation ruled by Communists. It has not yet become a Communist nation."

THE COMMUNISM OF MAO TSE-TUNG. By Arthur A. Cohen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, 210 p. $5.00.

An important book whose purpose is to delineate Mao's view of Communism in order to judge the validity of his eulogists' claims that his contributions to Communist doctrine and revolutionary practice are innovations which depart importantly from the "classical traditions." Mr. Cohen, using Chinese and Russian sources, concludes that Mao's originality lies in the *practice* of Communism, and that he has added little that is new to its basic theories.

CHINA ASSIGNMENT. By Karl Lott Rankin. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, 343 p. $6.95.

Mr. Rankin was U.S. Consul General in Canton and Hong Kong at the time of the Chinese Communist takeover of the Mainland, and subsequently Minister and Ambassador to the Nationalist Government. His is a sincerely conceived history of U.S. relations with China during the decade 1949–1959. Recognizing the shortcomings of the Chiang régime, he considers American support of it essential.

SOVIET SCIENTIST IN RED CHINA. By Mikhail A. Klochko. New York: Praeger, 1964, 213 p. $4.95.

An intriguing account by a Soviet scientist (now living under political asylum in Canada) of his visits to China in 1958 and 1960 to help develop new research and laboratory facilities. He is highly critical of the organization of Chinese science and technology and of conditions of scientific work there. Unfortunately he concluded, among other things, that "it will be a long time before China joins the nuclear club."

A CURTAIN OF IGNORANCE. By Felix Greene. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964, 340 p. $5.50.

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Although he says that he has found no evidence of a "conscious conspiracy" by the American press, specialists and politicians deliberately to misinform the American public about both Chinas, Mr. Greene, formerly head of B.B.C.'s New York office, seems out to prove that there is one.

AN INSTANCE OF TREASON: OZAKI HOTSUMI AND THE SORGE SPY RING. By Chalmers Johnson. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 278 p. $6.50.

A thorough account, by a University of California political scientist, of the life and work of the Comintern's ranking spy in Japan (concurrently China expert and adviser to high government executives). Based primarily on Japanese-language sources, police and court records, and unpublished private materials.

AUSTRALIAN PARTY POLITICS. By James Jupp. Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 235 p. $7.50.

A book intended for general use on political parties in Australia in the last 75 years, stressing those points that have contemporary relevance. Emphasis is on the relationship between the party machine and the parliamentarians and on the organizational structure and policies of the parties.

Africa

FEDERALISM AND THE NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA. Edited by David P. Currie. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, 440 p. $8.50.

Papers by African scholars on various regions of Africa are complemented by essays on federalism, economic advance, human rights and international legal relations.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN TROPICAL AFRICA. Edited by James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, 730 p. $10.00.

Essays by leading authorities, principally political scientists, emphasizing the role of political parties and groups in national integration. In its conclusion the book opens new theoretical prospects and provides guidelines for further analysis.

AFRICAN SOCIALISM. Edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace), 1964, 313 p. $6.75.

This interdisciplinary approach to African socialism is enhanced by the inclusion of articles by African leaders setting forth their own interpretations.

AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES AND WESTERN TRADITION. By Eric Ashby. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 113 p. $2.95.

These thoughtful and perceptive essays challenge many of the premises on which African universities have been founded and set forth patterns of adaptation which merit wide consideration.

A HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS. Edited by Helen Kitchen. New York: Praeger (for the African-American Institute), 1964, 311 p. $6.00 (Paper, $2.25).

A comprehensive and concise compendium drawn in great part from the authoritative journal *Africa Report;* Mrs. Kitchen is the journal's editor.

L'ISLAM NOIR. By Vincent Monteil. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964, 367 p. Fr. 21.

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A fascinating survey of the particular attributes of Islam as interpreted and practiced in black Africa.

L'ALGÉRIE QUI SE CHERCHE. By Daniel Guérin. Paris: Présence Africaine, 1964, 105 p. Fr. 5.70.

A lucid and sympathetic account of Algeria in 1963 by a pioneer French anti-colonialist.

OÙ VA L'ALGÉRIE? By Mohamed Boudiaf. Paris: Éditions Librairie de l'Étoile, 1964, 208 p. Fr. 11.67.

One of the top leaders of the Algerian revolution, imprisoned by the French in the period 1956–62, tells the story of his imprisonment by the present régime in Algeria in 1963 and explains his militant opposition to it.

POLITICS IN GHANA: 1946–1960. By Dennis Austin. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 459 p. $10.10.

This superb political history combines factual richness with felicity of style.

THE KATANGA CIRCUS: A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THREE UN WARS. By Mugur Valahu. New York: Speller, 1964, 364 p. $6.00.

An impassioned advocate of Katanga's separatism castigates the role of the United Nations.

PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICE: AN EAST AFRICAN STUDY. PAFMECSA 1958–1964. By Richard Cox. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1964, 95 p. $1.95 (Paper).

A somewhat uncritical examination of attempts made by the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa toward political unity.

WITH FORKS AND HOPE: AN AFRICAN NOTEBOOK. By Elspeth Huxley. New York: Morrow, 1964, 398 p. $5.95.

In her inimitable style Mrs. Huxley examines East African peoples and places and concludes with an optimistic prognosis.

WELENSKY'S 4000 DAYS: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND. By Sir Roy Welensky. London: Collins, 1964, 383 p. 36/.

The former Prime Minister of the extinct Federation gives his personal account of its formation and dissolution. A controversial book, colloquially written, it merits a place, as an invaluable historical document, with more objective studies of the Federation.

THE AFRICAN PATRIOTS. By Mary Benson. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1964, 310 p. $5.95.

Miss Benson's history of the African National Congress is the first detailed treatment of a South African political party to be published and is based on first-hand information from a witness whose testimony is no less valid for being biased.

THE GREAT RED ISLAND. By Arthur Stratton. New York: Scribner, 1964, 368 p. $7.50.

A charming, personal and informative account of Madagascar.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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A New course in South Africa; report of the group of experts established in pursuance of the Security Council resolution of 4 December 1963. N.Y., 1964. 35 p. (64.I.13.) 25¢.

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

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